π‘οΈ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix Path Traversal Vulnerability#73
π‘οΈ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix Path Traversal Vulnerability#73
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Co-authored-by: acebytes <2820910+acebytes@users.noreply.github.com>
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π¨ Severity: HIGH
π‘ Vulnerability: The
StatusSocketdaemon accepted user-provided file paths for configuration validation (handleValidateConfig) without checking if the resolved path escaped the intended directory scope. This allowed local file inclusion and path traversal attacks (e.g.,../../../../../etc/passwd) becauseexpandingTildeInPathdoes not resolve parent directory (..) components.π― Impact: Attackers could potentially read sensitive files on the system by supplying manipulated paths.
π§ Fix: Used
(path as NSString).standardizingPathto resolve..components and implemented a strict prefix check against the canonical~/.cacheout/directory.β Verification: Ensure that attempting to validate a config outside
~/.cacheout/is rejected. Tests were run, but this environment lacks the macOS tooling. Visual verification of logic is complete.PR created automatically by Jules for task 6296325120435992903 started by @acebytes