security: validate trusted proxy before trusting IP headers #410
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.
Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.
Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.
You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.
Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.
This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.
Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.
Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.
Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
Summary
Security Issue Addressed
Rate Limiter IP Spoofing (Medium) - Previously, the rate limiter trusted X-Real-IP and X-Forwarded-For headers from any source. An attacker could bypass rate limiting by sending fake headers with different IP addresses.
Changes
backend/middleware/ratelimit.go:isTrustedProxy()function to validate proxy sourceTRUSTED_PROXIESenv var for additional trusted IPs (comma-separated, CIDR supported)Configuration
To configure additional trusted proxies, set the
TRUSTED_PROXIESenvironment variable:Test plan
🤖 Generated with Claude Code