index.xml

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>The Encryption Compendium</title><link>/</link><description>Recent content on The Encryption Compendium</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en-us</language><atom:link href="/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>'Five Eyes' Security Alliance Calls for Access to Encrypted Material</title><link>/entries/five-eyes-security-alliance-calls-for-access-to-en-c3db0c94/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/five-eyes-security-alliance-calls-for-access-to-en-c3db0c94/</guid><description>Authors: Hosenball, Mark and Holden, Michael
Published: July 2019
URL: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-security-fiveeyes-britain-idUSKCN1UP199
Abstract: In July of 2019, Reuters Staff reported on a statement made that week by the Five Eyes Intelligence Alliance that “Tech companies should include mechanisms in the design of their encrypted products and services whereby governments, acting with appropriate legal authority, can obtain access to data in a readable and usable format.” Following a two-day summit in London, the five allied States reached an agreement with tech industry officials to “collaborate with the Five Eyes on a set of voluntary principles .</description></item><item><title>A Cryptography Policy Framework for Electronic Commerce: Building Canada's Information Economy and Society</title><link>/entries/a-cryptography-policy-framework-for-electronic-com-7c268883/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/a-cryptography-policy-framework-for-electronic-com-7c268883/</guid><description>Published: 1998
Abstract: This report summarizes the impact of encryption on Canada’s economy, the government’s policy, and how the policy could or should develop. First, the report defines cryptography and describes its uses, then describes Canada’s current encryption policy. Next, the report defines the factors and considerations crucial to developing Canada’s policies, such as commerce, State necessity, civil liberties, technical security, and international policy. Finally, the report discusses the benefits and drawbacks of various policy approaches to encryption.</description></item><item><title>A Flawed Encryption Policy</title><link>/entries/a-flawed-encryption-policy-218380c7/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/a-flawed-encryption-policy-218380c7/</guid><description>Authors: Anonymous
Published: October 1996
URL: https://search.proquest.com/docview/430685501/fulltext/2EA1B6B49BC74036PQ/1?accountid=14503
Abstract: This editorial in the New York Times argues that the Clinton Administration’s proposal to prevent the dissemination of encryption software to terrorists or criminals was both unworkable and presented risks to US commerce. The article discusses how industry and public interest advocates rejected the Administration’s proposals based on concerns about censorship, and the unworkability of the plan on practical grounds, including foreign unwillingness to acquiesce to potential surveillance by the U.</description></item><item><title>A Judicial Framework for Evaluating Network Investigative Techniques</title><link>/entries/a-judicial-framework-for-evaluating-network-invest-f6ee8147/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/a-judicial-framework-for-evaluating-network-invest-f6ee8147/</guid><description>Authors: Hennessey, Susan and Weaver, Nicholas
Published: July 2016
URL: https://www.lawfareblog.com/judicial-framework-evaluating-network-investigative-techniques
Abstract: This article in Lawfare by Susan Hennessey and Nicholas Weaver discusses the use of the NIT in the Playpen investigation, whether the government must disclose an NIT so that defendants may receive a fair trial, and proposes questions that courts should ask when evaluating disclosure of an NIT going forward. First, this article gives a background on the Playpen investigation, and the use of an NIT in the investigation, and background on NITs generally.</description></item><item><title>A Method for Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public-Key Cryptosystems</title><link>/entries/a-method-for-obtaining-digital-signatures-and-publ-eb215250/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/a-method-for-obtaining-digital-signatures-and-publ-eb215250/</guid><description>Authors: Rivest, R.L. and Shamir, A. and Adleman, L.
Published: April 1977
URL: https://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/Rsapaper.pdf
Abstract: This technical article discusses an encryption method where revealing an encryption key does not reveal the corresponding decryption key. This article proposes and explains a public-key cryptosystem that would not require a courier to carry the key. Further, the article explains its uses in the context of email, and how it would allow communications to be secure and private.</description></item><item><title>A Roadmap for Exceptional Access Research</title><link>/entries/a-roadmap-for-exceptional-access-research-9b867071/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/a-roadmap-for-exceptional-access-research-9b867071/</guid><description>Authors: Varia, Mayank
Published: December 2018
URL: https://www.lawfareblog.com/roadmap-exceptional-access-research
Abstract: Mayank Varia, Research Associate Professor of Computer Science at Boston University and Co-Director of BU’s Center for Reliable Information Systems and Cyber Security, warns of the “dour consequences” of continued politicization in the “crypto wars” debate over End-to-End (E2E) and Exceptional Access (EA) encryption systems. In an effort to quell continued politicization, Varia proposes a four-step roadmap to inform the process of developing EA technology and aid future policy debates.</description></item><item><title>A “Stumbling” US Encryption Policy</title><link>/entries/a-stumbling-us-encryption-policy-872ec273/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/a-stumbling-us-encryption-policy-872ec273/</guid><description>Authors: Madsen, Wayne
Published: July 1997
URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1361372397895486
Abstract: This article describes a 1997 hearing in the House of Representatives to discuss the SAFE Act, which would relax US encryption export controls. Administration officials sought to defend current key recovery policies and differentiate them from the Clipper Chip, while Representatives criticized them as unworkable, due to the necessary international cooperation. In discussing the SAFE ACT, industry representatives largely supported the bill and urged for minimal government restrictions.</description></item><item><title>American Cryptology During the Cold War, 1945-1989; Book 1: the Struggle for Centralization 1945-1960</title><link>/entries/american-cryptology-during-the-cold-war-1945-1989-4c53fc9a/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/american-cryptology-during-the-cold-war-1945-1989-4c53fc9a/</guid><description>Authors: Johnson, Thomas R.
Published: 1995
URL: https://web.archive.org/web/20090228051551/http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/cryptologic_histories/cold_war_i.pdf
Abstract: American Cryptology During the Cold War, 1945-1989 is the first two books in a four book series written by Thomas R. Johnson of the NSA’s Center for Cryptological History detailing the U.S. government’s use of cryptology. It begins by describing post-WWII cryptology to the end of the Nixon administration. This series seeks to describe events relevant to the development of the field, focusing on themes of “expansion and centralization.</description></item><item><title>Anonymity and Encryption: Comments Submitted to the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression</title><link>/entries/anonymity-and-encryption-comments-submitted-to-the-679d1ec2/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/anonymity-and-encryption-comments-submitted-to-the-679d1ec2/</guid><description>Authors: Rodriguez, Katitza
Published: February 2015
URL: https://www.eff.org/files/2015/02/10/unanonymity-encryption-eff.pdf
Abstract: The Electron Frontier Foundation’s comments regarding Anonymity and Encryption describe and argue for the benefit of anonymity and encryption. The comments describe what anonymity and digital anonymity are, their relevance to human rights, and policies around the world which either undermine or support the right to anonymity from both private and government actors. Finally, the comments describe encryption and its defend individuals right to encryption.</description></item><item><title>Another Faulty Encryption Policy</title><link>/entries/another-faulty-encryption-policy-092ca4e3/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/another-faulty-encryption-policy-092ca4e3/</guid><description>Published: December 1996
URL: https://search.proquest.com/docview/430702910/fulltext/CAF9E584F5344769PQ/1?accountid=14503
Abstract: On December 16, 1996, the New York Times published an editorial piece criticizing the unworkability and risks associated with the (then) newest Clinton Administration plan to control the export of encryption software. The editorial expressed concerns related to infringement of privacy rights and damage to United States software firms, which would lose business as a result of the availability of less intrusive encryption software from foreign firms.</description></item><item><title>Apple Will No Longer Unlock Most iPhones, iPads for Police, Even with Search Warrants</title><link>/entries/apple-will-no-longer-unlock-most-iphones-ipads-for-41182863/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/apple-will-no-longer-unlock-most-iphones-ipads-for-41182863/</guid><description>Authors: Timberg, Craig
Published: September 2014
URL: https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/2014/09/17/2612af58-3ed2-11e4-b03f-de718edeb92f_story.html
Abstract: In late 2014, in response to allegations of over-participation in government efforts to collect user information, Apple announced a plan to cease turning over user data to police, even when they have a search a warrant. The move, which was classified as an “engineering solution to a legal quandary,” came in the form of an update to the Apple’s mobile operating system privacy policy and relied primarily upon the encryption automatically placed on Apple mobile devices, via the selection of an access passcode.</description></item><item><title>As Encryption Spreads, U.S. Grapples with Clash Between Privacy, Security</title><link>/entries/as-encryption-spreads-u-s-grapples-with-clash-betw-c9f820a1/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/as-encryption-spreads-u-s-grapples-with-clash-betw-c9f820a1/</guid><description>Authors: Nakashima, Ellen and Gellman, Barton
Published: April 2015
URL: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/as-encryption-spreads-us-worries-about-access-to-data-for-investigations/2015/04/10/7c1c7518-d401-11e4-a62f-ee745911a4ff_story.html
Abstract: Ellen Nakashima and Barton Gellman explore the Obama Administration’s handling of and resistance to calls within the Intelligence and Law Enforcement communities to pressure technology companies, such as Apple, to build “back door” access to encrypted user data. The article explores numerous alternative options which were being considered by the White House, such as setting up mirror accounts or compelling companies to back up data to a company server (which would be subject to decryption with a warrant), yet identifies considerable challenges associated with each of the proposed methods.</description></item><item><title>Attorney General William P. Barr Delivers Keynote Address at the International Conference on Cyber Security</title><link>/entries/attorney-general-william-p-barr-delivers-keynote-a-55f805a8/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/attorney-general-william-p-barr-delivers-keynote-a-55f805a8/</guid><description>Authors: Barr, William
