Validate guest-writable fields in try_pop_buffer_into before allocation

The back-pointer and flatbuffer size prefix in the shared output buffer
are written by the guest and were used without validation, allowing a
malicious guest to trigger a ~4 GB host-side allocation.

Add bounds checks on both fields before any heap allocation occurs and
return descriptive errors on violation. Add unit and integration tests
exercising corrupt size prefixes and back-pointers.

Signed-off-by: Ludvig Liljenberg <4257730+ludfjig@users.noreply.github.com>

Author: ludfjig

src/hyperlight_host/src/mem/shared_mem.rs

@@ -1121,9 +1121,21 @@ impl HostSharedMemory {
         let last_element_offset_rel: usize =
             self.read::<u64>(last_element_offset_abs - 8)? as usize;
 
+        // Validate element offset (guest-writable): must be in [8, stack_pointer_rel).
+        if last_element_offset_rel >= stack_pointer_rel || last_element_offset_rel < 8 {
+            return Err(new_error!(
+                "Corrupt buffer back-pointer: element offset {} is outside valid range [8, {}).",
+                last_element_offset_rel,
+                stack_pointer_rel,
+            ));
+        }
+
         // make it absolute
         let last_element_offset_abs = last_element_offset_rel + buffer_start_offset;
 
+        // Max bytes the element can span (excluding the 8-byte back-pointer).
+        let max_element_size = stack_pointer_rel - last_element_offset_rel - 8;
+
         // Get the size of the flatbuffer buffer from memory
         let fb_buffer_size = {
             let size_i32 = self.read::<u32>(last_element_offset_abs)? + 4;
@@ -1133,6 +1145,14 @@ impl HostSharedMemory {
             usize::try_from(size_i32)
         }?;
 
+        if fb_buffer_size > max_element_size {
+            return Err(new_error!(
+                "Corrupt buffer size prefix: flatbuffer claims {} bytes but the element slot is only {} bytes.",
+                fb_buffer_size,
+                max_element_size
+            ));
+        }
+
         let mut result_buffer = vec![0; fb_buffer_size];
 
         self.copy_to_slice(&mut result_buffer, last_element_offset_abs)?;
@@ -1631,6 +1651,139 @@ mod tests {
         }
     }
 
