Defensive Audit Personal Toolkit/Project for Low‑Artifact Persistence on Linux
BackdoorAli
GitHub: https://github.com/BackdoorAli
Linux Less‑Persistence is a modular, defensive security toolkit designed to help security professionals examine low‑artifact persistence mechanisms on Linux systems.
It focuses on persistence surfaces frequently abused by attackers, while deliberately avoiding operational or step‑by‑step instructions. The goal is visibility and understanding, not enablement.
This project is intended for:
- Defensive security engineering
- Incident response and threat hunting
- Red teams performing detection‑aware assessments
- Linux hardening and security research
This is not a persistence deployment framework.
It is a heuristic audit and analysis toolkit.
This project is published with explicit defensive and educational intent.
It is designed to help identify signals and patterns that may indicate persistence abuse, without providing actionable guidance on how to establish or maintain persistence.
You must only use this software on systems you:
- own
- administer
- are explicitly authorised to assess.
By using this tool, you agree to comply with all applicable laws and regulations.
Knowing how persistence mechanisms behave conceptually is not wrongdoing.
Using that knowledge irresponsibly is.
Linux Less‑Persistence does not contain offensive tooling, payloads, or exploitation workflows.
Attackers seeking long‑term access to Linux systems increasingly avoid obvious persistence mechanisms such as:
- conspicuous daemons
- well‑known startup scripts
- clearly identifiable binaries
Instead, they favor low‑artifact persistence, where legitimate system behavior overlaps with persistence potential.
Common attacker considerations include:
- What executes implicitly without user interaction?
- What blends into normal configuration?
- What survives reboots without obvious binaries?
- What is rarely inspected during routine audits?
This project mirrors that reasoning from a defender’s perspective, identifying areas where persistence could hide — without demonstrating how to place it there.
Understanding attacker tradecraft at a conceptual level is essential for effective defense, detection engineering, and incident response.
git clone https://github.com/BackdoorAli/linux-less-persistence.git
cd linux-less-persistence
python3 -m venv .venv
source .venv/bin/activate
pip install -e .Inspects system‑level and user‑level services for:
- unexpected local overrides
- drop‑in configuration snippets
- risky or unusual execution paths
Audits cron tables and spool entries for scheduled execution that warrants review.
Examines shell startup files (e.g. .bashrc, .profile, .zshrc) that execute implicitly on login or shell start.
Reviews desktop autostart .desktop entries that execute on graphical session launch.
Flags running processes whose executables originate from ephemeral or memory‑backed locations.
All findings are heuristic signals, not conclusions. Context and analytical judgment are required.
This toolkit does not guarantee:
- deterministic identification of malicious activity
- complete detection of fully fileless attacks
- coverage of kernel‑level or firmware‑level persistence
Limitations exist because:
- some legitimate software exhibits similar patterns
- advanced attackers may use techniques outside user‑space visibility
- context is required to distinguish misconfiguration from compromise
Treat findings as investigative starting points, not final verdicts.
Linux Less‑Persistence supports baseline generation and comparison to detect drift over time.
# Save a known‑good baseline
llp --baseline-save baseline.json
# Compare current state to baseline
llp --baseline-compare baseline.jsonThis is useful for:
- system hardening validation
- post‑incident comparison
- change monitoring
# Run all modules
llp
# Run selected modules
llp --checks systemd,cron
# Output results as JSON
llp --format jsonFrom a red team standpoint, effective persistence is rarely about complexity — it is about invisibility.
Attackers often evaluate:
- which execution paths are trusted
- which configurations are rarely audited
- which mechanisms appear benign when slightly altered
This project acknowledges those realities without crossing into operational guidance.
The intent is to help defenders — and responsible red teams — reason about detection risk, not exploitation success.
Distributed under the MIT License. Read LICENSE.md for more.
This project is under active development.
Additional modules, refinements, and documentation may be added over time.