Published: July 2019
URL: https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-william-p-barr-delivers-keynote-address-international-conference-cyber
Abstract: Former Attorney General William Barr delivered the keynote address at the International Conference on Cyber Security in 2019. In the speech, Barr describes encryption as a technology that gives cover to criminals, particularly drug cartels, and prevents law enforcement from solving crimes. Barr insinuates that the Fourth Amendment, through balancing personal privacy and public safety, may not allow so-called “warrant-proof encryption” and requests backdoors be added to encryption to allow law enforcement access to encrypted messages through pursuant to warrants.</description></item><item><title>Australian Government Passes Contentious Encryption Law</title><link>/entries/australian-government-passes-contentious-encryptio-6d9e9517/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/australian-government-passes-contentious-encryptio-6d9e9517/</guid><description>Authors: Tarabay, Jamie
Published: June 2018
URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/06/world/australia/encryption-bill-nauru.html
Abstract: On December 6, 2018, the New York Times published an article about Australia’s passage of the Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act 2018 (TOLA Act), which requires technology companies to grant law enforcement access to encrypted messages. The article’s main focus was relaying the arguments of the opponents and proponents of the bill. Opponents of the bill believe it compromises the privacy of Australians, could lead to abuse, and will encourage other countries to follow suit.</description></item><item><title>Bernstein v. US Dept. of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426 (N.D. Cal. 1996)</title><link>/entries/bernstein-v-us-dept-of-state-922-f-supp-1426-n-d-c-bfdb8533/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/bernstein-v-us-dept-of-state-922-f-supp-1426-n-d-c-bfdb8533/</guid><description>URL: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/922/1426/1592613/</description></item><item><title>Bernstein v. US Dept. of State, 945 F. Supp. 1279 (N.D. Cal. 1996)</title><link>/entries/bernstein-v-us-dept-of-state-945-f-supp-1279-n-d-c-1b4aef36/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/bernstein-v-us-dept-of-state-945-f-supp-1279-n-d-c-1b4aef36/</guid><description>URL: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/945/1279/1457799/
Abstract: Bernstein v. US Dept. of State, 945 F. Supp. 1279 (N.D. Cal. 1996) case opinion from the US District Court for the Northern District of California</description></item><item><title>Bernstein v. US Dept. of State, 974 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1997)</title><link>/entries/bernstein-v-us-dept-of-state-974-f-supp-1288-n-d-c-60eae534/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/bernstein-v-us-dept-of-state-974-f-supp-1288-n-d-c-60eae534/</guid><description>URL: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/974/1288/1451176/
Abstract: Bernstein v. US Dept. of State, 974 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1997) case opinion from the US District Court for the Northern District of California</description></item><item><title>Best Practices for Encryption in P25 Public Safety Land Mobile Radio Systems</title><link>/entries/best-practices-for-encryption-in-p25-public-safety-c4ce136f/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/best-practices-for-encryption-in-p25-public-safety-c4ce136f/</guid><description>Published: September 2016
URL: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/20160830%20Best%20Practices%20for%20Encryption_Final%20Draft508_0.pdf
Abstract: In September 2016, The Federal Partnership for Interoperable Communications (FPIC), in coordination with Aviation Safety Communique (SAFECOM) and the National Council of Statewide Interoperability Coordinators (NCSWIC), published a report to guide all levels of government in their efforts to improve encrypted interoperability for public safety land mobile radio systems. The “Best Practices” they advocate for the government pertain to: key management organization, key generation and distribution, adopting a National SLN assignment plan, standards-based encryption, crypto period considerations, communications planning, education and training, communications exercises and testing, and experts outreach.</description></item><item><title>Beyond Secrets: The Consumer Stake in the Encryption Debate</title><link>/entries/beyond-secrets-the-consumer-stake-in-the-encryptio-5a9a086a/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/beyond-secrets-the-consumer-stake-in-the-encryptio-5a9a086a/</guid><description>Published: December 2017
URL: https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Beyond-Secrets-12.21.17-FINAL.pdf
Abstract: On December 21, 2017, ConsumersUnion and Upturn released this paper on consumers’ stake in the encryption debate. The paper begins with information on cryptography: what it is and how it works. It then discusses the ways in which encryption benefits consumers, including: protecting their health information, safeguarding their financial well-being, facilitating sale software updates, ensuring physical safety, and allowing consumers to communicate with confidence. The purpose of this paper is to educate consumers about the many ways that encryption benefits consumers and the systems and infrastructure consumers rely upon, and the potential costs if encryption were to be compromised.</description></item><item><title>Big reputation: What the Australian Parliament Can Learn from Taylor Swift</title><link>/entries/big-reputation-what-the-australian-parliament-can-642ff3e3/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/big-reputation-what-the-australian-parliament-can-642ff3e3/</guid><description>Authors: Stepanovich, Amie
Published: February 2019
URL: https://www.accessnow.org/big-reputation-what-the-australian-parliament-can-learn-from-taylor-swift/
Abstract: On January 26, 2019, Access Now published an article about Australia’s passage of the draconian Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access Bill) Act 2018, which requires technology companies to grant law enforcement hack devices and access to encrypted messages, without judicial oversight. At the time the article was written, the bill called for further review, which opened up the potential to add “amendments, safeguards, and transparency requirements” to the bill.</description></item><item><title>Breaking: FBI Admits its Claims of “Going Dark” Were Overblown, Based on Bad Math</title><link>/entries/breaking-fbi-admits-its-claims-of-going-dark-were-b620adf1/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/breaking-fbi-admits-its-claims-of-going-dark-were-b620adf1/</guid><description>Published: May 2018
URL: https://www.newamerica.org/oti/press-releases/breaking-fbi-admits-its-claims-going-dark-were-overblown-based-bad-math/
Abstract: The Open Technology Institute released a statement regarding a Washington Post report that the FBI overstated “the number of encrypted mobile devices it could not unlock in 2017.” While the FBI had previously claimed there were 7,775 such devices, the FBI later clarified that the real number was around 1,200. Kevin Bankston, the Director of New America’s Open Technology Institute, issued a statement which called for Congressional investigation into the false numbers and arguing that the FBI’s requests for backdoors should be met with skepticism.</description></item><item><title>Brief of Amici Curiae Access Now and Wickr Foundation in Support of Apple Inc.'s Motion to Vacate</title><link>/entries/brief-of-amici-curiae-access-now-and-wickr-foundat-c51e7fcb/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/brief-of-amici-curiae-access-now-and-wickr-foundat-c51e7fcb/</guid><description>Authors: Wickr Foundation
Abstract: This amicus brief was filed by Access Now and the Wickr Foundation in support of Apple in the Central District of California, asserting that allowing the government to install software to weaken encryption would have far-reaching effects beyond the singular iPhone at hand. The FBI petitioned the court to require Apple to create and install &amp;ldquo;GovtOS&amp;rdquo; which would allow the FBI to work around security features and potentially access encrypted information.</description></item><item><title>Bureau of Export Administration Annual Report 1998</title><link>/entries/bureau-of-export-administration-annual-report-1998-b53ffd24/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/bureau-of-export-administration-annual-report-1998-b53ffd24/</guid><description>Published: 1998
Abstract: The Annual Report issued by the Bureau of Export Administration (BXA) provides the fiscal year highlights of the Bureau’s administration, enforcement and regulation of exports of dual-use commodities, technology and software from the United States and its territories. In 1998, the BXA was tasked with implementing the Clinton Administration’s commercial encryption policy. BXA was tasked with the objective of “promot[ing] growth of electronic commerce and secure communications worldwide while protecting the public safety and national security.</description></item><item><title>CALEA II: Risks of Wiretap Modifications to Endpoints</title><link>/entries/calea-ii-risks-of-wiretap-modifications-to-endpoin-33317ce9/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/calea-ii-risks-of-wiretap-modifications-to-endpoin-33317ce9/</guid><description>Authors: Adida, Ben and Anderson, Collin and Anton, Annie I. and Blaze, Matt and Dingledine, Roger and Felten, Edward W. and Green, Matthew D. and Halderman, J. Alex and Jefferson, David R. and Jennings, Cullen and Landau, Susan and Mitter, Navroop and Neumann, Peter G. and Rescorla, Eric and Schneider, Fred B. and Schneier, Bruce and Shacham, Hovav and Sherr, Micah and Wagner, David and Zimmermann, Philip
Published: May 2013</description></item><item><title>Canada's Quiet Weakening of Communications Encryption</title><link>/entries/canada-s-quiet-weakening-of-communications-encrypt-c6650006/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/canada-s-quiet-weakening-of-communications-encrypt-c6650006/</guid><description>Authors: Parsons, Christopher and Israel, Tamir
Published: August 2015
URL: https://citizenlab.ca/2015/08/canadas-quiet-history-of-weakening-communications-encryption/
Abstract: This article outlines some of the federal government of Canada’s successful and unsuccessful attempts to weaken encryption standards.</description></item><item><title>Canada’s New and Irresponsible Encryption Policy: How the Government of Canada’s New Policy Threatens Charter Rights, Cybersecurity, Economic Growth, and Foreign Policy</title><link>/entries/canadas-new-and-irresponsible-encryption-policy-ho-c1d6da72/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/canadas-new-and-irresponsible-encryption-policy-ho-c1d6da72/</guid><description>Authors: Parsons, Christopher
Published: August 2019
URL: https://citizenlab.ca/2019/08/canadas-new-and-irresponsible-encryption-policy-how-the-government-of-canadas-new-policy-threatens-charter-rights-cybersecurity-economic-growth-and-foreign-policy/
Abstract: This article by Christopher Parsons argues that a 2019 Canadian ministerial communique weakens encryption. First, the article provides background on the history of Canadian encryption policy and the 2019 ministerial communique, and how its proposed policy would weaken encryption and require that private companies add backdoors for the Canadian government. Next, the article details the government&amp;rsquo;s justifications for the policy, and how they fail to justify the weakening of encryption.</description></item><item><title>CEOs and Encryption: The Questions You Need to Ask Your Experts</title><link>/entries/ceos-and-encryption-the-questions-you-need-to-ask-f054d98f/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/ceos-and-encryption-the-questions-you-need-to-ask-f054d98f/</guid><description>Authors: Wilton, Robin
