Skip to content
Open
Show file tree
Hide file tree
Changes from all commits
Commits
File filter

Filter by extension

Filter by extension

Conversations
Failed to load comments.
Loading
Jump to
Jump to file
Failed to load files.
Loading
Diff view
Diff view
4 changes: 4 additions & 0 deletions .jules/sentinel.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
## 2025-02-14 - Prevent Zip Slip Vulnerability during Extraction
**Vulnerability:** Zip Slip (path traversal) risk when extracting `zipfile.ZipFile` archives using `extractall()` without verifying individual member paths in `helpers/skills_import.py`.
**Learning:** Malicious zip files can contain relative paths (e.g., `../../etc/passwd`) or absolute paths that extract files outside the intended target directory. Using `extractall()` blindly trusts the paths within the zip archive, bypassing directory containment.
**Prevention:** Explicitly iterate through every member in `z.namelist()`, construct the member's resolved absolute path, and verify it falls within the intended target directory using a safe path containment method like `Path.resolve().is_relative_to()` before proceeding with extraction.
4 changes: 4 additions & 0 deletions helpers/skills_import.py
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -94,6 +94,10 @@ def _unzip_to_temp_dir(zip_path: Path) -> Path:
target.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)

with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_path, "r") as z:
for member in z.namelist():
member_path = (target / member).resolve()
if not member_path.is_relative_to(target.resolve()):
raise ValueError(f"Unsafe path in archive: {member}")
z.extractall(target)

# If zip contains a single top-level folder, treat that as the root
Expand Down