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@renovate renovate bot commented Jan 14, 2026

This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Confidence
hono (source) 4.10.44.11.7 age confidence

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2026-22817

Summary

A flaw in Hono’s JWK/JWKS JWT verification middleware allowed the JWT header’s alg value to influence signature verification when the selected JWK did not explicitly specify an algorithm. This could enable JWT algorithm confusion and, in certain configurations, allow forged tokens to be accepted.

Details

When verifying JWTs using JWKs or a JWKS endpoint, the middleware selected the verification algorithm based on the JWK’s alg field if present, but otherwise fell back to the alg value provided in the unverified JWT header.

Because the alg field in a JWK is optional and often omitted in real-world JWKS configurations, this behavior could allow an attacker to control the algorithm used for verification. In some environments, this may lead to authentication or authorization
bypass through crafted tokens.

The practical impact depends on application configuration, including which algorithms are accepted and how JWTs are used for authorization decisions.

Impact

In affected configurations, an attacker may be able to forge JWTs with attacker-controlled claims, potentially resulting in authentication or authorization bypass.

Applications that do not use the JWK/JWKS middleware, do not rely on JWT-based authentication, or explicitly restrict allowed algorithms are not affected.

Resolution

Update to the latest patched release.

Breaking change:

As part of this fix, the JWT middleware now requires the alg option to be explicitly specified. This prevents algorithm confusion by ensuring that the verification algorithm is not derived from untrusted JWT header values.

Applications upgrading must update their configuration accordingly.

Before (vulnerable configuration)

import { jwt } from 'hono/jwt'

app.use(
  '/auth/*',
  jwt({
    secret: 'it-is-very-secret',
    // alg was optional
  })
)

After (patched configuration)

import { jwt } from 'hono/jwt'

app.use(
  '/auth/*',
  jwt({
    secret: 'it-is-very-secret',
    alg: 'HS256', // required
  })
)

CVE-2026-22818

Summary

A flaw in Hono’s JWK/JWKS JWT verification middleware allowed the algorithm specified in the JWT header to influence signature verification when the selected JWK did not explicitly define an algorithm. This could enable JWT algorithm confusion and, in certain configurations, allow forged tokens to be accepted.

Details

When verifying JWTs using JWKs or a JWKS endpoint, the middleware selected the verification algorithm based on the JWK’s alg field if present. If the JWK did not specify an algorithm, the middleware fell back to using the alg value provided in the unverified JWT header.

Because the alg field in a JWK is optional and commonly omitted in real-world JWKS configurations, this behavior could allow an attacker to influence which algorithm is used for verification. In some environments, this may result in authentication or authorization bypass through crafted JWTs.

The practical impact depends on application configuration, including which algorithms are accepted and how JWTs are used to make authorization decisions.

Impact

In affected configurations, an attacker may be able to forge JWTs with attacker-controlled claims, potentially leading to authentication or authorization bypass.

Applications that do not use the JWK/JWKS middleware, do not rely on JWT-based authentication, or explicitly restrict allowed algorithms are not affected.

Resolution

Update to the latest patched release.

Breaking change:

The JWK/JWKS JWT verification middleware has been updated to require an explicit allowlist of asymmetric algorithms when verifying tokens. The middleware no longer derives the verification algorithm from untrusted JWT header values.

Instead, callers must explicitly specify which asymmetric algorithms are permitted, and only tokens signed with those algorithms will be accepted. This prevents JWT algorithm confusion by ensuring that algorithm selection is fully controlled by application
configuration.

As part of this fix, the alg option is now required when using the JWK/JWKS middleware, and symmetric (HS*) algorithms are no longer accepted in this context.

Before (vulnerable configuration)

import { jwk } from 'hono/jwk'

app.use(
  '/auth/*',
  jwk({
    jwks_uri: 'https://example.com/.well-known/jwks.json',
    // alg was optional
  })
)

After (patched configuration)

import { jwk } from 'hono/jwk'

app.use(
  '/auth/*',
  jwk({
    jwks_uri: 'https://example.com/.well-known/jwks.json',
    alg: ['RS256'], // required: explicit asymmetric algorithm allowlist
  })
)

CVE-2026-24398

Summary

IP Restriction Middleware in Hono is vulnerable to an IP address validation bypass. The IPV4_REGEX pattern and convertIPv4ToBinary function in src/utils/ipaddr.ts do not properly validate that IPv4 octet values are within the valid range of 0-255, allowing attackers to craft malformed IP addresses that bypass IP-based access controls.

Details

The vulnerability exists in two components:

  1. Permissive regex pattern: The IPV4_REGEX (/^[0-9]{0,3}\.[0-9]{0,3}\.[0-9]{0,3}\.[0-9]{0,3}$/) accepts octet values greater than 255 (e.g., 999).
  2. Unsafe binary conversion: The convertIPv4ToBinary function does not validate octet ranges before performing bitwise operations. When an octet exceeds 255, it overflows into adjacent octets during the bit-shift calculation.