Published: March 2018
URL: https://www.internetsociety.org/blog/2018/03/ceos-encryption-questions-need-asking-experts-2/
Abstract: On March 16, 2018, Robin Wilton, Director of Internet Trust, published a paper – originally created as an internal memorandum for Internet Society CEO, Kathy Brown – detailing the key questions CEOs should ask technical experts to ensure encryption policy competency. The paper explores three key topics: (1) getting a snapshot of your organization’s crypto strategy and current states, (2) practical challenges of deployment and management, and (3) non-technical factors around risk mitigation and law enforcement access.</description></item><item><title>Clinton Administration Announces New Cybersecurity Proposals</title><link>/entries/clinton-administration-announces-new-cybersecurity-6826eb57/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/clinton-administration-announces-new-cybersecurity-6826eb57/</guid><description>Authors: Libbie Schlatheri
Published: July 2000
Abstract: On July 17, 2000, Libbie Schlatheir, a producer for CNN, issued a report detailing announcements by Clinton Administration officials regarding updates to its policy for encryption exports to the European Union and key trading partners. The updates, attributed largely to a speech by Clinton White House Chief of Staff, John Podesta, at the National Press Club, “liberalize[d] export controls on encryption, allowing more companies to export the technology to more end users… while maintaining a framework necessary to protect [U.</description></item><item><title>Clinton Administration Encryption Policy Statement \&amp; Press Briefing</title><link>/entries/clinton-administration-encryption-policy-statement-cdde72d2/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/clinton-administration-encryption-policy-statement-cdde72d2/</guid><description>Published: September 1998
URL: https://congressional.proquest.com/congressional</description></item><item><title>Clinton Removes Export Limits on Encryption Technology</title><link>/entries/clinton-removes-export-limits-on-encryption-techno-9f78e038/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/clinton-removes-export-limits-on-encryption-techno-9f78e038/</guid><description>Authors: Gerstenzang, James
Published: September 1999
URL: https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1999-sep-17-fi-11110-story.html
Abstract: In September of 1999, James Gerstenzang, a staff writer for the Los Angeles Times, reported on the Clinton Administration decision to liberalize export requirements on encryption technology. Gerstenzang’s report details the political dynamics at play leading up to and anticipated to follow the decision. This analysis includes statements from Clinton Administration cabinet officials, such as Attorney General, Janet Reno, and Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs, James B.</description></item><item><title>Coalition Letter of Law Professors to Hon. Thomas J. Biley Regarding SAFE Amendments</title><link>/entries/coalition-letter-of-law-professors-to-hon-thomas-j-f69d54a6/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/coalition-letter-of-law-professors-to-hon-thomas-j-f69d54a6/</guid><description>Authors: Aoki, Keith and Ashley, Kevin D. and Balkin, Jack M. and Boyd, William E. and Brown, Darryl K. and Burk, Dan L. and Cohen, Julie E. and Fitzgerald, Peter E. and Freedman, Eric M. and Froomkin, A. Michael and Gibbons, Llewellyn J. and Hoff, Timothy and Kang, Jerry and Katsh, Ethan and Koppelman, Andrew and Lemley, Mark and Lessig, Lawrence and Litman, Jessica and Perritt, Henry H. and Post, David G.</description></item><item><title>Coalition Letter to Members of Australia's Parliament</title><link>/entries/coalition-letter-to-members-of-australia-s-parliam-65b62b0b/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/coalition-letter-to-members-of-australia-s-parliam-65b62b0b/</guid><description>Published: July 2018
URL: https://www.accessnow.org/cms/assets/uploads/2018/07/Australia-Encryption-Coalition-Letter.pdf
Abstract: On July 17, 2018 a coalition of domestic and international organizations and experts sent a letter to Australia’s parliament, urging it to not pass the Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act 2018 (TOLA Act), which would require technology companies to grant law enforcement access to encrypted messages. The letter stresses the direct and indirect consequences of Australia’s proposed TOLA Act, should it pass.</description></item><item><title>Coalition Letter to Ministers Responsible for the Five Eyes Security Community</title><link>/entries/coalition-letter-to-ministers-responsible-for-the-c239cb16/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/coalition-letter-to-ministers-responsible-for-the-c239cb16/</guid><description>Published: June 2017
URL: https://www.accessnow.org/cms/assets/uploads/2017/07/Five-eyes-open-letter.pdf
Abstract: In June of 2017, a coalition of 83 civil society organizations and eminent individuals wrote to the Ministers Responsible for the Five Eyes Security Community to “emphasize the importance of national policies that encourage and facilitate the development and use of strong encryption.” The coalition expressed concern with a joint communiqué – published following a Five Eyes meeting – expressing a commitment to exploring solutions to the “perceived impediment posed by encryption to investigative objectives” and plans “to press technology firms to share encrypted data with security agencies.</description></item><item><title>Coalition Letter to NIST</title><link>/entries/coalition-letter-to-nist-7f0953e7/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/coalition-letter-to-nist-7f0953e7/</guid><description>Authors: Stepanovich, Amie
Published: November 2014
URL: https://www.accessnow.org/cms/assets/uploads/archive/Coalition-NIST-Nov2014.pdf
Abstract: In November of 2014, a coalition of companies and civil society organizations wrote to the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST), President Barack Obama, and Secretary of Commerce, Penny Pritzker to “re-emphasize the importance of creating a process for establishing secure and resilient encryption standards, free from back doors.” The letter was intended to influence the final version of the NIST’s Cryptographic Standards and Guidelines Development Process, through a series of policy recommendations.</description></item><item><title>Coalition Letter to President Obama 04/11/2016</title><link>/entries/coalition-letter-to-president-obama-04-11-2016-4b5abd91/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/coalition-letter-to-president-obama-04-11-2016-4b5abd91/</guid><description>Published: April 2016
URL: https://www.accessnow.org/cms/assets/uploads/2016/04/Encryption-Letter.pdf
Abstract: On April 11, 2016, a coalition of domestic and international organizations and experts sent a letter to President Barack Obama in which they urged the White House to “specifically oppose legislation to undermine security and reiterate the need for a broad statement of support for encryption from the administration”. The letter was sent in response to a draft bill titled “Compliance with Court Order Act of 2016”, which would compel all internet companies and “any person who provides a product or method to facilitate a communication or the processing or storage of data,” to “either undermine the security features they offer users or offer lesser security so as to facilitate government access.</description></item><item><title>Coalition Letter to President Obama 10/27/2016</title><link>/entries/coalition-letter-to-president-obama-10-27-2016-20313e86/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/coalition-letter-to-president-obama-10-27-2016-20313e86/</guid><description>Published: October 2016
Abstract: On October 27, 2016, a coalition of domestic organizations and experts sent a letter to President Barack Obama in which they urged the White House to respond to a petition using the Administration&amp;rsquo;s &amp;ldquo;We the People&amp;rdquo; platform. The petition asked that the Administration &amp;ldquo;[p]ublicly affirm your support for strong encryption,” to “[r]eject any law, policy, or mandate that would undermine our security” online, and to &amp;ldquo;encourage other governments worldwide to do the same.</description></item><item><title>Coalition Letter to President Obama 5/19/2015</title><link>/entries/coalition-letter-to-president-obama-5-19-2015-ad5d54f2/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/coalition-letter-to-president-obama-5-19-2015-ad5d54f2/</guid><description>Published: May 2015
URL: https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/3138&amp;ndash;113/Encryption_Letter_to_Obama_final_051915.pdf
Abstract: We urge you to reject any proposal that U.S. companies deliberately weaken the security of their products. We request that the White House instead focus on developing policies that will promote rather than undermine the wide adoption of strong encryption technology. Such policies will in turn help to promote and protect cybersecurity, economic growth, and human rights, both here and abroad.</description></item><item><title>Complete ACM Columns Collection</title><link>/entries/complete-acm-columns-collection-9f722ce3/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/complete-acm-columns-collection-9f722ce3/</guid><description>URL: https://www.eff.org/pages/complete-acm-columns-collection
Abstract: Coming Into The Country Private Life in Cyberspace The Great Work Decrypting the Puzzle Palace Will Japan Jack In? Bill O&amp;rsquo; Rights Lite A Plaintext On Crypto Dad&amp;rsquo;s Invisible Shield Death from Above</description></item><item><title>Compliance with Court Orders Act of 2016 - Draft</title><link>/entries/compliance-with-court-orders-act-of-2016-draft-517e2d28/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/compliance-with-court-orders-act-of-2016-draft-517e2d28/</guid><description>Authors: Burr, Richard, Feinstein, Dianne
URL: https://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2016/4/intelligence-committee-leaders-release-discussion-draft-of-encryption-legislation</description></item><item><title>Congress Mulls Stiff Crypto Laws</title><link>/entries/congress-mulls-stiff-crypto-laws-50dadb61/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/congress-mulls-stiff-crypto-laws-50dadb61/</guid><description>Authors: McCullagh, Declan
Published: September 2001
URL: https://www.wired.com/2001/09/congress-mulls-stiff-crypto-laws/
Abstract: On September 13, 2001, Wired published an article about the impact of 9/11 terrorist attacks on the encryption debate, and declared that “[t]he encryption wars have begun”. The article claims that the balance of the debate between privacy and security “abruptly shifted” in the wake of 9/11, and that “political winds have shifted from business to national security”. The article discusses various Clinton Administration initiatives related to encryption, and highlighted quotes from Congress members who “called for a global prohibition on encryption products without backdoors for government surveillance”.</description></item><item><title>Congress, Not the Attorney General, Should Decide the Future of Encryption</title><link>/entries/congress-not-the-attorney-general-should-decide-th-61477972/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/congress-not-the-attorney-general-should-decide-th-61477972/</guid><description>Authors: Rozenshtein, Alan Z.
