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13 changes: 8 additions & 5 deletions detections/endpoint/linux_system_network_discovery.yml
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -53,8 +53,11 @@ tags:
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1016/atomic_red_team/linux_net_discovery/sysmon_linux.log
source: Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: sysmon:linux
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1016/atomic_red_team/linux_net_discovery/sysmon_linux.log
source: Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: sysmon:linux
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1016/atomic_red_team/macos_net_discovery/macos_network_discovery.log
sourcetype: osquery:results
source: osquery
101 changes: 101 additions & 0 deletions detections/endpoint/macos_list_firewall_rules.yml
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@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
name: MacOS List Firewall Rules
id: f8db6e0b-55bb-40ca-bc85-2b3700adb0f8
version: 1
date: '2025-09-08'
author: Jamie Windley, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |
This analytic detects attempts to enumerate or verify the configuration of the macOS application firewall.
Specifically, it monitors executions of `defaults read /Library/Preferences/com.apple.alf` and `/usr/libexec/ApplicationFirewall/socketfilterfw --getglobalstate`.
These commands provide insight into firewall status, allowed applications, and explicit authorization rules.
While they are legitimate administrative operations, adversaries may leverage them to identify potential attack surfaces, determine whether the firewall is active, or enumerate allowed network flows.
Monitoring for these commands, particularly when executed by non-administrative users or at unusual times, can provide early indication of reconnaissance activity on macOS endpoints
data_source:
- osquery
search: |
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
count
values(Processes.process) as process
values(Processes.parent_process) AS parent_process
values(Processes.parent_process_exec) AS parent_process_exec
values(Processes.parent_process_id) AS parent_process_id
values(Processes.parent_process_name) AS parent_process_name
values(Processes.parent_process_path) AS parent_process_path
min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime

from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
(
Processes.process_name = "defaults"
Processes.process = "* read *",
Processes.process = "*/Library/Preferences/com.apple.alf*"
)
OR
(
Processes.process_name = "socketfilterfw"
Processes.process = "*--getglobalstate*"
)

by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.process Processes.process_hash
Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process_path
Processes.user Processes.vendor_product

| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `macos_list_firewall_rules_filter`
how_to_implement: |
Collection of process execution events from macOS endpoints is required. This can be achieved using osquery's `es_process_events` table, EndpointSecurity framework integrations, or an EDR platform capable of recording process command lines. Ensure that captured events include at least the process path, full command line, user context, and timestamp.
known_false_positives: |
These commands are frequently executed by system administrators or IT personnel during routine configuration checks, troubleshooting, or automated maintenance scripts. Security tools or monitoring agents may also query firewall status for inventory or compliance purposes. To reduce false positives, consider excluding events from known administrative accounts, trusted management systems, or scheduled maintenance jobs.
references:
- https://www.manpagez.com/man/8/socketfilterfw/
- https://ss64.com/mac/defaults.html
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$" AND dest = "$dest$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$",
"$dest$") starthoursago=168 | stats count min(_time)
as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message)
as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all)
as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics"
by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
message: MacOS firewall rules listed via $process$ by $user$ on $dest$ using $process$
risk_objects:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 6
- field: user
type: user
score: 6
threat_objects:
- field: parent_process_name
type: parent_process_name
- field: process_name
type: process_name
Comment thread
nasbench marked this conversation as resolved.
- field: process
type: process
tags:
analytic_story:
- Network Discovery
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1016
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/refs/heads/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1016/atomic_red_team/macos_net_discovery/macos_list_firewall_rules.log
sourcetype: osquery:results
Comment thread
jwindley marked this conversation as resolved.
source: osquery
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