Add service-name check and regress test

src/internal.c

@@ -8345,7 +8345,8 @@ static int DoUserAuthRequest(WOLFSSH* ssh,
 {
     word32 begin;
     int ret = WS_SUCCESS;
-    byte authNameId;
+    byte authNameId = ID_UNKNOWN;
+    int serviceValid = 1;
     WS_UserAuthData authData;
 
     WLOG(WS_LOG_DEBUG, "Entering DoUserAuthRequest()");
@@ -8356,37 +8357,32 @@ static int DoUserAuthRequest(WOLFSSH* ssh,
     if (ret == WS_SUCCESS) {
         begin = *idx;
         WMEMSET(&authData, 0, sizeof(authData));
-        ret = GetSize(&authData.usernameSz, buf, len, &begin);
-    }
-
-    if (ret == WS_SUCCESS) {
-        authData.username = buf + begin;
-        begin += authData.usernameSz;
-
-        ret = GetUint32(&authData.serviceNameSz, buf, len, &begin);
+        ret = GetStringRef(&authData.usernameSz, &authData.username,
+                buf, len, &begin);
     }
 
     if (ret == WS_SUCCESS) {
-        ret = wolfSSH_SetUsernameRaw(ssh, authData.username, authData.usernameSz);
+        ret = GetStringRef(&authData.serviceNameSz, &authData.serviceName,
+                buf, len, &begin);
     }
 
     if (ret == WS_SUCCESS) {
-        if (authData.serviceNameSz > len - begin) {
-            ret = WS_BUFFER_E;
+        if (NameToId((const char*)authData.serviceName, authData.serviceNameSz)
+                != ID_SERVICE_CONNECTION) {
+            WLOG(WS_LOG_DEBUG, "DUAR: Invalid service name");
+            serviceValid = 0;
+            ret = SendUserAuthFailure(ssh, 0);
+            /* Consume all remaining data */
+            *idx = len;
+        }
+        else {
+            ret = GetStringRef(&authData.authNameSz, &authData.authName,
+                    buf, len, &begin);
         }
     }
 
-    if (ret == WS_SUCCESS) {
-        authData.serviceName = buf + begin;
-        begin += authData.serviceNameSz;
-
-        ret = GetSize(&authData.authNameSz, buf, len, &begin);
-    }
-
-    if (ret == WS_SUCCESS) {
-        authData.authName = buf + begin;
-        begin += authData.authNameSz;
-        authNameId = NameToId((char*)authData.authName, authData.authNameSz);
+    if (ret == WS_SUCCESS && serviceValid) {
+        authNameId = NameToId((const char*)authData.authName, authData.authNameSz);
         ssh->authId = authNameId;
 
         if (authNameId == ID_USERAUTH_PASSWORD)
@@ -8409,11 +8405,14 @@ static int DoUserAuthRequest(WOLFSSH* ssh,
 #endif
         else {
             WLOG(WS_LOG_DEBUG,
-                 "invalid userauth type: %s", IdToName(authNameId));
+                 "DUAR: invalid userauth type: %s", IdToName(authNameId));
             ret = SendUserAuthFailure(ssh, 0);
+            /* Consume all remaining data */
+            begin = len;
         }
 
         if (ret == WS_SUCCESS) {
+            /* Set the username for valid service only */
             ret = wolfSSH_SetUsernameRaw(ssh,
                     authData.username, authData.usernameSz);
         }
@@ -17976,6 +17975,12 @@ int wolfSSH_TestChannelPutData(WOLFSSH_CHANNEL* channel, byte* data,
     return ChannelPutData(channel, data, dataSz);
 }
 
+int wolfSSH_TestDoUserAuthRequest(WOLFSSH* ssh, byte* buf, word32 len,
+        word32* idx)
+{
+    return DoUserAuthRequest(ssh, buf, len, idx);
+}
+
 #ifndef WOLFSSH_NO_DH_GEX_SHA256
 
 int wolfSSH_TestDoKexDhGexRequest(WOLFSSH* ssh, byte* buf, word32 len,

tests/unit.c

@@ -1181,13 +1181,25 @@ static int test_ChannelPutData(void)
     return result;
 }
 
