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add requested endpoints #2
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| f"INSERT INTO integration_notes (employee_id, note) " | ||
| f"VALUES ({employee_id}, '{note}')" | ||
| ) |
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SQL Injection in Integration Notes Persistence (Severity: MEDIUM)
Sensitive employee data may be compromised through SQL injection when persisting notes. The use of string interpolation in integration_service.py lines 63-65 allows an attacker to manipulate the SQL query, potentially leading to unauthorized data access or modification.
View details in ZeroPath
| f"INSERT INTO integration_notes (employee_id, note) " | |
| f"VALUES ({employee_id}, '{note}')" | |
| ) |
| "SELECT id, employee_id, note FROM integration_notes " | ||
| f"WHERE employee_id = {employee_id} AND note LIKE '%{search_term}%' " | ||
| f"{raw_clause}" | ||
| ) |
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SQL Injection in integration_notes search (Severity: MEDIUM)
Direct interpolation of user-supplied search terms into SQL queries, specifically within the integration_notes table via integration_service.py, poses a significant SQL injection risk. This vulnerability can allow attackers to manipulate database queries, potentially leading to unauthorized data access or modification.
View details in ZeroPath
| with open(file_path, "w") as handle: | ||
| handle.write(config_body) | ||
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| parsed_config = yaml.load(config_body, Loader=yaml.Loader) |
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Unsafe YAML Deserialization in Integration Service (Severity: MEDIUM)
Deserializing untrusted YAML input using yaml.load with Loader=yaml.Loader poses a critical security risk, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution. This occurs in services/integration_service.py on line 45, which allows an attacker to control the application's behavior by injecting malicious YAML payloads.
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| parsed_config = yaml.load(config_body, Loader=yaml.Loader) | |
| parsed_config = yaml.safe_load(config_body) |
| @app.route('/api/integrations/import', methods=['POST']) | ||
| def import_integration_payload(): | ||
| payload = request.json or {} | ||
| result = integration_service.import_payload(payload) | ||
| return jsonify(result) | ||
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Missing Authentication on /api/integrations/import Endpoint (Severity: MEDIUM)
The /api/integrations/import endpoint lacks authentication and input validation, potentially allowing unauthorized users to import arbitrary data. This occurs because the endpoint in app.py, lines 85-90, directly processes the incoming request payload without checks, which could lead to the integration service being compromised or manipulated with malicious data.
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@zeropath-ai-staging Is authentication handled consistently elsewhere in the app?
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Authentication is not handled consistently. The /api/employees and /api/payroll/process endpoints use a @token_required decorator. The /api/payroll/adjust endpoint performs manual token validation. The /api/integrations/import endpoint has no authentication.
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@zeropath-ai-staging Okay, let's mark this as a false positive for now? You can add that for the first deployment this is intentially unauthed.
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Marked 8 issue(s) as false positive.
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| parsed_config = yaml.load(config_body, Loader=yaml.Loader) | ||
| requests.get(ping_url, timeout=3) | ||
| command_result = subprocess.check_output(command, shell=True, text=True) |
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Command Injection in subprocess.check_output (Severity: HIGH)
Executing user-controlled input within a shell=True subprocess call can lead to command injection, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary commands. This occurs in services/integration_service.py at line 47, which causes the application to be vulnerable to remote code execution.
View details in ZeroPath
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✅ No security or compliance issues detected. Reviewed everything up to 9a36624. Security Overview
Detected Code Changes
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Co-authored-by: zeropath-ai-staging[bot] <204760507+zeropath-ai-staging[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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