Observation
On May 13, 2026 between 05:15:05 and 05:15:52 UTC, my kernel-level monitoring sensor recorded a severe latency spike to the Arbitrum sequencer.
Sharing this because it may be relevant to relay operators and SUAVE Kettle routing design — specifically the problem of public RPC health signals lagging real sequencer state.
Raw Telemetry
Measurement method: Linux kernel tcp_connect kprobe, 150ms probe interval, target sequencer.arbitrum.io:443.
[
{"ts": 1778649305, "chain": "arbitrum", "rtt_ms": 14, "risk": 0.05, "stall_flag": false},
{"ts": 1778649306, "chain": "arbitrum", "rtt_ms": 3081, "risk": 0.97, "stall_flag": true, "note": "STALL ONSET"},
{"ts": 1778649310, "chain": "arbitrum", "rtt_ms": 2717, "risk": 0.95, "stall_flag": true},
{"ts": 1778649318, "chain": "arbitrum", "rtt_ms": 1843, "risk": 0.90, "stall_flag": true},
{"ts": 1778649330, "chain": "arbitrum", "rtt_ms": 921, "risk": 0.78, "stall_flag": true},
{"ts": 1778649348, "chain": "arbitrum", "rtt_ms": 287, "risk": 0.55, "stall_flag": true},
{"ts": 1778649352, "chain": "arbitrum", "rtt_ms": 18, "risk": 0.06, "stall_flag": false, "note": "RECOVERY"}
]
Event summary:
- Normal baseline:
~14ms (P99 ≈ 85ms)
- Peak during stall:
3081ms — 36x above P99 baseline
- Duration: 47 seconds (05:15:05 → 05:15:52 UTC)
- First kernel-visible:
05:15:06 UTC
- First visible to public RPC layer:
05:15:53 UTC
- Gap: 47 seconds of stall that application-layer health checks did not see
On-Chain Evidence
Keeper/solver transaction failed at block 462289970 (05:15:11 UTC — 6 seconds into the stall):
TX: 0x93fc225dc2aded30eb0c51185467b547ccb9d989bb83db3feb80538a2f9b924c
Block: 462289970
Status: FAILED (0x0)
From: 0x0587a02effe763c8b8e686cac7ac0dab20a36d35
To: 0x93c30e6e09f698cfea99b09b5166ed90cfaedd17
Gas: 0.03 Gwei | Logs: 0 (reverted before any state change)
Verify on Arbiscan
0.03 Gwei + zero logs = automated keeper that submitted into the stall and reverted on stale state. Public RPCs showed the sequencer as healthy at the time of submission.
Why This Matters for SUAVE / Relay Routing
If a Kettle or relay is routing based on public RPC health signals, it remains blind to this 47-second window. During that window:
- Bundles are submitted against a sequencer that is TCP-reachable but not processing
- Inclusions fail (TX above is one example — there were others)
- Solver reputation degrades on failures that were not the solver's fault
A kernel-level TCP probe closes this gap. The kprobe fires at the network stack — it cannot be fooled by a sequencer that accepts connections but queues transactions internally.
What I Captured (Not All Shared Here)
The probe ran 5 hours 32 minutes continuously across 4 chains (03:57–09:29 UTC), capturing ~132,000 probe records. This issue shows a small excerpt.
The same session captured:
- ZKSync: 20+ stall events, peak 2928ms at 08:26 UTC
- Optimism: 5+ events, peak 1210ms
- Base: 0 stall events — fully stable during Azul hardfork activation
The full .jsonl session dump, the probe architecture, and the correlation methodology are not public. If this data is useful for SUAVE routing research or relay health oracle design, I'm happy to discuss directly.
— Kent
aleksandrkent64@gmail.com
Observation
On May 13, 2026 between 05:15:05 and 05:15:52 UTC, my kernel-level monitoring sensor recorded a severe latency spike to the Arbitrum sequencer.
Sharing this because it may be relevant to relay operators and SUAVE Kettle routing design — specifically the problem of public RPC health signals lagging real sequencer state.
Raw Telemetry
Measurement method: Linux kernel
tcp_connectkprobe, 150ms probe interval, targetsequencer.arbitrum.io:443.[ {"ts": 1778649305, "chain": "arbitrum", "rtt_ms": 14, "risk": 0.05, "stall_flag": false}, {"ts": 1778649306, "chain": "arbitrum", "rtt_ms": 3081, "risk": 0.97, "stall_flag": true, "note": "STALL ONSET"}, {"ts": 1778649310, "chain": "arbitrum", "rtt_ms": 2717, "risk": 0.95, "stall_flag": true}, {"ts": 1778649318, "chain": "arbitrum", "rtt_ms": 1843, "risk": 0.90, "stall_flag": true}, {"ts": 1778649330, "chain": "arbitrum", "rtt_ms": 921, "risk": 0.78, "stall_flag": true}, {"ts": 1778649348, "chain": "arbitrum", "rtt_ms": 287, "risk": 0.55, "stall_flag": true}, {"ts": 1778649352, "chain": "arbitrum", "rtt_ms": 18, "risk": 0.06, "stall_flag": false, "note": "RECOVERY"} ]Event summary:
~14ms(P99 ≈ 85ms)3081ms— 36x above P99 baseline05:15:06 UTC05:15:53 UTCOn-Chain Evidence
Keeper/solver transaction failed at block 462289970 (05:15:11 UTC — 6 seconds into the stall):
Verify on Arbiscan
0.03 Gwei + zero logs = automated keeper that submitted into the stall and reverted on stale state. Public RPCs showed the sequencer as healthy at the time of submission.
Why This Matters for SUAVE / Relay Routing
If a Kettle or relay is routing based on public RPC health signals, it remains blind to this 47-second window. During that window:
A kernel-level TCP probe closes this gap. The
kprobefires at the network stack — it cannot be fooled by a sequencer that accepts connections but queues transactions internally.What I Captured (Not All Shared Here)
The probe ran 5 hours 32 minutes continuously across 4 chains (03:57–09:29 UTC), capturing ~132,000 probe records. This issue shows a small excerpt.
The same session captured:
The full
.jsonlsession dump, the probe architecture, and the correlation methodology are not public. If this data is useful for SUAVE routing research or relay health oracle design, I'm happy to discuss directly.— Kent
aleksandrkent64@gmail.com