For example, the IP address 1.2.2.355 is accepted and converts to the same binary value as 1.2.3.99:

  • 355 = 256 + 99 = 0x163
  • After bit-shifting: (1 << 24) + (2 << 16) + (2 << 8) + 355 = 0x01020363 = 1.2.3.99

Impact

An attacker can bypass IP-based restrictions by crafting malformed IP addresses:

  • Blocklist bypass: If 1.2.3.0/24 is blocked, an attacker can use 1.2.2.355 (or similar) to bypass the restriction.
  • Allowlist bypass: Requests from unauthorized IP ranges may be incorrectly permitted.

This is exploitable when the application relies on client-provided IP addresses (e.g., X-Forwarded-For header) for access control decisions.

Affected Components

  • IP Restriction Middleware
  • src/utils/ipaddr.ts: IPV4_REGEX, convertIPv4ToBinary, distinctRemoteAddr

CVE-2026-24472

Summary

Cache Middleware contains an information disclosure vulnerability caused by improper handling of HTTP cache control directives. The middleware does not respect standard cache control headers such as Cache-Control: private or Cache-Control: no-store, which may result in private or authenticated responses being cached and subsequently exposed to unauthorized users.

Details

The vulnerability exists in the cache decision logic of Cache Middleware. When determining whether a response should be cached, the middleware does not take HTTP cache control semantics into account and may cache responses that are explicitly marked as private by the application. While some runtimes, such as Cloudflare Workers, enforce cache control restrictions at the platform level, other runtimes including Deno, Bun, and Node.js rely on the middleware’s behavior. As a result, applications running on these runtimes may unintentionally cache sensitive responses.

Impact

This issue can lead to Web Cache Deception and information disclosure. If an authenticated user accesses an endpoint that returns user-specific or sensitive data and the response is cached despite being marked as private, subsequent unauthenticated requests may receive the cached response. This may result in the exposure of personally identifiable information or session-related data. The impact is limited to applications that use the hono/cache middleware and rely on it to correctly honor HTTP cache control directives.

Affected Components

  • Cache Middleware

CVE-2026-24473

Summary

Serve static Middleware for the Cloudflare Workers adapter contains an information disclosure vulnerability that may allow attackers to read arbitrary keys from the Workers environment. Improper validation of user-controlled paths can result in unintended access to internal asset keys.

Details

The vulnerability exists in the serve-static middleware used with the Cloudflare Workers adapter. When serving static assets, the middleware does not sufficiently validate or restrict user-supplied paths before resolving them against the Workers asset storage.

As a result, an attacker may craft requests that access arbitrary keys beyond the intended static asset scope. This issue only affects applications running on Cloudflare Workers that use Serve static Middleware with user-controllable request paths.

Impact

This vulnerability may lead to information disclosure by allowing unauthorized access to internal assets or data stored in the Workers environment. The exposed data is limited to readable asset keys and does not allow modification of stored data or execution of arbitrary code.

The impact is limited to applications that use Serve static Middleware in the Cloudflare Workers adapter and rely on it to safely handle untrusted request paths.

Affected Components

  • Serve static Middleware (Cloudflare Workers adapter)

Release Notes

honojs/hono (hono)

v4.11.7

Compare Source

Security Release

This release includes security fixes for multiple vulnerabilities in Hono and related middleware. We recommend upgrading if you are using any of the affected components.

IP Restriction Middleware

Fixed an IPv4 address validation bypass that could allow IP-based access control to be bypassed under certain configurations.

Cache Middleware

Fixed an issue where responses marked with Cache-Control: private or no-store could be cached, potentially leading to information disclosure on some runtimes.

Serve Static Middleware (Cloudflare Workers adapter)

Fixed an issue that could allow unintended access to internal asset keys when serving static files with user-controlled paths.

hono/jsx ErrorBoundary

Fixed a reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) issue in the ErrorBoundary component that could occur when untrusted strings were rendered without proper escaping.

Recommendation

Users are encouraged to upgrade to this release, especially if they:

  • Use IP Restriction Middleware
  • Use Cache Middleware on Deno, Bun, or Node.js
  • Use Serve Static Middleware with user-controlled paths on Cloudflare Workers
  • Render untrusted data inside ErrorBoundary components

Security Advisories & CVEs


Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.11.6...v4.11.7

v4.11.6

Compare Source

v4.11.5

Compare Source

What's Changed

New Contributors

Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.11.4...v4.11.5

v4.11.4

Compare Source

Security

Fixed a JWT algorithm confusion issue in the JWT and JWK/JWKS middleware.

Both middlewares now require an explicit algorithm configuration to prevent the verification algorithm from being influenced by untrusted JWT header values.

If you are using the JWT or JWK/JWKS middleware, please update to the latest version as soon as possible.

JWT middleware
import { jwt } from 'hono/jwt'

app.use(
  '/auth/*',
  jwt({
    secret: 'it-is-very-secret',
    alg: 'HS256', // required
  })
)
JWK/JWKS middleware
import { jwk } from 'hono/jwk'

app.use(
  '/auth/*',
  jwk({
    jwks_uri: 'https://example.com/.well-known/jwks.json',
    alg: ['RS256'], // required (asymmetric algorithms only)
  })
)

For more details, see the Security Advisory.

