bpf: cgroup: fix sysctl new-value handling in __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl#12232
bpf: cgroup: fix sysctl new-value handling in __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl#12232kernel-patches-daemon-bpf[bot] wants to merge 3 commits into
Conversation
|
Upstream branch: 9a720e0 |
AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug. In-Reply-To-Subject: |
AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug. In-Reply-To-Subject: |
|
Forwarding comment 4570323229 via email |
|
Forwarding comment 4570343110 via email |
proc_sys_call_handler() allocates its temporary sysctl buffer with kvzalloc() and passes it to __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl(). Since kvzalloc() may fall back to vmalloc() for large allocations, freeing that buffer with kfree() is wrong and can corrupt memory. Use kvfree() to safely handle both kmalloc and kvzalloc()/vmalloc allocations. The bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are developing for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing v6.13-rc1. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly available. Manual inspection confirms that the bug is still present in v7.1-rc5. Reproduced the bug based on v7.1-rc4 in a QEMU x86_64 guest booted with KASAN and CONFIG_FAILSLAB enabled. To exercise the replacement path, the test tree also included the accompanying fix for the stale ret == 1 check in __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl(). The reproducer confines failslab injections to the proc_sys_call_handler() range, uses stacktrace-depth=32, and injects fail-nth=1 while writing 8191 bytes to /proc/sys/kernel/domainname from a task in the target cgroup. Under that setup, fail-nth=1 triggered the fault: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffeb0200024d48 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 209 Comm: repro_proc_sys_ Not tainted 7.1.0-rc4-00686-g97625979a5d4 PREEMPT(lazy) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:kfree+0x6e/0x510 Code: 80 48 01 ef 0f 82 ae 04 00 00 48 c7 c0 00 00 00 80 48 2b 05 04 1b 23 04 48 01 c7 48 c1 ef 0c 48 c1 e7 06 48 03 3d e2 1a 23 04 <4c> 8b 57 08 4c 89 d0 83 e0 01 48 83 e8 01 49 09 c2 49 > RSP: 0018:ffff888108de7ab8 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000777f80000000 RBX: ffff88815af398c0 RCX: 0000000000000080 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffeb0200024d40 RBP: ffffc90000935000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: ffffffff86b4b297 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff819b71fd R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff888108de7cc0 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f8988cc2b80(0000) GS:ffff8881d3256000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffeb0200024d48 CR3: 0000000101d6b000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl+0x626/0xc30 __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl+0x74d/0xc30 ? __pfx___cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl+0x10/0x10 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x345/0x870 ? proc_sys_call_handler+0x250/0x480 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f proc_sys_call_handler+0x3a2/0x480 ? __pfx_proc_sys_call_handler+0x10/0x10 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? selinux_file_permission+0x39f/0x500 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? lock_is_held_type+0x9e/0x120 vfs_write+0x98e/0x1000 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? kmem_cache_free+0x308/0x550 ? __pfx_vfs_write+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_do_sys_openat2+0x10/0x10 ksys_write+0xf2/0x1d0 ? __pfx_ksys_write+0x10/0x10 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? trace_irq_enable.constprop.0+0x110/0x140 do_syscall_64+0x115/0x690 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f8988dd8907 Code: 10 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 18 > RSP: 002b:00007fff4069b878 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f8988dd8907 RDX: 0000000000001fff RSI: 0000564f97ef46b0 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 0000564f97ef46b0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000564f97ef46b0 R10: 0000000000000004 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000001fff R14: 0000000000000005 R15: 0000000000000001 </TASK> With this fix applied on top of the same test setup, rerunning the reproducer with fail-nth=1 yields no corresponding Oops reports. Fixes: 4508943 ("proc: use kvzalloc for our kernel buffer") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Zilin Guan <zilin@seu.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Dawei Feng <dawei.feng@seu.edu.cn> Reviewed-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