+    /// Bounds checking for `try_pop_buffer_into` against corrupt guest data.
+    mod try_pop_buffer_bounds {
+        use super::*;
+
+        #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
+        struct RawBytes(Vec<u8>);
+
+        impl TryFrom<&[u8]> for RawBytes {
+            type Error = String;
+            fn try_from(value: &[u8]) -> std::result::Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+                Ok(RawBytes(value.to_vec()))
+            }
+        }
+
+        /// Create a buffer with stack pointer initialized to 8 (empty).
+        fn make_buffer(mem_size: usize) -> super::super::HostSharedMemory {
+            let eshm = ExclusiveSharedMemory::new(mem_size).unwrap();
+            let (hshm, _) = eshm.build();
+            hshm.write::<u64>(0, 8u64).unwrap();
+            hshm
+        }
+
+        #[test]
+        fn normal_push_pop_roundtrip() {
+            let mem_size = 4096;
+            let mut hshm = make_buffer(mem_size);
+
+            // Size-prefixed flatbuffer-like payload: [size: u32 LE][payload]
+            let payload = b"hello";
+            let mut data = Vec::new();
+            data.extend_from_slice(&(payload.len() as u32).to_le_bytes());
+            data.extend_from_slice(payload);
+
+            hshm.push_buffer(0, mem_size, &data).unwrap();
+            let result: RawBytes = hshm.try_pop_buffer_into(0, mem_size).unwrap();
+            assert_eq!(result.0, data);
+        }
+
+        #[test]
+        fn malicious_flatbuffer_size_prefix() {
+            let mem_size = 4096;
+            let mut hshm = make_buffer(mem_size);
+
+            let payload = b"small";
+            let mut data = Vec::new();
+            data.extend_from_slice(&(payload.len() as u32).to_le_bytes());
+            data.extend_from_slice(payload);
+            hshm.push_buffer(0, mem_size, &data).unwrap();
+
+            // Corrupt size prefix at element start (offset 8) to near u32::MAX.
+            hshm.write::<u32>(8, 0xFFFF_FFFBu32).unwrap(); // +4 = 0xFFFF_FFFF
+
+            let result: Result<RawBytes> = hshm.try_pop_buffer_into(0, mem_size);
+            let err_msg = format!("{}", result.unwrap_err());
+            assert!(
+                err_msg.contains("Corrupt buffer size prefix: flatbuffer claims 4294967295 bytes but the element slot is only 9 bytes"),
+                "Unexpected error message: {}",
+                err_msg
+            );
+        }
+
+        #[test]
+        fn malicious_element_offset_too_small() {
+            let mem_size = 4096;
+            let mut hshm = make_buffer(mem_size);
+
+            let payload = b"test";
+            let mut data = Vec::new();
+            data.extend_from_slice(&(payload.len() as u32).to_le_bytes());
+            data.extend_from_slice(payload);
+            hshm.push_buffer(0, mem_size, &data).unwrap();
+
+            // Corrupt back-pointer (offset 16) to 0 (before valid range).
+            hshm.write::<u64>(16, 0u64).unwrap();
+
+            let result: Result<RawBytes> = hshm.try_pop_buffer_into(0, mem_size);
+            let err_msg = format!("{}", result.unwrap_err());
+            assert!(
+                err_msg.contains(
+                    "Corrupt buffer back-pointer: element offset 0 is outside valid range [8, 24)"
+                ),
+                "Unexpected error message: {}",
+                err_msg
+            );
+        }
+
+        #[test]
+        fn malicious_element_offset_past_stack_pointer() {
+            let mem_size = 4096;
+            let mut hshm = make_buffer(mem_size);
+
+            let payload = b"test";
+            let mut data = Vec::new();
+            data.extend_from_slice(&(payload.len() as u32).to_le_bytes());
+            data.extend_from_slice(payload);
+            hshm.push_buffer(0, mem_size, &data).unwrap();
+
+            // Corrupt back-pointer (offset 16) to 9999 (past stack pointer 24).
+            hshm.write::<u64>(16, 9999u64).unwrap();
+
+            let result: Result<RawBytes> = hshm.try_pop_buffer_into(0, mem_size);
+            let err_msg = format!("{}", result.unwrap_err());
+            assert!(
+                err_msg.contains("Corrupt buffer back-pointer: element offset 9999 is outside valid range [8, 24)"),
+                "Unexpected error message: {}",
+                err_msg
+            );
+        }
+
+        #[test]
+        fn malicious_flatbuffer_size_off_by_one() {
+            let mem_size = 4096;
+            let mut hshm = make_buffer(mem_size);
+
+            let payload = b"abcd";
+            let mut data = Vec::new();
+            data.extend_from_slice(&(payload.len() as u32).to_le_bytes());
+            data.extend_from_slice(payload);
+            hshm.push_buffer(0, mem_size, &data).unwrap();
+
+            // Corrupt size prefix: claim 5 bytes (total 9), exceeding the 8-byte slot.
+            hshm.write::<u32>(8, 5u32).unwrap(); // fb_buffer_size = 5 + 4 = 9
+
+            let result: Result<RawBytes> = hshm.try_pop_buffer_into(0, mem_size);
+            let err_msg = format!("{}", result.unwrap_err());
+            assert!(
+                err_msg.contains("Corrupt buffer size prefix: flatbuffer claims 9 bytes but the element slot is only 8 bytes"),
+                "Unexpected error message: {}",
+                err_msg
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
     #[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
     mod guard_page_crash_test {
         use crate::mem::shared_mem::{ExclusiveSharedMemory, SharedMemory};

src/hyperlight_host/tests/integration_test.rs

@@ -578,6 +578,42 @@ fn guest_outb_with_invalid_port_poisons_sandbox() {
     });
 }
 
