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13 changes: 4 additions & 9 deletions .jules/sentinel.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -1,9 +1,4 @@
## 2025-05-13 - [SQL Injection Risk via sql.raw in Bulk Insert Retrieval]
**Vulnerability:** A potential SQL injection vulnerability in `createMany` inside `packages/core/src/db/repositories/tasks.ts`. The code used `sql.raw` to interpolate task IDs into an `IN` clause manually without parameterization.
**Learning:** Using `sql.raw` to join dynamically generated strings (like UUID arrays) bypasses Drizzle's parameterization, exposing the app to SQL injection if any ID string is manipulated.
**Prevention:** Always use Drizzle ORM's built-in parameterization functions like `inArray` instead of manual string concatenation or `sql.raw`.

## 2024-05-21 - [CRITICAL] Fix config.yaml file permissions
**Vulnerability:** The daemon configuration file (`~/.agor/config.yaml`) and its parent directory (`~/.agor`) were created with default file permissions (e.g., `0o755`/`0o644`), which made them readable by other users on the system. This file stores extremely sensitive information such as API keys and master JWT secrets.
**Learning:** Default Node.js filesystem operations (`fs.writeFile` and `fs.mkdir`) do not enforce strict permissions unless explicitly specified with a `mode` parameter. When handling sensitive files, relying on the system `umask` is insufficient.
**Prevention:** Always specify `mode: 0o600` for sensitive files and `mode: 0o700` for their parent directories. Additionally, use `fs.chmod` to retroactively secure existing files and directories that might have been created with permissive defaults.
## 2025-02-26 - [Command Injection via String Interpolation in Unix Commands]
**Vulnerability:** The `unixUserExists` function in `@agor/core/unix/user-manager.ts` used `execSync` with a string interpolated `username` variable directly passed to a shell (`/bin/sh`). This allowed a malicious or unexpected username input to execute arbitrary commands.
**Learning:** Functions that accept dynamic inputs like usernames, paths, or variables must never use shell-interpreted execution (`execSync`, `exec`) directly without proper argument splitting and parameterization.
**Prevention:** Always use `execFileSync` or `execFile` with an array of arguments, utilizing the `--` separator to signify the end of command options and the beginning of raw inputs.
22 changes: 11 additions & 11 deletions packages/core/src/unix/user-manager.test.ts
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -27,14 +27,14 @@ import {
validateResolvedUnixUser,
} from './user-manager.js';

// Mock execSync for system-dependent tests
// Mock execFileSync for system-dependent tests
vi.mock('node:child_process', () => ({
execSync: vi.fn(),
execFileSync: vi.fn(),
}));

import { execSync } from 'node:child_process';
import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process';

const mockedExecSync = vi.mocked(execSync);
const mockedExecFileSync = vi.mocked(execFileSync);

describe('user-manager', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -309,18 +309,18 @@ describe('user-manager', () => {
// =========================================================================

describe('unixUserExists (mocked)', () => {
// Note: These tests use mocked execSync since we can't create real users
// Note: These tests use mocked execFileSync since we can't create real users

it('returns true when user exists', async () => {
mockedExecSync.mockReturnValueOnce(Buffer.from('')); // Success (no throw)
mockedExecFileSync.mockReturnValueOnce(Buffer.from('')); // Success (no throw)

// Import fresh to use mock
const { unixUserExists } = await import('./user-manager.js');
expect(unixUserExists('root')).toBe(true);
});

it('returns false when user does not exist', async () => {
mockedExecSync.mockImplementationOnce(() => {
mockedExecFileSync.mockImplementationOnce(() => {
throw new Error('id: nonexistent: no such user');
});

Expand Down Expand Up @@ -456,7 +456,7 @@ describe('user-manager', () => {
});

it('validates user exists for strict mode', () => {
mockedExecSync.mockImplementationOnce(() => {
mockedExecFileSync.mockImplementationOnce(() => {
throw new Error('no such user');
});

Expand All @@ -466,7 +466,7 @@ describe('user-manager', () => {
});

it('validates user exists for insulated mode', () => {
mockedExecSync.mockImplementationOnce(() => {
mockedExecFileSync.mockImplementationOnce(() => {
throw new Error('no such user');
});

Expand All @@ -482,13 +482,13 @@ describe('user-manager', () => {
});

it('passes when user exists', () => {
mockedExecSync.mockReturnValueOnce(Buffer.from('')); // user exists
mockedExecFileSync.mockReturnValueOnce(Buffer.from('')); // user exists

expect(() => validateResolvedUnixUser('strict', 'alice')).not.toThrow();
});

it('error message includes mode context', () => {
mockedExecSync.mockImplementationOnce(() => {
mockedExecFileSync.mockImplementationOnce(() => {
throw new Error('no such user');
});

Expand Down
4 changes: 2 additions & 2 deletions packages/core/src/unix/user-manager.ts
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* @see context/guides/rbac-and-unix-isolation.md
*/

import { execSync } from 'node:child_process';
import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process';
import type { UnixUserMode } from '../config/types.js';
import { formatShortId } from '../lib/ids.js';
import type { UserID, UUID } from '../types/index.js';
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ export class UnixUserNotFoundError extends Error {
*/
export function unixUserExists(username: string): boolean {
try {
execSync(`id "${username}" > /dev/null 2>&1`, { stdio: 'pipe' });
execFileSync('id', ['--', username], { stdio: 'ignore' });
return true;
} catch {
return false;
Expand Down