When writing to sysctls, proc_sys_call_handler() guarantees that the buffer passed to proc handlers is NUL-terminated. If bpf_sysctl_set_new_value() replaces the pending sysctl value, it can hand a replacement buffer directly to proc handlers. However, the helper currently copies only buf_len bytes into that buffer without appending a NUL terminator, leaving downstream parsers vulnerable to out-of-bounds access. Fix this by appending a '\0' after the replaced value to restore the expected sysctl semantics. Since the helper already rejects buf_len greater than PAGE_SIZE - 1, there is always room for the extra byte. Reproduced in a QEMU x86_64 guest booted with KASAN while exercising the sysctl replacement path with a cgroup/sysctl BPF program. The reproducer targets `/proc/sys/net/core/flow_limit_cpu_bitmap`, fills the original user write buffer with non-zero bytes, and overrides the sysctl value so the replacement buffer lacks a terminating NUL. Under that setup, the pre-fix kernel reported: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in strnchrnul+0x72/0x90 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88800de57000 by task repro_patch3/66 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 66 Comm: repro_patch3 Not tainted 7.1.0-rc3-00269-g8370ca1f87cc #6 PREEMPT(lazy) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0xa0 print_report+0xcb/0x5e0 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x21d/0x3f0 ? strnchrnul+0x72/0x90 ? strnchrnul+0x72/0x90 kasan_report+0xca/0x100 ? strnchrnul+0x72/0x90 strnchrnul+0x72/0x90 bitmap_parse+0x37/0x2e0 flow_limit_cpu_sysctl+0xc6/0x840 ? __pfx_flow_limit_cpu_sysctl+0x10/0x10 ? __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x5ba/0x870 proc_sys_call_handler+0x31d/0x480 ? __pfx_proc_sys_call_handler+0x10/0x10 ? selinux_file_permission+0x39f/0x500 ? lock_is_held_type+0x9e/0x120 vfs_write+0x98e/0x1000 ? kmem_cache_free+0x308/0x550 ? __pfx_vfs_write+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_do_sys_openat2+0x10/0x10 ksys_write+0xf2/0x1d0 ? __pfx_ksys_write+0x10/0x10 ? trace_irq_enable.constprop.0+0x110/0x140 do_syscall_64+0x115/0x690 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x447f37 Code: ff ff f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24 RSP: 002b:00007fff01ade608 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 0000000000447f37 RDX: 0000000000001fff RSI: 00000000172b1780 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 00000000172b1780 R08: 00000000004ca1b0 R09: 00000000172b1780 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000001fff R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000005 R15: 0000000000000003 </TASK> The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 4096-byte region [ffff88800de56000, ffff88800de57000) With this fix applied, rerunning the same sysctl-targeted path yields no corresponding KASAN reports. Signed-off-by: Zilin Guan <zilin@seu.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Dawei Feng <dawei.feng@seu.edu.cn>
Commit 4e63acd ("bpf: Introduce bpf_sysctl_{get,set}_new_value helpers") changed the success return value to 0, but failed to update the corresponding check in __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl(). Since bpf_prog_run_array_cg() now returns 0 on success, the legacy ret == 1 condition is never satisfied. As a result, the modified value is ignored, and bpf_sysctl_set_new_value() fails to replace the write buffer. Fix this by checking for a return value of 0 instead, so cgroup/sysctl programs can correctly replace the pending sysctl buffer. This bug was discovered during a manual code review. Tested via a cgroup/sysctl BPF reproducer overriding writes to a target sysctl. Pre-fix, bpf_sysctl_set_new_value("foo") was silently ignored: the write returned 8192 and the value remained "600". Post-fix, the BPF replacement buffer properly propagates: the write returns 3 and the value updates to "foo". Fixes: 4e63acd ("bpf: Introduce bpf_sysctl_{get,set}_new_value helpers") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Zilin Guan <zilin@seu.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Dawei Feng <dawei.feng@seu.edu.cn>
|
Upstream branch: 9a720e0 |
dcbe395 to
2a4bb36
Compare
Pull request for series with
subject: bpf: cgroup: fix sysctl new-value handling in __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl
version: 2
url: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/list/?series=1102583