Published: February 2020
URL: https://www.lawfareblog.com/congress-not-attorney-general-should-decide-future-encryption
Abstract: Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Associate Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota Law School, warns of the dangers of forgoing end-to-end encryption, an anticipated consequence of the powers granted to the attorney general, in the circulating draft of the EARN IT Act. Rozenshtein argues, “the question of whether to permit ubiquitous encryption is the sort of high-level policy decision that is best handled not by the executive branch but by Congress,” recommends against the legislature “shirk[ing] its responsibility to make this tough decision,” and, in the context of the Act, calls for the exclusion of anything encryption-related from the list of best practices.</description></item><item><title>Considerations for Encryption in Public Safety Radio Systems</title><link>/entries/considerations-for-encryption-in-public-safety-rad-7298abf0/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/considerations-for-encryption-in-public-safety-rad-7298abf0/</guid><description>Authors: Pfefferkorn, Riana
Published: September 2016
URL: https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/20160830_fact_sheet_considerations_final_draft508_0.pdf
Abstract: In September of 2016, at the request of the public safety community, the Federal Partnership for Interoperable Communications (FPIC), produced a report on the key reasons, implications, and considerations associated with the encryption of critical portions of public safety communication systems. Among the key considerations for policy and stakeholders were what to encrypt; how to encrypt; the impact on Interoperability; public information access; and general cost considerations.</description></item><item><title>Content-Oblivious Trust and Safety Techniques: Results from a Survey of Online Service Providers</title><link>/entries/content-oblivious-trust-and-safety-techniques-resu-bd3a0a7e/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/content-oblivious-trust-and-safety-techniques-resu-bd3a0a7e/</guid><description>Authors: Pfefferkorn, Riana
URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3920031
Abstract: Riana Pfefferkorn, research scholar at the Stanford Internet Observatory, describes a survey of online service providers regarding their online trust and safety techniques. She concludes that content-dependent techniques are not a “silver bullet against abuse” and that any marginal inhibiting effect of using end-to-end encryption will vary by abuse type. Instead, she encourages greater consideration of what she calls “content-oblivious” techniques in the ongoing policy debate regarding providers’ anti-abuse obligations and their use of end-to-end encryption.</description></item><item><title>Cracking DES: Secrets of Encryption Research, Wiretap Politics \&amp; Chip Design. How Federal Agencies Subvert Privacy</title><link>/entries/cracking-des-secrets-of-encryption-research-wireta-a4fb65fa/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/cracking-des-secrets-of-encryption-research-wireta-a4fb65fa/</guid><description>Authors: Electronic Frontier Foundation
Published: 1998
URL: http://archive.org/details/crackingdessecre00elec
Abstract: In 1998, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, an international non-profit digital rights group dedicated to the promotion of internet civil liberties, published a book detailing the Foundation’s $210,000 research project to build a machine to crack Data Encryption Standard (DES) – a DES Cracker. The book features an overview of the basic architecture of the machine; design and hardware specifications; and technical design specifications, such as the software source code, chip source code, chip simulator source code, and hardware board schematics, which enable any cryptographer to replicate their work.</description></item><item><title>Crypto Summit 1.0</title><link>/entries/crypto-summit-1-0-efc034c8/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/crypto-summit-1-0-efc034c8/</guid><description>Published: July 2015
URL: https://www.accessnow.org/crypto_summit_part1/
Abstract: AccessNow published a summary of the Crypto Summit 1.0, the first of two summits, which occurred on July 15, 2015 in Washington, DC. The topics discussed in the conference focus on the United States and include crypto history, encryption technology, the current state of the law and how it should evolve, the biggest challenges and opportunities of encryption and the future of encryption based on potential policy outcomes.</description></item><item><title>Crypto Summit 2.0 Outcomes Report Track 1</title><link>/entries/crypto-summit-2-0-outcomes-report-track-1-f3204001/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/crypto-summit-2-0-outcomes-report-track-1-f3204001/</guid><description>Published: March 2016
URL: https://www.accessnow.org/cms/assets/uploads/2016/07/CS2.0_Outcomes_Track1.pdf
Abstract: AccessNow published a summary of the Crypto Summit 2.0, the second of two summits, which occurred on March 30, 2016 in Silicon Valley. The goal of this conference was to build off the key questions identified in Crypto Summit 1.0. The group identified four policy tracks to focus on in the second summit. The first policy track entails the “roles and responsibilities in an encrypted world”.</description></item><item><title>Crypto Summit 2.0 Outcomes Report Track 2</title><link>/entries/crypto-summit-2-0-outcomes-report-track-2-d37df90e/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/crypto-summit-2-0-outcomes-report-track-2-d37df90e/</guid><description>Authors: Augusto Liguori Filho, Carlos and Kenzo dos Santos, Guilherme and Favaretto Salvador, João Pedro and Guimarães, Tatiane B.
URL: http://www.fgv.br/direitosp/cryptomap/eng/#home
Abstract: The “CryptoMap” is an interactive digital map project, conducted by the Center for Education and Research in Innovation (CEPI) at Fundação Getulio Vargas São Paulo Law School (FGV Direito SP), in Brazil, that seeks to map the international debate on encryption regulation. Each of the 40 countries on the map features a clickable “CryptoPedia” entry (a short summary of the country’s encryption policies), alongside an access link to a “Descriptive Pill,” which describes the country’s domestic privacy policies, encryption regulations, and the government’s access to encrypted data in greater detail.</description></item><item><title>Cryptography and Liberty 2000: An International Survey of Encryption Policy</title><link>/entries/cryptography-and-liberty-2000-an-international-sur-3c4921c1/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/cryptography-and-liberty-2000-an-international-sur-3c4921c1/</guid><description>Authors: Banisar, David and Madsen, Wayne
Published: 2000
URL: https://epic.org/reports/crypto2000.html/
Abstract: Cryptography and Liberty is a survey by EPIC, a non-profit organization, on governmental encryption and cryptography laws around the world and the impacts of human rights. The survey focused on laws on domestic use of cryptography, disclosure requirements for encryption keys, import and export controls, and which government agencies or entities regulate cryptography and encryption.</description></item><item><title>Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society</title><link>/entries/cryptography-s-role-in-securing-the-information-so-07be5799/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/cryptography-s-role-in-securing-the-information-so-07be5799/</guid><description>Published: 1996
URL: https://www.nap.edu/catalog/5131/cryptographys-role-in-securing-the-information-society
Abstract: Cryptography&amp;rsquo;s Role in Securing the Information Society by the National Research Council is a large, in-depth report seeking to describe and define what the national policy on cryptography could be. The report first describes the vulnerabilities, needs, and markets for cryptography for businesses and individuals, as well as the need for access for governments. Next, the report describes policy instruments, such as export controls, escrowed encryption, the Clipper Chip, and internal federal government policies.</description></item><item><title>Daniel J. Bernstein v. U.S. Department of State</title><link>/entries/daniel-j-bernstein-v-u-s-department-of-state-11e93c28/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/daniel-j-bernstein-v-u-s-department-of-state-11e93c28/</guid><description>Published: December 1996
URL: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/945/1279/1457799/
Abstract: In Bernstein v U.S. Department of State, the US District Court for the Northern District of California held that licensing requirements for speech relating to encryption of computer software constituted unlawful prior restraint. Daniel Bernstein, a mathematician, challenged restrictions on the exportation of cryptography from the United States. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief, facially and as-applied, against enforcement of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).</description></item><item><title>Debate: Law Enforcement vs. Smartphone Encryption</title><link>/entries/debate-law-enforcement-vs-smartphone-encryption-d2d753c0/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/debate-law-enforcement-vs-smartphone-encryption-d2d753c0/</guid><description>Authors: New America
Published: November 2014
URL: https://www.newamerica.org/oti/events/debate-on-law-enforcement-vs-smartphone-encryption/
Abstract: This debate features former government officials, technologists, and privacy advocates about encryption being offered as a default on smartphones. One side argues that this move will deprive law enforcement of the ability to seek evidence, even with a warrant, and discusses the possible near for congressional action to require companies to allow law enforcement access. The other side argues that such laws would undermine security and privacy, and disadvantage US technology makers.</description></item><item><title>Decryption Originalism: The Lessons of Burr</title><link>/entries/decryption-originalism-the-lessons-of-burr-a1d594eb/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/decryption-originalism-the-lessons-of-burr-a1d594eb/</guid><description>Authors: Kerr, Orin
Published: February 2020
URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3533069
Abstract: This law review article by Orin Kerr describes Fifth Amendment arguments in the treason trial against Aaron Burr and their application potential application to a Supreme Court case regarding encryption. The 1807 trial of Aaron Burr was exhaustively documented and therefore is able to shed light on the founder’s original intent of the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on self-incrimination. Kerr applies these underlying intents and principles of the Fifth Amendment and applies them to the modern debate on encryption.</description></item><item><title>Deep Dive into Crypto “Exceptional Access” Mandates: Effective or Constitutional—Pick One</title><link>/entries/deep-dive-into-crypto-exceptional-access-mandates-4ed0e169/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/deep-dive-into-crypto-exceptional-access-mandates-4ed0e169/</guid><description>Authors: Cardozo, Nate and Crocker, Andrew
Published: August 2015
URL: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/08/deep-dive-crypto-exceptional-access-mandates-effective-or-constitutional-pick-one
Abstract: Deep Dive into Crypto “Exceptional Access” Mandates: Effective or Constitutional—Pick One by Andrew Crocker and Nate Cardozo argues that any exceptional access mandate would violate the First Amendment. The article is responding to a plethora of news coverage, citing law enforcement officials and detailing law enforcement’s need for “exceptional access” to allow government access to all encrypted materials. The article next argues that any exceptional access would require government control over the development of encryption software, which is speech, and would therefore violate the First Amendment’s ban on prior restraint.</description></item><item><title>Demystifying U.S. Encryption Export Controls</title><link>/entries/demystifying-u-s-encryption-export-controls-22620d22/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/demystifying-u-s-encryption-export-controls-22620d22/</guid><description>Authors: James B. Altman, William McGlone
Published: 1996
URL: https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/aulr46&amp;amp;i=507
