feat(install): defer LUKS encryption to first boot

Makefile

@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ install: completion
 	fi
 	install -D -m 0644 -t $(DESTDIR)/usr/lib/systemd/system crates/initramfs/*.service
 	install -D -m 0755 target/release/bootc-initramfs-setup $(DESTDIR)/usr/lib/bootc/initramfs-setup
+	install -D -m 0755 -t $(DESTDIR)/usr/lib/bootc crates/initramfs/luks-firstboot/bootc-luks-firstboot.sh
 	install -D -m 0755 -t $(DESTDIR)/usr/lib/dracut/modules.d/51bootc crates/initramfs/dracut/module-setup.sh
 
 # Run this to also take over the functionality of `ostree container` for example.

crates/initramfs/bootc-luks-firstboot.service

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=bootc first-boot LUKS encryption
+Documentation=man:bootc(1)
+DefaultDependencies=no
+ConditionKernelCommandLine=rd.bootc.luks.encrypt
+ConditionPathExists=/etc/initrd-release
+
+# Run before the root filesystem is mounted. We need the root block device
+# to be available but not yet mounted, so we can encrypt it in-place.
+# After encryption, cryptsetup reencrypt auto-opens the device as
+# /dev/mapper/cr_root, and udev creates the by-uuid symlink so that the
+# root=UUID= karg resolves to the encrypted device.
+Before=sysroot.mount
+Before=initrd-root-fs.target
+
+# We need block devices to be available and udev to have settled
+After=systemd-udev-settle.service
+After=dracut-initqueue.service
+Wants=systemd-udev-settle.service
+
+# If we fail, drop to emergency shell -- do not leave the system
+# with a half-encrypted root partition
+OnFailure=emergency.target
+OnFailureJobMode=isolate
+
+[Service]
+Type=oneshot
+ExecStart=/usr/lib/bootc/bootc-luks-firstboot.sh
+StandardInput=null
+StandardOutput=journal+console
+StandardError=journal+console
+RemainAfterExit=yes
+# Encryption of a large root partition can take several minutes
+TimeoutStartSec=900

crates/initramfs/dracut/module-setup.sh

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #!/bin/bash
 installkernel() {
-    instmods erofs overlay
+    instmods erofs overlay dm_crypt
 }
 check() {
     # We are never installed by default; see 10-bootc-base.conf
@@ -17,4 +17,15 @@ install() {
     mkdir -p "${initdir}${systemdsystemconfdir}/initrd-root-fs.target.wants"
     ln_r "${systemdsystemunitdir}/${service}" \
         "${systemdsystemconfdir}/initrd-root-fs.target.wants/${service}"
+
+    # First-boot LUKS encryption support
+    local luks_service=bootc-luks-firstboot.service
+    if [ -x /usr/lib/bootc/bootc-luks-firstboot.sh ]; then
+        dracut_install /usr/lib/bootc/bootc-luks-firstboot.sh
+        dracut_install cryptsetup systemd-cryptenroll blkid sed awk grep
+        inst_simple "${systemdsystemunitdir}/${luks_service}"
+        mkdir -p "${initdir}${systemdsystemconfdir}/sysroot.mount.requires"
+        ln_r "${systemdsystemunitdir}/${luks_service}" \
+            "${systemdsystemconfdir}/sysroot.mount.requires/${luks_service}"
+    fi
 }

