π‘οΈ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix command injection risk in unix id-lookups#53
π‘οΈ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix command injection risk in unix id-lookups#53Donach wants to merge 1 commit into
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Co-authored-by: Donach <39565367+Donach@users.noreply.github.com>
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π¨ Severity: HIGH
π‘ Vulnerability: The
id-lookups.tsfunctions (getGidFromGroupName,getUidFromUsername,getHomedirFromUsername) previously usedexecSyncwith string interpolation. This means variables were evaluated in a shell, allowing possible command injection via shell metacharacters.π― Impact: A maliciously crafted username or groupname could be exploited to run arbitrary commands in the daemon context, leading to remote code execution.
π§ Fix: Replaced
execSyncwithexecFileSync. Passed the dynamic variables strictly as arguments via an array and enforced the--separator to prevent argument injection if an input starts with-.β Verification: Ran
pnpm lintandpnpm testsuccessfully. ConfirmedexecFileSyncimplementation is intact and robust.PR created automatically by Jules for task 14796835733922872536 started by @Donach