RegPwn BOF

src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/README.md

@@ -652,6 +652,38 @@ To change the Path of the binary executed:
 reg add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\<service_name> /v ImagePath /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d C:\path\new\binary /f
 ```
 
+### Registry symlink race to arbitrary HKLM value write (ATConfig)
+
+Some Windows Accessibility features create per-user **ATConfig** keys that are later copied by a **SYSTEM** process into an HKLM session key. A registry **symbolic link race** can redirect that privileged write into **any HKLM path**, giving an arbitrary HKLM **value write** primitive.
+
+Key locations (example: On-Screen Keyboard `osk`):
+
+- `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATs` lists installed accessibility features.
+- `HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATConfig\<feature>` stores user-controlled configuration.
+- `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\Session<session id>\ATConfig\<feature>` is created during logon/secure-desktop transitions and is writable by the user.
+
+Abuse flow (CVE-2026-24291 / ATConfig):
+
+1. Populate the **HKCU ATConfig** value you want to be written by SYSTEM.
+2. Trigger the secure-desktop copy (e.g., **LockWorkstation**), which starts the AT broker flow.
+3. **Win the race** by placing an **oplock** on `C:\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared\ink\fsdefinitions\oskmenu.xml`; when the oplock fires, replace the **HKLM Session ATConfig** key with a **registry link** to a protected HKLM target.
+4. SYSTEM writes the attacker-chosen value to the redirected HKLM path.
+
+Once you have arbitrary HKLM value write, pivot to LPE by overwriting service configuration values:
+
+- `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\<svc>\ImagePath` (EXE/command line)
+- `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\<svc>\Parameters\ServiceDll` (DLL)
+
+Pick a service that a normal user can start (e.g., **`msiserver`**) and trigger it after the write. **Note:** the public exploit implementation **locks the workstation** as part of the race.
+
+Example tooling (RegPwn BOF / standalone):
+
+```bash
+beacon> regpwn C:\payload.exe SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\msiserver ImagePath
+beacon> regpwn C:\evil.dll SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SomeService\Parameters ServiceDll
+net start msiserver
+```
+
 ### Services registry AppendData/AddSubdirectory permissions
 
 If you have this permission over a registry this means to **you can create sub registries from this one**. In case of Windows services this is **enough to execute arbitrary code:**
@@ -1981,5 +2013,7 @@ C:\Windows\microsoft.net\framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe -version #Compile the
 - [Unit 42 – Privileged File System Vulnerability Present in a SCADA System](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/iconics-suite-cve-2025-0921/)
 - [Symbolic Link Testing Tools – CreateSymlink usage](https://github.com/googleprojectzero/symboliclink-testing-tools/blob/main/CreateSymlink/CreateSymlink_readme.txt)
 - [A Link to the Past. Abusing Symbolic Links on Windows](https://infocon.org/cons/SyScan/SyScan%202015%20Singapore/SyScan%202015%20Singapore%20presentations/SyScan15%20James%20Forshaw%20-%20A%20Link%20to%20the%20Past.pdf)
+- [RIP RegPwn – MDSec](https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2026/03/rip-regpwn/)
+- [RegPwn BOF (Cobalt Strike BOF port)](https://github.com/Flangvik/RegPwnBOF)
 
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