crates/initramfs/luks-firstboot/bootc-luks-firstboot.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# bootc-luks-firstboot -- encrypt root partition on first boot
+#
+# This script runs in the initrd before sysroot.mount. It checks for the
+# rd.bootc.luks.encrypt kernel argument and, if present, encrypts the root
+# partition in-place using cryptsetup reencrypt --encrypt.
+#
+# The root partition must have been created with 32MB of trailing free space
+# (filesystem smaller than partition) by bootc install to-disk.
+#
+# After encryption:
+# - The root device is available as /dev/mapper/cr_root
+# - TPM2 is enrolled via systemd-cryptenroll
+# - A recovery key is generated and printed to the console
+# - /etc/crypttab is written inside the encrypted root
+# - BLS entries are updated with rd.luks.uuid kargs
+# - The rd.bootc.luks.encrypt trigger karg is removed
+#
+# The root=UUID=<ext4-uuid> karg does NOT need to change. Once the initrd
+# unlocks LUKS via rd.luks.uuid on subsequent boots, the ext4 UUID becomes
+# visible on /dev/mapper/cr_root and systemd resolves root= normally.
+#
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR MIT
+
+set -euo pipefail
+
+ENCRYPT_KARG=""
+ROOT_DEV=""
+LUKS_NAME="cr_root"
+
+log() {
+    echo "bootc-luks-firstboot: $*" >&2
+}
+
+die() {
+    log "FATAL: $*"
+    exit 1
+}
+
+parse_cmdline() {
+    local arg
+    local -a cmdline_args
+    read -r -a cmdline_args < /proc/cmdline
+
+    for arg in "${cmdline_args[@]}"; do
+        case "$arg" in
+            rd.bootc.luks.encrypt=*)
+                ENCRYPT_KARG="${arg#rd.bootc.luks.encrypt=}"
+                ;;
+            root=UUID=*)
+                local uuid="${arg#root=UUID=}"
+                ROOT_DEV=$(blkid -U "$uuid" 2>/dev/null) || true
+                ;;
+            root=/dev/*)
+                ROOT_DEV="${arg#root=}"
+                ;;
+        esac
+    done
+}
+
+
+encrypt_root() {
+    log "Encrypting root device $ROOT_DEV (method: $ENCRYPT_KARG)"
+
+    # Generate a temporary passphrase for initial encryption. This will be
+    # replaced by TPM2 enrollment below.
+    local tmp_passphrase
+    tmp_passphrase=$(cat /proc/sys/kernel/random/uuid)
+
+    # Encrypt in-place. The filesystem was created 32MB smaller than the
+    # partition by bootc, so cryptsetup uses the trailing space for the
+    # LUKS2 header. The device is auto-opened as /dev/mapper/$LUKS_NAME.
+    log "Running cryptsetup reencrypt --encrypt --reduce-device-size 32M ..."
+    echo -n "$tmp_passphrase" | cryptsetup reencrypt \
+        --encrypt \
+        --reduce-device-size 32M \
+        --batch-mode \
+        "$ROOT_DEV" "$LUKS_NAME" \
+        --key-file=-
+
+    log "Encryption complete. Device: /dev/mapper/$LUKS_NAME"
+
+    # Enroll TPM2. --wipe-slot=all removes the temporary passphrase and
+    # binds unlock to the local TPM2 device with default PCR policy.
+    if [ "$ENCRYPT_KARG" = "tpm2" ]; then
+        log "Enrolling TPM2..."
+        echo -n "$tmp_passphrase" | systemd-cryptenroll \
+            --unlock-key-file=/dev/stdin \
+            --tpm2-device=auto \
+            --wipe-slot=all \
+            "$ROOT_DEV"
+        log "TPM2 enrolled, temporary passphrase removed"
+
+        # Add a recovery key. systemd-cryptenroll --recovery-key generates
+        # a high-entropy key and prints it to stdout. We capture and display
+        # it on the console for the user to record.
+        log "Generating recovery key..."
+        local recovery_output
+        recovery_output=$(systemd-cryptenroll \
+            --tpm2-device=auto \
+            --recovery-key \
+            "$ROOT_DEV" 2>&1) || {
+            log "WARNING: Could not add recovery key: $recovery_output"
+        }
+        # Print the recovery key prominently so the user can record it
+        echo ""
+        echo "========================================================"
+        echo "  LUKS RECOVERY KEY -- RECORD THIS NOW"
+        echo "  $recovery_output"
+        echo "========================================================"
+        echo ""
+    fi
+}
+
+configure_system() {
+    local luks_uuid
+    luks_uuid=$(cryptsetup luksDump "$ROOT_DEV" | awk '/^UUID:/{print $2; exit}')
+    log "LUKS UUID: $luks_uuid"
+
+    # Mount the encrypted root to update its configuration
+    local mnt="/run/bootc-luks-mnt"
+    mkdir -p "$mnt"
+    mount /dev/mapper/"$LUKS_NAME" "$mnt"
+
+    # Write crypttab inside the ostree deploy directory
+    local deploy_etc
+    deploy_etc=$(find "$mnt/ostree/deploy" -maxdepth 4 -name "etc" -type d | head -1)
+    if [ -n "$deploy_etc" ]; then
+        echo "$LUKS_NAME UUID=$luks_uuid - tpm2-device=auto" > "$deploy_etc/crypttab"
+        log "Written crypttab: $deploy_etc/crypttab"
+    else
+        log "WARNING: Could not find ostree deploy etc directory"
+    fi
+
+    # Update BLS entries. These may be on /boot (separate partition, already
+    # mounted by the initrd) or inside the encrypted root at /boot/loader/.
+    # Check both locations.
+    local updated=0
+    local entry
+    for entry in /boot/loader/entries/*.conf "$mnt"/boot/loader/entries/*.conf; do
+        [ -f "$entry" ] || continue
+        if grep -q "rd.bootc.luks.encrypt" "$entry"; then
+            # Remove the first-boot trigger karg
+            sed -i 's/ rd.bootc.luks.encrypt=[^ ]*//' "$entry"
+            # Add LUKS unlock kargs. The root=UUID= karg stays unchanged --
+            # once systemd-cryptsetup unlocks LUKS via rd.luks.uuid, the
+            # ext4 UUID inside becomes visible and root= resolves normally.
+            sed -i "s|^options |options rd.luks.uuid=$luks_uuid rd.luks.name=$luks_uuid=$LUKS_NAME rd.luks.options=$luks_uuid=tpm2-device=auto,headless=true |" "$entry"
+            updated=$((updated + 1))
+            log "Updated BLS entry: $entry"
+        fi
+    done
+
+    if [ "$updated" -eq 0 ]; then
+        log "WARNING: No BLS entries found to update"
+    fi
+
+    umount "$mnt"
+}
+
+# Main
+parse_cmdline
+
+if [ -z "$ENCRYPT_KARG" ]; then
+    log "No encryption requested. Exiting."
+    exit 0
+fi
+
+if [ -z "$ROOT_DEV" ]; then
+    die "rd.bootc.luks.encrypt set but no root= device found"
+fi
+
+if ! cryptsetup isLuks "$ROOT_DEV" 2>/dev/null; then
+    encrypt_root
+else
+    log "Root device $ROOT_DEV is already LUKS. Skipping encryption."
+fi
+
+# Always run configure_system when the karg is present. This handles
+# the case where a previous boot encrypted the device but was
+# interrupted before BLS entries were updated.
+configure_system
+
+log "First-boot encryption complete."