+/* Plaintext SSH packet from IoSend (before encryption/MAC): LENGTH_SZ,
+ * PAD_LENGTH_SZ, then payload starting with the message ID (RFC 4253;
+ * wolfSSH PreparePacket/BundlePacket). Not for encrypted payloads or
+ * arbitrary truncated chunks. */
+static int CaptureMsgId(const byte* buf, word32 len)
+{
+    word32 off = LENGTH_SZ + PAD_LENGTH_SZ;
+
+    if (len <= off)
+        return -1;
+    return (int)buf[off];
+}
+
 /* Verify DoChannelRequest sends CHANNEL_SUCCESS for known types and
  * CHANNEL_FAILURE for unrecognized ones (RFC 4254 Section 5.4).
  *
  * A custom IoSend callback captures the outgoing packet in plaintext
- * (no cipher negotiated on a fresh session). The SSH packet layout is:
- *   [4-byte packet_length][1-byte padding_length][1-byte msg_id]...
- * so the message ID lives at byte offset 5. */
+ * (no cipher negotiated on a fresh session). Message ID is read via
+ * CaptureMsgId() using LENGTH_SZ + PAD_LENGTH_SZ. */
 static byte   s_chanReqCapture[256];
 static word32 s_chanReqCaptureSz = 0;
 
@@ -1289,20 +1301,204 @@ static int test_DoChannelRequest(void)
             goto done;
         }
 
