fix: security hardening - CEI pattern, over-withdrawal guard, debt settlement#13
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giwaov wants to merge 1 commit intocirclefin:masterfrom
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fix: security hardening - CEI pattern, over-withdrawal guard, debt settlement#13giwaov wants to merge 1 commit intocirclefin:masterfrom
giwaov wants to merge 1 commit intocirclefin:masterfrom
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…ttlement - Fix reentrancy risk in _executeRefund by setting refunded=true before external transfer call (checks-effects-interactions pattern) (circlefin#12) - Add cumulative withdrawal check in earlyWithdrawByArbiter to prevent over-withdrawal via repeated calls (circlefin#11) - Add _settleDebt call in refundByRecipient to prevent debt bypass (circlefin#10)
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Summary
This PR addresses three security vulnerabilities in RefundProtocol.sol:
1. Reentrancy risk in _executeRefund (fixes #12)
The _executeRefund\ function performed an external \ iatToken.transfer()\ call before updating \payments[paymentID].refunded = true. This violates the checks-effects-interactions (CEI) pattern and opens a reentrancy vector if the token contract is malicious or upgradeable.
Fix: Move the state update (\payments[paymentID].refunded = true) before the external transfer call.
2. Over-withdrawal via repeated earlyWithdrawByArbiter calls (fixes #11)
The \earlyWithdrawByArbiter\ function checks \withdrawalAmount > payment.amount\ per payment but never validates the cumulative withdrawn amount. An arbiter could call this function multiple times to withdraw more than the payment amount.
Fix: Add a cumulative check: \payment.withdrawnAmount + withdrawalAmount > payment.amount.
3. Debt bypass in refundByRecipient (fixes #10)
The
efundByRecipient\ function does not call _settleDebt(msg.sender)\ before checking and deducting the recipient's balance, unlike \withdraw()\ which does settle debt first. This means a recipient with outstanding debt can get a full refund without settling.
Fix: Add _settleDebt(msg.sender)\ call before the balance check, matching the pattern in \withdraw().
Testing
All 36 existing tests pass:
\
forge test -vv
36 passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped
\\
Changes