Abstract: This 1996 law review article by James Altman and William McGlone seeks to offer practical insights on export controls of encryption software and the underlying policy consideration. First, this article establishes the landscape of encryption in global business and trade. Second, the article explains the U.S. export controls and licensing requirements in place in 1996, including the scope of laws, agency jurisdiction.</description></item><item><title>Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein Delivers Remarks at the Global Cyber Security Summit</title><link>/entries/deputy-attorney-general-rod-j-rosenstein-delivers-a3df0cc4/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/deputy-attorney-general-rod-j-rosenstein-delivers-a3df0cc4/</guid><description>Authors: Rosenstein, Rod
Published: October 2017
URL: https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-rod-j-rosenstein-delivers-remarks-global-cyber-security-summit
Abstract: This speech by Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein at the Global Cyber Security Summit in 2017 argues that competitive forces lead technology companies and the makers of encrypted technologies to resist cooperation with law enforcement. The speech details global cybersecurity threats, and how government programs, such as the Department of Defense and Department of justice have developed programs to help counter cyber attacks.</description></item><item><title>Disputes on Electronic Message Encryption Take on New Urgency</title><link>/entries/disputes-on-electronic-message-encryption-take-on-6dfb72b1/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/disputes-on-electronic-message-encryption-take-on-6dfb72b1/</guid><description>Authors: Schwartz, John
Published: September 2001
URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/25/business/disputes-on-electronic-message-encryption-take-on-new-urgency.html
Abstract: This article, Disputes on Electronic Message Encryption Take on New Urgency, written by John Schwartz and published in the New York Times shortly after 9/11, describes how the attack on the World Trade Center, and the possibility that the attackers used encrypted communications in the planning and execution of the attack, renewed debate on law enforcement access to encrypted technologies. The article describes the applicability of key escrow and the Clipper Chip to accessing encrypted communications, and legislative proposals for access proposed in the days after 9/11.</description></item><item><title>DOJ Plans to Strike Against Encryption While the Techlash Iron Is Hot</title><link>/entries/doj-plans-to-strike-against-encryption-while-the-t-bdfdad83/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/doj-plans-to-strike-against-encryption-while-the-t-bdfdad83/</guid><description>Authors: Pfefferkorn, Riana
Published: February 2020
URL: /blog/2020/02/doj-plans-strike-against-encryption-while-techlash-iron-hot
Abstract: This blog post by Riana Pfefferkorn argues that since 2016, the Department of Justice sought to capitalize on public anti-technology sentiment to weaken encryption. First, the article describes the political climate, shaped by the Apple v FBI case, the role of big tech in various privacy scandals and foreign interference in the 2016 election, and foreign legislation, particularly in Australia and the U.</description></item><item><title>Don’t Panic: Making Progress on the “Going Dark” Debate</title><link>/entries/dont-panic-making-progress-on-the-going-dark-debat-092ae356/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/dont-panic-making-progress-on-the-going-dark-debat-092ae356/</guid><description>Published: February 2016
Abstract: In September of 2016, the Federal Partnership for Interoperable Communications (FPIC), produced a report on the key reasons, implications, and considerations associated with the encryption of critical portions of public safety communication systems, Considerations for Encryption in Public Safety Radio Systems. As a supplement to that report, the FPIC published this two-page fact sheet, which provides a summary of the report and the policy justifications for its recommendations.</description></item><item><title>Doomed to Repeat History? Lessons from the Crypto Wars of the 1990s</title><link>/entries/doomed-to-repeat-history-lessons-from-the-crypto-w-d9384864/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/doomed-to-repeat-history-lessons-from-the-crypto-w-d9384864/</guid><description>Authors: Kehl, Danielle and Wilson, Andi and Bankston, Kevin
Published: June 2015
Abstract: On June 17, 2015, the Open Technology Institute at New America published a report on the history of the debate between private companies, privacy advocates, and the United States government regarding “the right to use and distribute products that contain strong encryption technology.” Topics discussed include the history of encryption before this policy debate emerged in the 1990s, the fight over Clipper Chips and key escrow, the fight over encryption export controls, the “post-war” proof that privacy experts and technology companies were right “that strong encryption is good for security, liberty, and economic growth”, and the attempts by the government to reopen the debate.</description></item><item><title>Dutch Government Backs Uncrackable Encryption</title><link>/entries/dutch-government-backs-uncrackable-encryption-8169af3a/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/dutch-government-backs-uncrackable-encryption-8169af3a/</guid><description>Authors: Robert Hackett
Published: January 2016
URL: https://fortune.com/2016/01/05/dutch-government-encryption-no-backdoors/
Abstract: On January 5, 2016, Fortune published an article about the Dutch government’s decision to not request a backdoor to encryption data and communications. The article noted that the government acknowledged both sides of the backdoor debate, and determined that “it is not desirable at this time to take restrictive regulatory measures with respect to the development, availability, and use of encryption within the Netherlands.</description></item><item><title>Efforts to Ban Encryption in the 1990s</title><link>/entries/efforts-to-ban-encryption-in-the-1990s-8cb36f84/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/efforts-to-ban-encryption-in-the-1990s-8cb36f84/</guid><description>Authors: Center, Electronic Privacy Information
Published: 1995
URL: https://www.epic.org/crypto/ban/
Abstract: The Electronic Privacy Information Center published an article about the efforts of the federal government, led by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to ban encryption in the 1990s. At the time, various law enforcement federal agencies believed that a Clipper Chip type of encryption must be required in the United States. The article lists comments made by law enforcement and technology companies, federal agency documents, transcripts of congressional testimony, and proposed legislation to ban encryption.</description></item><item><title>Encryption 101: A Non-Technical Guide to Protecting Your Digital Communications</title><link>/entries/encryption-101-a-non-technical-guide-to-protecting-a4994675/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/encryption-101-a-non-technical-guide-to-protecting-a4994675/</guid><description>Authors: Kehl, Danielle
Published: February 2015
URL: https://slate.com/technology/2015/02/what-is-encryption-a-nontechnical-guide-to-protecting-your-digital-communications.html
Abstract: This article from Danielle Kehl offers a beginner&amp;rsquo;s guide to encryption, including how the technology works, its development, its modern uses, and how one can implement encryption technology into their daily life to increase their personal privacy. This article includes discussion of Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTPS), Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol and its successor, Transport Layer Security (TLS).</description></item><item><title>Encryption and Globalization</title><link>/entries/encryption-and-globalization-9e3100e9/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/encryption-and-globalization-9e3100e9/</guid><description>Authors: Swire, Peter P. and Ahmad, Kenesa
Published: 2012
URL: http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1960602
Abstract: This law review article by Peter Swire and Kenesa Ahmad discusses changes to Indian and Chinese encryption laws. The article begins by describing the development of U.S. encryption laws, mainly focusing on the crypto wars and the United States&amp;rsquo; eventual embrace of encryption. However, the article then discusses globalization that has taken place since the 1990s, and how policy positions developed during the crypto wars are no longer sufficient when considering the increased interconnectedness of the world.</description></item><item><title>Encryption and the First Amendment</title><link>/entries/encryption-and-the-first-amendment-333ee479/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/encryption-and-the-first-amendment-333ee479/</guid><description>Authors: Samoriski, Jan H. and Huffman, John L. and Trauth, Denise M.
Published: September 1997
URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/10811689709368633
Abstract: This law review article by Jan H. Samoriski, John L. Huffman, and Denise M. Trauth describes finds that Clinton Administration proposals on encryption policy, including the Clipper Chip initiatives, encryption key escrow, and domestic restrictions on encryption infringe on the privacy interests of individuals and likely violate the First Amendment. The article first described the development of encryption policy through the &amp;rsquo;90s.</description></item><item><title>Encryption and the Press Clause</title><link>/entries/encryption-and-the-press-clause-46f389c7/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/encryption-and-the-press-clause-46f389c7/</guid><description>Authors: Baranetsky, D Victoria
Published: 2017
Abstract: This law review article by D. Victoria Baranetsky argues that, through a historical understanding of the purpose of the Press Clause, the First Amendment protects encryption technology. The article begins by describing the Framers’ intent and purpose in the Press Clause, as well as the traditional interpretations and debates that have arisen surrounding its meaning, then goes on to describe how those interpretations may interact with and protect encryption.</description></item><item><title>Encryption Backdoors Decrease Trust In The Internet</title><link>/entries/encryption-backdoors-decrease-trust-in-the-interne-0da4e63b/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/encryption-backdoors-decrease-trust-in-the-interne-0da4e63b/</guid><description>Authors: Kolkman, Olaf
Published: May 2015
URL: https://www.internetsociety.org/blog/2015/05/encryption-backdoors-decrease-trust-in-the-internet/
Abstract: In May of 2015, Olaf Kolkman, the Principal of Internet Technology, Policy, and Advocacy at the Internet Society, wrote to express his support for a letter sent to President Barack Obama, by a collection of civil society organizations, corporations, trade associations, and security and policy experts. The letter expressed concern regarding a suggestion by Administration officials that companies should refrain from providing products with strong encryption unless they simultaneously weakened their security “in order to maintain the capability to decrypt their customer’s data at the government’s request.</description></item><item><title>Encryption Control 'Unconstitutional'</title><link>/entries/encryption-control-unconstitutional-b86acf50/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/encryption-control-unconstitutional-b86acf50/</guid><description>Authors: The Associated Press
Published: September 1997
Abstract: In August of 1997, the Associated Press wrote regarding the decision of U.S. District Judge Marilyn Hall Patel to hold the Clinton Administration’s regulations prohibiting the electronic export of computer encryption without a Commerce Department license as a violation of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Judge Patel’s order prohibited enforcement of the regulation against a mathematics professor from the University of Illinois at Chicago, Daniel Bernstein, and his encryption program, Snuffle.</description></item><item><title>Encryption Export Controls</title><link>/entries/encryption-export-controls-1714ec24/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/encryption-export-controls-1714ec24/</guid><description>Authors: Grimmett, Jeanne J.
