Multiple security fixes#384
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Reject trashinfo entries that aren't owned by the invoking user, and reject volume trashinfos with absolute or traversing Path= values, so an attacker with write access to a shared trash dir can't dictate restore destinations. Reject trash dirs whose info/ or files/ subdir is a symlink, so trash-put can't be lured into moving files outside the trash dir. Refuse trash-put arguments that look like options and also exist as files on disk, so a file named '--trash-dir=x' in the cwd cannot hijack argparse when the user runs 'trash-put *'. Cap the trashinfo-creation retry loop, so an unwritable info/ dir on a shared mount doesn't spin trash-put forever. Escape C0 control bytes in paths and messages before printing, so filenames with ESC/OSC sequences can't hijack the user's terminal.
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There are a few areas that could be addressed to improve security when handling malicious files
This patch rejects trashinfo entries that aren't owned by the invoking user, and reject volume trashinfos with absolute or traversing Path= values, so an attacker with write access to a shared trash dir can't dictate restore destinations.
Also reject trash dirs whose info/ or files/ subdir is a symlink, so trash-put can't be lured into moving files outside the trash dir.
Refuse trash-put arguments that look like options and also exist as files on disk, so a file named '--trash-dir=x' in the cwd cannot hijack argparse when the user runs 'trash-put *'.
Cap the trashinfo-creation retry loop, so an unwritable info/ dir on a shared mount doesn't spin trash-put forever.
Escape C0 control bytes in paths and messages before printing, so filenames with ESC/OSC sequences can't hijack the user's terminal.