What's Changed

New Contributors

Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.11.3...v4.11.4

v4.11.3

Compare Source

What's Changed

  • fix(types): fix middleware union type merging in MergeMiddlewareResponse by @​yusukebe in #​4602

Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.11.2...v4.11.3

v4.11.2

Compare Source

What's Changed

New Contributors

Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.11.1...v4.11.2

v4.11.1

Compare Source

What's Changed

Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.11.0...v4.11.1

v4.11.0

Compare Source

Release Notes

Hono v4.11.0 is now available!

This release includes new features for the Hono client, middleware improvements, and an important type system fix.

Type System Fix for Middleware

We've fixed a bug in the type system for middleware. Previously, app did not have the correct type with pathless handlers:

const app = new Hono()
  .use(async (c, next) => {
    await next()
  })
  .get('/a', async (c, next) => {
    await next()
  })
  .get((c) => {
    return c.text('Hello')
  })

// app's type was incorrect

This has now been fixed.

Thanks @​kosei28!

Typed URL for Hono Client

You can now pass the base URL as the second type parameter to hc to get more precise URL types:

const client = hc<typeof app, 'http://localhost:8787'>(
  'http://localhost:8787/'
)

const url = client.api.posts.$url()
// url is TypedURL with precise type information
// including protocol, host, and path

This is useful when you want to use the URL as a type-safe key for libraries like SWR.

Thanks @​miyaji255!

Custom NotFoundResponse Type

You can now customize the NotFoundResponse type using module augmentation. This allows c.notFound() to return a typed response:

import { Hono, TypedResponse } from 'hono'

declare module 'hono' {
  interface NotFoundResponse
    extends Response,
      TypedResponse<{ error: string }, 404, 'json'> {}
}

const app = new Hono()
  .get('/posts/:id', async (c) => {
    const post = await getPost(c.req.param('id'))
    if (!post) {
      return c.notFound()
    }
    return c.json({ post }, 200)
  })
  .notFound((c) => c.json({ error: 'not found' }, 404))

Now the client can correctly infer the 404 response type.

Thanks @​miyaji255!

tryGetContext Helper

The new tryGetContext() helper in the Context Storage middleware returns undefined instead of throwing an error when the context is not available:

import { tryGetContext } from 'hono/context-storage'

const context = tryGetContext<Env>()
if (context) {
  // Context is available
  console.log(context.var.message)
}

Thanks @​AyushCoder9!

Custom Query Serializer

You can now customize how query parameters are serialized using the buildSearchParams option:

const client = hc<AppType>('http://localhost', {
  buildSearchParams: (query) => {
    const searchParams = new URLSearchParams()
    for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(query)) {
      if (v === undefined) continue
      if (Array.isArray(v)) {
        v.forEach((item) => searchParams.append(`${k}[]`, item))
      } else {
        searchParams.set(k, v)
      }
    }
    return searchParams
  },
})

Thanks @​bolasblack!

New features

  • feat(types): make Hono client's $url return the exact URL type #​4502
  • feat(types): enhance NotFoundHandler to support custom NotFoundResponse type #​4518
  • feat(timing): add wrapTime to simplify usage #​4519
  • feat(pretty-json): support force option #​4531
  • feat(client): add buildSearchParams option to customize query serialization #​4535
  • feat(context-storage): add optional tryGetContext helper #​4539
  • feat(secure-headers): add CSP report-to and report-uri directive support #​4555
  • fix(types): replace schema-based path tracking with CurrentPath parameter #​4552

All changes

New Contributors

Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.10.8...v4.11.0

v4.10.8

Compare Source

What's Changed

New Contributors

Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.10.7...v4.10.8

v4.10.7

Compare Source

What's Changed
New Contributors

Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.10.6...v4.10.7

v4.10.6

Compare Source

Deperecated
bearer-auth options

The following options are deprecated and will be removed in a future version:

  • noAuthenticationHeaderMessage => use noAuthenticationHeader.message
  • invalidAuthenticationHeaderMessage => use invalidAuthenticationHeader.message
  • invalidTokenMessage => use invalidToken.message
What's Changed
New Contributors

Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.10.5...v4.10.6

v4.10.5

Compare Source

What's Changed

New Contributors

Full Changelog: honojs/hono@v4.10.4...v4.10.5


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changeset-bot bot commented Jan 14, 2026

⚠️ No Changeset found

Latest commit: c03ab1f

Merging this PR will not cause a version bump for any packages. If these changes should not result in a new version, you're good to go. If these changes should result in a version bump, you need to add a changeset.

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@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-hono-vulnerability branch from 01037c3 to c03ab1f Compare January 27, 2026 19:28
@renovate renovate bot changed the title chore(deps): update dependency hono to v4.11.4 [security] chore(deps): update dependency hono to v4.11.7 [security] Jan 27, 2026
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