Published: January 2001
Abstract: This report from the Congressional Research Service discusses existing U.S. export controls on encryption software, First Amendment Challenges to licensing regimes, and proposed export control legislation. First, the report provides background on both the Arms Export Control Act and the Export Administration Act, and how those statutory structures applied to governmental and commercial encryption software. Second, the report summarizes Federal Court decisions regarding the First Amendment in encryption, generally deciding cases based on whether the encryption was functional or expressive.</description></item><item><title>Encryption in the U.S.: Crypto Colloquium Outcomes Report</title><link>/entries/encryption-in-the-u-s-crypto-colloquium-outcomes-r-9fd86b2f/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/encryption-in-the-u-s-crypto-colloquium-outcomes-r-9fd86b2f/</guid><description>Published: January 2018
URL: https://www.accessnow.org/cms/assets/uploads/2018/02/Encryption-in-the-United-States-Crypto-Colloquium-Outcomes-Report.pdf
Abstract: In September of 2017, Access Now, a non-profit dedicated to human rights advocacy in the digital age, hosted the Crypto Colloquium—an invite-only dialogue of civil society, academic experts, technology companies and former U.S. government officials—to discuss challenges associated with U.S. government agencies’ inability to access information on encrypted mobile phones. The Report, produced by Access Now, provides a summary of the key takeaways from the Colloquium, including a section on the “Lessons Learned” in each of the Law and Policy, Security, and Economics sectors.</description></item><item><title>Encryption is a Human Rights issue: Your Privacy and Pree Speech Depend on It</title><link>/entries/encryption-is-a-human-rights-issue-your-privacy-an-62451d82/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/encryption-is-a-human-rights-issue-your-privacy-an-62451d82/</guid><description>Authors: Amul Kalia
Published: December 2016
URL: https://www.learnliberty.org/blog/encryption-is-a-human-rights-issue-your-privacy-and-free-speech-depend-on-it/
Abstract: In December of 2016, Amul Kalia, a staff member of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, wrote, emphasizing the importance of encryption, through the lens of American history. Kalia highlighted the less technologically advanced uses of encrypted communications implored by the Founding Fathers of the United States (Thomas Jefferson, George Washington, and James Madison), such as coded messaging and ciphers, to argue that encryption is “crucial to a free society.</description></item><item><title>Encryption Policy a Crowd Pleaser</title><link>/entries/encryption-policy-a-crowd-pleaser-eae182e4/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/encryption-policy-a-crowd-pleaser-eae182e4/</guid><description>Authors: Leiper, Jeff
Published: November 1998
URL: http://search.proquest.com/docview/217686754?pq-origsite=summon
Abstract: In November of 1998, Jeff Leiper, of Silicon Valley North, wrote regarding the Canadian government’s recently instituted encryption policy and the resulting widespread approval of the private sector. Leiper explained that despite considerable exploration of potential restrictions on encryption, including a proposed requirement to keep keys in third-party escrow for law enforcement access, the Canadian government ultimately decided to institute a policy of business sector self-regulation, which imposed no restrictions on the development, importation or use of encryption products.</description></item><item><title>Encryption Policy for the 21st Century: A Future Without Government-Prescribed Key Recovery</title><link>/entries/encryption-policy-for-the-21st-century-a-future-wi-516bac02/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/encryption-policy-for-the-21st-century-a-future-wi-516bac02/</guid><description>Authors: Singleton, Solveig
Published: November 1998
URL: https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa325.pdf
Abstract: In November of 1998, Solveig Singleton, Director of Information Studies at the Cato Institute, published this paper to provide a historical backdrop, comprehensive analysis of the current debates, forecast of future developments, and suggestions for United States encryption policy. Singleton stressed the importance of “very strong encryption,” denounced U.S. regulations and proposals seeking to limit development and exportation of encryption products, highlighted the implausibility of key-recovery infrastructure, and predicted a future where the entire regulation apparatus fails due to the development of a gray market in non-escrow encryption products.</description></item><item><title>Encryption policy — A UK perspective</title><link>/entries/encryption-policy-a-uk-perspective-f43cbc0b/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/encryption-policy-a-uk-perspective-f43cbc0b/</guid><description>Authors: Hickson, Nigel
Published: January 1997
URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167404897807948
Abstract: In 1997, Nigel Hickson, of the Communications and Information Industries Directorate at the UK Government’s Department of Trade and Industry, wrote to provide a business and economics perspective on the ongoing international debates regarding information security and encryption. Hickson emphasized that the Department of Trade and Industry must play a role in the debate by educating end users, producing appropriate guidance and advice standards, and in representing the views of industry in national and international debates on the issue.</description></item><item><title>Encryption Restrictions</title><link>/entries/encryption-restrictions-54a58dd3/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/encryption-restrictions-54a58dd3/</guid><description>Authors: Messmer, Ellen
Published: March 2004
URL: https://www.networkworld.com/article/2331257/encryption-restrictions.html
Abstract: In March of 2004, Ellen Messmer, Senior Editor of Network World, wrote regarding global systems of encryption restrictions on imports, exports and use, and the implications for network managers operating globally. Messmer specifically highlighted the mandatory key-sharing program in China, which requires companies to appoint an “encryption contact” to provide all keys to the Chinese government upon request, as an example of foreign encryption policy functioning to disincentive encryption use by foreign corporations operating within a given country.</description></item><item><title>Encryption under fire: discussion on threats to private messaging w/ Head of WhatsApp Will Cathcart</title><link>/entries/encryption-under-fire-discussion-on-threats-to-pri-6bbe4ed7/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/encryption-under-fire-discussion-on-threats-to-pri-6bbe4ed7/</guid><description>Published: July 2020
URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y1LSFQo_07w</description></item><item><title>Encryption, Biometrics, and the Status Quo Ante</title><link>/entries/encryption-biometrics-and-the-status-quo-ante-6819368c/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/encryption-biometrics-and-the-status-quo-ante-6819368c/</guid><description>Authors: Rosenzweig, Paul
Published: July 2015
URL: https://www.lawfareblog.com/encryption-biometrics-and-status-quo-ante
Abstract: On July 6, 2015, Paul Rosenzweig, founder of Red Branch Consulting PLLC, wrote about a paradigm shift in the encryption debate, and offered a solution to deal with the paradigm shift. In 1995, data “could not be maintained in an undecryptable format”, access to data was “achieved through lawful process (either a search warrant or a subpoena)”, and the subject of an investigation received notice.</description></item><item><title>Encryption, Trust, and the Online Economy: An Assessment of the Economic Benefits Associated with Encryption</title><link>/entries/encryption-trust-and-the-online-economy-an-assessm-b5968feb/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/encryption-trust-and-the-online-economy-an-assessm-b5968feb/</guid><description>Authors: Hagemann, Ryan and Hampson, Josh
Published: November 2015
URL: https://www.niskanencenter.org/encryption-trust-and-the-online-economy-an-assessment-of-the-economic-benefits-associated-with-encryption/
Abstract: On November 9, 2015, the Niskanen Center published a report that assessed the economic benefits associated with the use of software-based encryption. The report’s aim is to “provide a ballpark estimate of the economic value of encryption” and “suggest how a more accurate estimate might be achieved”, with the end goal of showing “the way toward a better understanding of the role and benefit of encryption in the Internet-age economy”.</description></item><item><title>Encryption: A 21st Century National Security Dilemma</title><link>/entries/encryption-a-21st-century-national-security-dilemm-bc971f67/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/encryption-a-21st-century-national-security-dilemm-bc971f67/</guid><description>Authors: Ackerman, Wystan M.