+#[test]
+fn corrupt_output_size_prefix_rejected() {
+    with_rust_sandbox(|mut sbox| {
+        let res = sbox.call::<i32>("CorruptOutputSizePrefix", ());
+        assert!(
+            res.is_err(),
+            "Expected error when guest corrupts size prefix, got: {:?}",
+            res,
+        );
+        let err_msg = format!("{:?}", res.unwrap_err());
+        assert!(
+            err_msg.contains("Corrupt buffer size prefix: flatbuffer claims 4294967295 bytes but the element slot is only 8 bytes"),
+            "Unexpected error message: {err_msg}"
+        );
+    });
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn corrupt_output_back_pointer_rejected() {
+    with_rust_sandbox(|mut sbox| {
+        let res = sbox.call::<i32>("CorruptOutputBackPointer", ());
+        assert!(
+            res.is_err(),
+            "Expected error when guest corrupts back-pointer, got: {:?}",
+            res,
+        );
+        let err_msg = format!("{:?}", res.unwrap_err());
+        assert!(
+            err_msg.contains(
+                "Corrupt buffer back-pointer: element offset 57005 is outside valid range [8, 24)"
+            ),
+            "Unexpected error message: {err_msg}"
+        );
+    });
+}
+
 #[test]
 fn guest_panic_no_alloc() {
     let heap_size = 0x4000;

src/tests/rust_guests/simpleguest/src/main.rs

@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ use hyperlight_guest_bin::host_comm::{
     print_output_with_host_print, read_n_bytes_from_user_memory,
 };
 use hyperlight_guest_bin::memory::malloc;
-use hyperlight_guest_bin::{guest_function, guest_logger, host_function};
+use hyperlight_guest_bin::{GUEST_HANDLE, guest_function, guest_logger, host_function};
 use log::{LevelFilter, error};
 use tracing::{Span, instrument};
 
@@ -804,6 +804,39 @@ fn fuzz_guest_trace(max_depth: u32, msg: String) -> u32 {
     fuzz_traced_function(0, max_depth, &msg)
 }
 
+#[guest_function("CorruptOutputSizePrefix")]
+fn corrupt_output_size_prefix() -> i32 {
+    unsafe {
+        let peb_ptr = core::ptr::addr_of!(GUEST_HANDLE).read().peb().unwrap();
+        let output_stack_ptr = (*peb_ptr).output_stack.ptr as *mut u8;
+
+        // Write a fake stack entry with a ~4 GB size prefix (0xFFFF_FFFB + 4).
+        let buf = core::slice::from_raw_parts_mut(output_stack_ptr, 24);
+        buf[0..8].copy_from_slice(&24_u64.to_le_bytes());
+        buf[8..12].copy_from_slice(&0xFFFF_FFFBu32.to_le_bytes());
+        buf[12..16].copy_from_slice(&[0u8; 4]);
+        buf[16..24].copy_from_slice(&8_u64.to_le_bytes());
+
+        core::arch::asm!("hlt", options(noreturn));
+    }
+}
+
+#[guest_function("CorruptOutputBackPointer")]
+fn corrupt_output_back_pointer() -> i32 {
+    unsafe {
+        let peb_ptr = core::ptr::addr_of!(GUEST_HANDLE).read().peb().unwrap();
+        let output_stack_ptr = (*peb_ptr).output_stack.ptr as *mut u8;
+
+        // Write a fake stack entry with back-pointer 0xDEAD (past stack pointer 24).
+        let buf = core::slice::from_raw_parts_mut(output_stack_ptr, 24);
+        buf[0..8].copy_from_slice(&24_u64.to_le_bytes());
+        buf[8..16].copy_from_slice(&[0u8; 8]);
+        buf[16..24].copy_from_slice(&0xDEAD_u64.to_le_bytes());
+
+        core::arch::asm!("hlt", options(noreturn));
+    }
+}
+
 // Interprets the given guest function call as a host function call and dispatches it to the host.
 fn fuzz_host_function(func: FunctionCall) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
     let mut params = func.parameters.unwrap();