-        if (s_chanReqCaptureSz <= 5) {
-            printf("DoChannelRequest[%s]: captured packet too short (%u)\n",
-                    cases[i].label, s_chanReqCaptureSz);
-            result = -410 - i;
+        {
+            int capMsgId = CaptureMsgId(s_chanReqCapture, s_chanReqCaptureSz);
+
+            if (capMsgId < 0) {
+                printf("DoChannelRequest[%s]: captured packet too short (%u)\n",
+                        cases[i].label, s_chanReqCaptureSz);
+                result = -410 - i;
+                goto done;
+            }
+
+            if (capMsgId != (int)cases[i].expectMsgId) {
+                printf("DoChannelRequest[%s]: msg_id=0x%02x, expected=0x%02x\n",
+                        cases[i].label,
+                        capMsgId, cases[i].expectMsgId);
+                result = -420 - i;
+                goto done;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+done:
+    wolfSSH_free(ssh);
+    wolfSSH_CTX_free(ctx);
+    return result;
+}
+
+/* Capture buffer for the service-name unit test. Separate from the channel-
+ * request capture so the two tests can run independently in any order. */
+static byte   s_authSvcCapture[256];
+static word32 s_authSvcCaptureSz = 0;
+static word32 s_authSvcSendCount = 0;
+
+static int CaptureIoSendAuthSvc(WOLFSSH* ssh, void* buf, word32 sz, void* ctx)
+{
+    (void)ssh; (void)ctx;
+    s_authSvcCaptureSz = (sz < (word32)sizeof(s_authSvcCapture))
+                         ? sz : (word32)sizeof(s_authSvcCapture);
+    WMEMCPY(s_authSvcCapture, buf, s_authSvcCaptureSz);
+    s_authSvcSendCount++;
+    return (int)sz;
+}
+
+/* Verify DoUserAuthRequest rejects non-"ssh-connection" service names per
+ * RFC 4252 Section 5.  For each case we assert:
+ *   1. ret == WS_SUCCESS (connection stays open for retry)
+ *   2. SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE is actually sent (see CaptureMsgId():
+ *      LENGTH_SZ + PAD_LENGTH_SZ then msg id)
+ *   3. *idx == len (entire payload consumed; buffer stays aligned)
+ *
+ * For invalid-service cases the auth-method field is intentionally omitted
+ * from the payload.  DoUserAuthRequest must short-circuit at the service-name
+ * check and still satisfy all three assertions — proving it never tries to
+ * parse the missing auth-method field.  If the short-circuit were absent,
+ * GetSize() for authNameSz would hit end-of-buffer and return WS_BUFFER_E,
+ * failing assertion 1.
+ *
+ * For the valid-service case, auth method "xyz-unknown" (always unsupported
+ * regardless of compile-time options) is included.  The function reaches
+ * auth-method dispatch, falls to the unknown-method else-branch, and sends
+ * USERAUTH_FAILURE via that normal path.
+ *
+ * A second valid-service row appends fake password-style bytes after the
+ * method name.  That proves DoUserAuthRequest() consumes trailing
+ * method-specific payload (begin = len in the unknown-method branch); without
+ * it, DoReceive() could advance inputBuffer.idx short of the packet end and
+ * misalign decoding. */
+static const byte s_unknownAuthTrailingFakePassword[] = {
+    0x00, /* "change password" FALSE */
+    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08,
+    'p', 'a', 's', 's', 'w', 'o', 'r', 'd',
+};
+
+static int test_DoUserAuthRequest_serviceName(void)
+{
+    WOLFSSH_CTX* ctx = NULL;
+    WOLFSSH* ssh = NULL;
+    int result = 0;
+    struct {
+        const char* svcName;
+        word32      svcNameSz;
+        const char* authMethod;   /* NULL = omit field (proves short-circuit) */
+        word32      authMethodSz;
+        int         expectRet;
+        const char* label;
+        const byte* authTrailing; /* bytes after auth method; NULL if none */
+        word32      authTrailingSz;
+    } cases[] = {
+        /* valid service: auth dispatch fires, fails on unknown method */
+        { "ssh-connection", 14, "xyz-unknown", 11, WS_SUCCESS,
+          "valid svc unknown auth", NULL, 0 },
+        /* same but trailing junk must be skipped so *idx reaches len */
+        { "ssh-connection", 14, "xyz-unknown", 11, WS_SUCCESS,
+          "valid svc unknown auth trailing junk",
+          s_unknownAuthTrailingFakePassword,
+          (word32)sizeof(s_unknownAuthTrailingFakePassword) },
+        /* invalid service: short-circuit, auth-method field absent */
+        { "ssh-agent",       9, NULL,           0, WS_SUCCESS,
+          "invalid ssh-agent svc", NULL, 0 },
+        { "bad",             3, NULL,           0, WS_SUCCESS,
+          "invalid bad svc", NULL, 0 },
+        /* zero-length service name: NameToId("",0)==ID_UNKNOWN, must reject */
+        { "",                0, NULL,           0, WS_SUCCESS,
+          "zero-length svc", NULL, 0 },
+        /* ssh-userauth: NameToId returns ID_SERVICE_USERAUTH, not
+         * ID_SERVICE_CONNECTION, so must also be rejected */
+        { "ssh-userauth",   12, NULL,           0, WS_SUCCESS,
+          "invalid ssh-userauth svc", NULL, 0 },
+    };
+    int i;
+
+    ctx = wolfSSH_CTX_new(WOLFSSH_ENDPOINT_SERVER, NULL);
+    if (ctx == NULL) return -500;
+    wolfSSH_SetIOSend(ctx, CaptureIoSendAuthSvc);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < (int)(sizeof(cases)/sizeof(cases[0])); i++) {
+        byte   buf[128];
+        word32 len = 0, idx = 0;
+        word32 snsz = cases[i].svcNameSz;
+        int    ret;
+
+        ssh = wolfSSH_new(ctx);
+        if (ssh == NULL) { result = -501; goto done; }
+
+        s_authSvcCaptureSz = 0;
+        s_authSvcSendCount = 0;
+        WMEMSET(s_authSvcCapture, 0, sizeof(s_authSvcCapture));
+
+        /* username: "user" */
+        buf[len++] = 0; buf[len++] = 0; buf[len++] = 0; buf[len++] = 4;
+        WMEMCPY(buf + len, "user", 4); len += 4;
+
+        /* service name */
+        buf[len++] = (byte)(snsz >> 24); buf[len++] = (byte)(snsz >> 16);
+        buf[len++] = (byte)(snsz >>  8); buf[len++] = (byte)snsz;
+        if (snsz > 0) { WMEMCPY(buf + len, cases[i].svcName, snsz); }
+        len += snsz;
+
+        /* auth method: omit for invalid-service cases to prove short-circuit */
+        if (cases[i].authMethod != NULL) {
+            word32 amsz = cases[i].authMethodSz;
+            buf[len++] = (byte)(amsz >> 24); buf[len++] = (byte)(amsz >> 16);
+            buf[len++] = (byte)(amsz >>  8); buf[len++] = (byte)amsz;
+            WMEMCPY(buf + len, cases[i].authMethod, amsz); len += amsz;
+            if (cases[i].authTrailingSz > 0U) {
+                WMEMCPY(buf + len, cases[i].authTrailing,
+                        cases[i].authTrailingSz);
+                len += cases[i].authTrailingSz;
+            }
+        }
+
+        ret = wolfSSH_TestDoUserAuthRequest(ssh, buf, len, &idx);
+
+        if (s_authSvcSendCount != 1) {
+            printf("DoUserAuthRequest_svcName[%s]: expected 1 send, got %u\n",
+                   cases[i].label, s_authSvcSendCount);
+            result = -540 - i;
+            goto done;
+        }
+
+        if (ret != cases[i].expectRet) {
+            printf("DoUserAuthRequest_svcName[%s]: ret=%d expected=%d\n",
+                   cases[i].label, ret, cases[i].expectRet);
+            result = -502 - i;
+            goto done;
+        }
+
+        /* MSGID_USERAUTH_FAILURE must be in the captured packet. */
+        {
+            int capMsgId = CaptureMsgId(s_authSvcCapture, s_authSvcCaptureSz);
+
+            if (capMsgId < 0 || capMsgId != MSGID_USERAUTH_FAILURE) {
+                printf("DoUserAuthRequest_svcName[%s]: USERAUTH_FAILURE not "
+                       "sent (capSz=%u msg_id=0x%02x)\n", cases[i].label,
+                       s_authSvcCaptureSz,
+                       capMsgId >= 0 ? capMsgId : 0);
+                result = -520 - i;
+                goto done;
+            }
+        }
+
+        /* All cases must consume the entire payload. */
+        if (idx != len) {
+            printf("DoUserAuthRequest_svcName[%s]: idx=%u expected len=%u\n",
+                   cases[i].label, idx, len);
+            result = -510 - i;
             goto done;
         }
 