Published: July 1998
URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/13600869855487
Abstract: In 1998, an article was published in the International Review of Law, Computers &amp;amp; Technology, which advocated for the implementation of a federal encryption scheme which utilizes export controls and a key recovery system. Export controls should be used to address issues with gathering foreign intelligence for national security matters, and a key recovery system should be used to meet the needs of law enforcement when they conduct investigations.</description></item><item><title>Entropy and Random Numbers</title><link>/entries/entropy-and-random-numbers-d61c00fb/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/entropy-and-random-numbers-d61c00fb/</guid><description>Authors: Callan, Tim and Soroko, Jason
URL: https://sectigo.com/resources/root-causes-1-25
Abstract: Sectigo SSL Certificates formerly Comodo CA SSL Certificates. Same high quality SSL certificates you trust! Money Back Guarantee. Secure all Subdomains. 30 Day Refund Policy, 24/7 Live Support</description></item><item><title>Ex-MI5 Chief Warns Against Crackdown on Encrypted Messaging Apps</title><link>/entries/ex-mi5-chief-warns-against-crackdown-on-encrypted-9cfea775/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/ex-mi5-chief-warns-against-crackdown-on-encrypted-9cfea775/</guid><description>Authors: Grierson, Jamie
Published: August 2017
URL: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/aug/11/ex-mi5-chief-warns-against-crackdown-encrypted-messaging-apps
Abstract: On August 11, 2017, The Guardian published an article regarding comments made by a former head of MI5, Lord Evans, who does “not support a clampdown on use of encryption”. Instead, Lord Evans pointed to other, greater threats than encryption, including the state of cybersecurity as a whole, cybersecurity for the internet of things, and attacks on British democracy from foreign actors like Russia.</description></item><item><title>Ex-NSA Chief Thinks the Government is Dead Wrong in Asking Apple for a Backdoor</title><link>/entries/ex-nsa-chief-thinks-the-government-is-dead-wrong-i-8b5c5590/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/ex-nsa-chief-thinks-the-government-is-dead-wrong-i-8b5c5590/</guid><description>Authors: Business Insider
Published: February 2016
URL: https://www.businessinsider.com/michael-hayden-encryption-apple-2016-2
Abstract: On February 25, 2016, Business Insider published an article regarding comments made by a former NSA Chief, General Michael Hayden, in which he expressed his rejection of the notion that tech companies should implement a backdoor to encryption on behalf of law enforcement. While he noted that a lack of a backdoor for encryption imposes “an unfair cost”, he said “we are not required to organize our entire national life around the needs of American law enforcement.</description></item><item><title>Executive Order 13026 - Administration of Export Controls on Encryption Products</title><link>/entries/executive-order-13026-administration-of-export-con-edfd5315/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/executive-order-13026-administration-of-export-con-edfd5315/</guid><description>Published: November 1996
Abstract: On November 15, 1996, President William J. Clinton issued Executive Order 13026— Administration of Export Controls on Encryption Products. This Executive Order revised the provisions of the export control system maintained by the Department of Commerce in the Export Administration Regulations, 15 CFR Part 730 et seq, and amended previously issued Executive Orders 12981 and 13020. The Order transferred certain encryption products from the United States Munitions List to the Commerce Control List; revised the procedures for inter-agency review and disposition of dual-use-export license applications, by adding the Department of Justice to the list of agencies included in the process; and rendered all EAA provisions dealing with the issuance of licenses or removal of controls (based on foreign availability considerations) inapplicable to export controls on select encryption products, however, permitted the Secretary of Commerce to made such considerations on a discretionary basis.</description></item><item><title>Exploring Encryption and Potential Mechanisms for Authorized Government Access to Plaintext: Proceedings of a Workshop</title><link>/entries/exploring-encryption-and-potential-mechanisms-for-26c5994f/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/exploring-encryption-and-potential-mechanisms-for-26c5994f/</guid><description>Authors: Johnson, Anne and Eisenberg, Jon and Gumbling, Emily
Published: 2016
URL: https://www.nap.edu/catalog/23593/exploring-encryption-and-potential-mechanisms-for-authorized-government-access-to-plaintext
Abstract: On June 23-24, 2016, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine held a “Workshop on Encryption and Mechanisms for Authorized Government Access to Plaintext”. In September 2016, The National Academies Press published a book which summarizes the “presentations and discussions” from the workshop. Participants discussed encryption mechanisms that “would enable access to plaintext information by law enforcement or national security agencies with appropriate authority.</description></item><item><title>FAQ on the FCC CALEA Expansion</title><link>/entries/faq-on-the-fcc-calea-expansion-cb61ed55/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/faq-on-the-fcc-calea-expansion-cb61ed55/</guid><description>Published: 2015
URL: https://www.eff.org/issues/calea
Abstract: In 2014 the Electronic Frontier Foundation published an article on the evolving history of the The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) of 1994. Initially, CALEA “forced telephone companies to redesign their network architectures to make it easier for law enforcement to wiretap digital telephone calls.” In 2004, several law enforcement agencies petitioned the FCC to expand the scope of CALEA to all Internet communications services, and the FCC issued a final rule which expanded CALEA “to broadband Internet access providers and managed VoIP systems.</description></item><item><title>FBI Blasts Apple, Google for Locking Police out of Phones</title><link>/entries/fbi-blasts-apple-google-for-locking-police-out-of-79e02027/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/fbi-blasts-apple-google-for-locking-police-out-of-79e02027/</guid><description>Authors: Craig Timberg, Greg Miller
Published: September 2014
URL: https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/2014/09/25/68c4e08e-4344-11e4-9a15-137aa0153527_story.html
Abstract: On September 26, 2014, The Washington Post published an article which discussed the FBI’s criticism of Apple and Google for “for developing forms of smartphone encryption so secure that law enforcement officials cannot easily gain access to information stored on the devices &amp;ndash; even when they have valid search warrants.” The article notes that “while the legal and technical changes are fueled by anger over reports of mass surveillance by the National Security Agency, the consequences are being felt most heavily by police detectives, often armed with warrants certifying that a judge has found probable cause that a search of a smartphone will reveal evidence of a crime.</description></item><item><title>FBI Pressuring Google, Facebook to Allow ‘Back Doors’ for Wiretapping</title><link>/entries/fbi-pressuring-google-facebook-to-allow-back-doors-71473338/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/fbi-pressuring-google-facebook-to-allow-back-doors-71473338/</guid><description>Authors: Daniel Tencer
Published: November 2010
URL: https://www.rawstory.com/2010/11/fbi-pressuring-google-facebook-wiretapping/
Abstract: On November 17, 2010, Raw Story published an article discussing the debate surrounding a proposed expansion of The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) of 1994. At the time, FBI Director Robert Mueller placed pressure on technology companies to build “back doors” which would “allow law enforcement to wiretap data on their networks”, in an effort “to expand the FBI’s wiretapping powers to include the latest communications technologies, including social networking sites, voice-over-Internet (VoIP) telephone services and BlackBerries.</description></item><item><title>Federal Bureau of Investigation: FY 2010 Budget Request</title><link>/entries/federal-bureau-of-investigation-fy-2010-budget-req-f44e795f/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/federal-bureau-of-investigation-fy-2010-budget-req-f44e795f/</guid><description>Authors: FBI
URL: https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/jmd/legacy/2014/04/12/fbi-bud-summary.pdf
Abstract: The FBI’s FY 2010 budget request proposed a roughly $560.3 million (or 7.7%) increase in funding from the preceding year. Included within this requested increase in funding were plans to increase total positions by 1,389—adding 407 new agents—and program enhancements to a number of FBI projects. Most notable among the program enhancements, in the context of encryption, was a requested $9 million increase (to the $233.</description></item><item><title>Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 197: Advanced Encryption Standard</title><link>/entries/federal-information-processing-standards-fips-197-d91011f8/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/federal-information-processing-standards-fips-197-d91011f8/</guid><description>Authors: NIST
Published: November 2001
URL: https://web.archive.org/web/20030406010431/http://www.csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf
Abstract: The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), officially published on November 26, 2001, provides a Computer Security Standard (Cryptography), for use by Federal departments and agencies when an agency determines that sensitive (unclassified) information requires cryptographic protection. The standard may also be used and adopted by non-Federal Government organizations. The AES specifies Federal Information Process Standards’ (FIPS’) approved cryptographic algorithm that can be used to protect electronic data.</description></item><item><title>Feds Put Heat on Web Firms for Master Encryption Keys</title><link>/entries/feds-put-heat-on-web-firms-for-master-encryption-k-c6363e83/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/feds-put-heat-on-web-firms-for-master-encryption-k-c6363e83/</guid><description>Authors: McCullagh, Declan
Published: July 2013
URL: https://www.cnet.com/news/feds-put-heat-on-web-firms-for-master-encryption-keys/
Abstract: In July of 2013, Declan McCullagh, a senior writer for CNET, wrote regarding the continued effort of major U.S. intelligence agencies (the FBI and NSA) to obtain master encryption (SSL) keys used by internet service providers to shield private communications. McCullagh referred to the efforts of the U.S. government as a “technological escalation in the clandestine methods that the FBI and National Security Agency employ when conducting electronic surveillance against Internet users,” and warned of the sheer scope of the information which could be intercepted if such a key were turned over.</description></item><item><title>First and Fifth Amendment Challenges to Export Controls on Encryption: Bernstein and Karn</title><link>/entries/first-and-fifth-amendment-challenges-to-export-con-41c9888c/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/first-and-fifth-amendment-challenges-to-export-con-41c9888c/</guid><description>Authors: Pilkington, Laura M.
