fix(git): use URL-rewrite for token-authenticated clone#1601
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WaliedA wants to merge 2 commits intoagent0ai:mainfrom
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fix(git): use URL-rewrite for token-authenticated clone#1601WaliedA wants to merge 2 commits intoagent0ai:mainfrom
WaliedA wants to merge 2 commits intoagent0ai:mainfrom
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Reviewed commit: ce38afa30e
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Replace the broken http.extraHeader approach with URL credential injection. The old approach still triggered git's credential subsystem which aborted with 'could not read Username' when GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0. Changes: - Rewrite HTTPS clone URL to https://oauth2:<token>@host/... (GitHub/GitLab) or https://x-token-auth:<token>@bitbucket.org/... (Bitbucket) - After clone, reset remote origin to the clean URL (token never on disk) - Add _validate_git_url() to reject unsafe/non-http(s)/ssh URLs - Sanitize token from error messages before re-raising - Pass clone command as argv list, never via shell string concat Fixes: public repos with any token, private repos with valid token. All five acceptance tests pass.
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…r _validate_git_url with non-git SSH usernamesURL validation Add regression tests for _validate_git_url to ensure it accepts safe SSH usernames and rejects unsafeGuards against the regression flagged by Codex review on PR agent0ai#1601 (commit ce38afa) where _SAFE_URL_RE only accepted the literal git@ SSH username. Commit 49a0ff9 already broadened the regex; this test locks that behavior in by parametrizing alice@host:org/repo.git, ssh://alice@host/..., and ssh://alice@host:2222/... alongside the existing git@ and https forms. Also covers a few unsafe URL classes that must continue to be rejected. URLs.
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Problem
When
git_tokenwas supplied, the previous code usedgit -c http.extraHeader=Authorization: Basic <base64>. Git still ran its credential subsystem first and aborted with:This broke any clone with a non-empty token, including public repos.
Fix
Replace the broken header approach with URL credential injection:
https://oauth2:<token>@host/...https://x-token-auth:<token>@bitbucket.org/...After a successful clone the remote origin is immediately reset to the clean URL so the token is never in
.git/config.Security hardening
_validate_git_url()regex allowlist_sanitize_token()on errorsBasicProjectData(existing)project.jsonAcceptance tests
***All
.git/configfiles confirmed token-free after clone.