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feat(rules): New Potential NTLM hash leak via shortcut file rule#585

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rabbitstack wants to merge 1 commit intomasterfrom
ntlm-hash-leak-via-shortcut-file
Open

feat(rules): New Potential NTLM hash leak via shortcut file rule#585
rabbitstack wants to merge 1 commit intomasterfrom
ntlm-hash-leak-via-shortcut-file

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What is the purpose of this PR / why it is needed?

Identifies potential NTLM hash leakage via malicious shortcut (.lnk) file processing. By crafting a .lnk file with a default icon from shell32.dll and the target path pointing to a remote SMB-hosted binary file, the explorer.exe process will fetch the remote file to extract the icon from the PE resource directory, leading to NTLM hash leak.

What type of change does this PR introduce?


Uncomment one or more /kind <> lines:

/kind feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)

/kind bug-fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)

/kind refactor (non-breaking change that restructures the code, while not changing the original functionality)

/kind breaking (fix or feature that would cause existing functionality to not work as expected

/kind cleanup

/kind improvement

/kind design

/kind documentation

/kind other (change that doesn't pertain to any of the above categories)

Any specific area of the project related to this PR?


Uncomment one or more /area <> lines:

/area instrumentation

/area telemetry

/area rule-engine

/area filters

/area yara

/area event

/area captures

/area alertsenders

/area outputs

/area rules

/area filaments

/area config

/area cli

/area tests

/area ci

/area build

/area docs

/area deps

/area evasion

/area other

Special notes for the reviewer


Does this PR introduce a user-facing change?


@rabbitstack rabbitstack added the rules Anything related to detection rules label Feb 1, 2026
Identifies potential NTLM hash leakage via malicious shortcut (.lnk) file processing. By crafting a .lnk file with a default icon from shell32.dll and the target path pointing to a remote SMB-hosted binary file, the explorer.exe process will fetch the remote file to extract the icon from the PE resource directory, leading to NTLM hash leak.
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