-        if (s_chanReqCapture[5] != cases[i].expectMsgId) {
-            printf("DoChannelRequest[%s]: msg_id=0x%02x, expected=0x%02x\n",
-                    cases[i].label,
-                    s_chanReqCapture[5], cases[i].expectMsgId);
-            result = -420 - i;
+        /* Invalid-service cases must NOT record the username. */
+        if (cases[i].authMethod == NULL && ssh->userName != NULL) {
+            printf("DoUserAuthRequest_svcName[%s]: userName set on invalid "
+                   "service (expected NULL)\n", cases[i].label);
+            result = -530 - i;
             goto done;
         }
+
+        wolfSSH_free(ssh);
+        ssh = NULL;
     }
 
 done:
@@ -1609,6 +1805,11 @@ int wolfSSH_UnitTest(int argc, char** argv)
     unitResult = test_ChannelPutData();
     printf("ChannelPutData: %s\n", (unitResult == 0 ? "SUCCESS" : "FAILED"));
     testResult = testResult || unitResult;
+
+    unitResult = test_DoUserAuthRequest_serviceName();
+    printf("DoUserAuthRequest_serviceName: %s\n",
+           (unitResult == 0 ? "SUCCESS" : "FAILED"));
+    testResult = testResult || unitResult;
 #endif
 
 #ifdef WOLFSSH_KEYGEN

wolfssh/internal.h

@@ -1350,6 +1350,8 @@ enum WS_MessageIdLimits {
     WOLFSSH_API int wolfSSH_TestDoKexDhReply(WOLFSSH* ssh, byte* buf,
             word32 len, word32* idx);
     WOLFSSH_API int wolfSSH_TestChannelPutData(WOLFSSH_CHANNEL*, byte*, word32);
+    WOLFSSH_API int wolfSSH_TestDoUserAuthRequest(WOLFSSH* ssh, byte* buf,
+            word32 len, word32* idx);
 #ifndef WOLFSSH_NO_DH_GEX_SHA256
     WOLFSSH_API int wolfSSH_TestDoKexDhGexRequest(WOLFSSH* ssh, byte* buf,
             word32 len, word32* idx);