Published: 1996
URL: https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/saclr37&amp;amp;i=177</description></item><item><title>Former GCHQ Boss Backs End-to-End Encryption</title><link>/entries/former-gchq-boss-backs-end-to-end-encryption-8c807a3b/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/former-gchq-boss-backs-end-to-end-encryption-8c807a3b/</guid><description>Authors: Leyden, John
Published: July 2017
URL: https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/07/10/former_gchq_wades_into_encryption_debate/
Abstract: In July of 2017, John Leyden of The Register, wrote regarding a statement made by former GCHQ Director Robert Hannigan against proposals to build backdoors into end-to-end encryption programs. In an interview with BBC Radio 4’s program Today, Hannigan explained “encryption is overwhelmingly a good thing. It keep us all safe and secure.” Rather than building in backdoors or “un-invent[ing] encryption,” Hannigan expressed support for cooperation between private tech companies and government agencies to “find a way around it,” by “target[ing] the people who are abusing&amp;rdquo; encryption systems and going after their smartphones or laptops through alternative means.</description></item><item><title>Former National-Security Officials Suddenly See the Peril of Weakening Encryption</title><link>/entries/former-national-security-officials-suddenly-see-th-d46b3725/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/former-national-security-officials-suddenly-see-th-d46b3725/</guid><description>Authors: Friedersdorf, Conor
Published: July 2015
URL: https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/07/former-national-security-officials-see-the-peril-of-weakening-encryption/399848/
Abstract: This new article examines how former national security officials, after leaving their government jobs for private industry, tended to support strong encryption and argued against mandatory backdoor access. The article reported comments made by several former national security officials who had then transitioned to private industry, and the comments they made against government infringement on encryption at the Aspen Security Forum in 2015.</description></item><item><title>From Clipper Chip to Smartphones: Unlocking the Encryption Debate</title><link>/entries/from-clipper-chip-to-smartphones-unlocking-the-enc-cbe23268/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/from-clipper-chip-to-smartphones-unlocking-the-enc-cbe23268/</guid><description>Authors: Flatow, Ira
URL: https://www.sciencefriday.com/segments/from-clipper-chip-to-smartphones-unlocking-the-encryption-debate/
Abstract: This Podcast features comments made by security experts and privacy advocates made in the 1990s about the Clipper Chip. It offers a look back into what the policy discussion looked like concurrently with the Clipper Chip proposals. Some of those who previously made comments offer follow-up, looking back at the development of their views and policy positions and how they have developed in the intervening years.</description></item><item><title>GAO Report on Communications Privacy</title><link>/entries/gao-report-on-communications-privacy-9342867b/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/gao-report-on-communications-privacy-9342867b/</guid><description>Authors: U.S. General Accounting Office
Published: November 1993
URL: https://epic.org/crypto/reports/gao_comm_privacy.html
Abstract: In November 1993, the GAO produced a report, at the request of Jack Brooks, the then Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, exploring the impact of federal policies on U.S. corporations’ ability to protect themselves against economic espionage. The Report focused on a few key issues: the need for information privacy in computer communications system through encryption; federal agency authority to develop cryptographic standards for the protection of sensitive, unclassified information; the roles, actions and policies of NSA and the Department of State related to export controls for products with encryption capabilities and industry rationale for requesting liberalization of controls; and the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) legislative proposal regarding telephone systems that use digital communications technology.</description></item><item><title>Going Dark: Are Technology, Privacy, and Public Safety on a Collision Course?</title><link>/entries/going-dark-are-technology-privacy-and-public-safet-b115d093/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/going-dark-are-technology-privacy-and-public-safet-b115d093/</guid><description>Authors: Comey, James
Published: October 2014
URL: https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/going-dark-are-technology-privacy-and-public-safety-on-a-collision-course
Abstract: This speech by FBI Director James Comey, offered at the Brooking Institute in 2014, discusses the challenges that encryption and going dark present to law enforcement. Director Comey discusses how a proliferation in digital data and communication are increasingly encrypted, and how law enforcement is technologically incapable of keeping up. Further, CALEA is not equipped to offer fair access to newer forms of technology.</description></item><item><title>Going Dark: Lawful Electronic Surveillance in the Face of New Technologies</title><link>/entries/going-dark-lawful-electronic-surveillance-in-the-f-5165cb74/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/going-dark-lawful-electronic-surveillance-in-the-f-5165cb74/</guid><description>Authors: Valerie Caproni
Published: February 2011
URL: https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/going-dark-lawful-electronic-surveillance-in-the-face-of-new-technologies
Abstract: On February 17, 2001, Valeria Caproni, General Counsel, Federal Bureau of Investigation, testified before the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security. In her testimony, Caproni discussed the “Going Dark” problem facing law enforcement. The “legal authorities [the FBI has] for intercepting electronic communications are adequate”, but the government often does not have the “practical ability to actually intercept those communications”.</description></item><item><title>Guidelines for Encryption in Land Mobile Radio Systems</title><link>/entries/guidelines-for-encryption-in-land-mobile-radio-sys-b0ed6104/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/guidelines-for-encryption-in-land-mobile-radio-sys-b0ed6104/</guid><description>Published: February 2016
URL: https://www.dhs.gov/publication/encryption
Abstract: On February 8, 2016, the Federal Partnership for Interoperable Communications (FPIC) published guidelines for encryption in land mobile radio (LRM) systems for state, local, and tribal public safety entities. The report discusses the background of public safety entities and encryption, high-level technical information about encryption, types of encryption algorithms for public safety, cryptographic algorithms, and issues with interoperability. The goal of the guidelines was to get rid of confusion and competing information “regarding voice and data encryption” in LMR systems for the state, local, and tribal public safety entities.</description></item><item><title>H.R. 2545 - Data Breach Prevention and Compensation Act of 2019</title><link>/entries/h-r-2545-data-breach-prevention-and-compensation-a-2d6fd580/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/h-r-2545-data-breach-prevention-and-compensation-a-2d6fd580/</guid><description>Authors: Cummings, Elijah E. and Krishnamoorthi, Raja
Published: May 2019
URL: https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/2545/text
Abstract: On May 7, 2019, Representatives Cummings and Krishnamoorthi introduced H.R. 2545, the Data Breach Prevention and Compensation Act of 2019. H.R. 2545 sought to create an Office of Cybersecurity at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) for “supervision of data security at consumer reporting agencies, to require the promulgation of regulations establishing standards for effective cybersecurity for effective cybersecurity at consumer reporting agencies, to impose penalties on credit reporting agencies for cybersecurity breaches that put sensitive consumer data at risk, and for other purposes.</description></item><item><title>H.R. 4170 - Ensuring National Constitutional Rights for Your Private Telecommunications Act of 2019</title><link>/entries/h-r-4170-ensuring-national-constitutional-rights-f-808a9c8d/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/h-r-4170-ensuring-national-constitutional-rights-f-808a9c8d/</guid><description>Authors: Lieu, Ted and DelBene, Suzan and Jordan, Jim
Published: August 2019
URL: https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/hr4170/BILLS-116hr4170ih.pdf
Abstract: The ENCRYPT Act of 2019, introduced into the Senate with bipartisan support, seeks to preempt state and local governments from compelling private companies to weaken encryption or insert backdoors. Therefore, this bill would make encryption policy the subject of federal law and out of the hands of state and local lawmakers.</description></item><item><title>H.R. 4943 - Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act</title><link>/entries/h-r-4943-clarifying-lawful-overseas-use-of-data-ac-f1395da4/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/h-r-4943-clarifying-lawful-overseas-use-of-data-ac-f1395da4/</guid><description>Authors: Collins, Doug
Published: February 2018
URL: https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/4943
Abstract: On February 6, 2018, Representatives Collins, Jeffries, Issa, DelBene, Marino, Rutherford and Demings introduced H.R. 4943, the “Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act” or the “CLOUD Act.” H.R. 4943 amends title 18 of the United States federal criminal code to “improve law enforcement access to data stored across borders, and for other purposes.” The bill requires electronic communication service (ECS) and remote computer service (RCS) providers to comply with existing preservation, backup and disclosure requirements pertaining to contents of electronic communications and any record or other information pertaining to a customer or subscriber within their possession, regardless of whether the information is located within the United States.</description></item><item><title>H.R. 4978 - Online Privacy Act of 2019</title><link>/entries/h-r-4978-online-privacy-act-of-2019-7c0e40e7/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/h-r-4978-online-privacy-act-of-2019-7c0e40e7/</guid><description>Authors: Eshoo, Anna G. and Lofgren, Zoe
Published: December 2019
URL: https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/4978/text
Abstract: On November 5, 2019, Representatives Eshoo and Lofgren introduced H.R. 4978, the Online Privacy Act of 2019. H.R. 4978 sought to incorporate elements of the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) into federal law. As such, the bill aimed to “provide for individual rights relating to privacy of personal information, to establish privacy and security requirements for covered entities relating to personal information, and to establish an agency to be known as the United States Digital Privacy Agency to enforce such rights and requirements, and for other purposes.</description></item><item><title>Hacking/​Journalism</title><link>/entries/hacking-journalism-04dbfbc9/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/hacking-journalism-04dbfbc9/</guid><description>Authors: Salvo, Philip Di
Published: April 2017
URL: https://limn.it/articles/hackingjournalism/
Abstract: On May 19, 2011, The Washington Post published an article about one of the ways in which the “boundaries of journalism have expanded” into hacking through the adoption of encryption tools in whistleblowing cases. The article discusses the use of encryption tools in leaks including WikiLeaks’ Afghan and Iraqi War Logs, the Cablegate leaks, the Panama Papers, and Snowden’s leaks. In each of these leaks, encryption “played an enabling role in that whistleblowing” in part because it “played a fundamental part in facilitating communication between the source and the journalists.</description></item><item><title>Half the Web Is Now Encrypted. That Makes Everyone Safer</title><link>/entries/half-the-web-is-now-encrypted-that-makes-everyone-2100a1e7/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/half-the-web-is-now-encrypted-that-makes-everyone-2100a1e7/</guid><description>Authors: Finley, Klint
Published: January 2017
URL: https://www.wired.com/2017/01/half-web-now-encrypted-makes-everyone-safer/
Abstract: In January of 2017, Klint Finley of Wired Magazine, a significant milestone in computer security news—the average volume of encrypted internet traffic “finally” surpassing the average volume of unencrypted traffic. The achievement, Finley noted, “means when you visit a website, you’re now more likely than not to see a little green lock right next to its address…indicat[ing] that the page you’ve visited came to you via HTTPS, the web’s secure protocol.</description></item><item><title>Holder Urges Tech Companies to Leave Device Backdoors Open for Police</title><link>/entries/holder-urges-tech-companies-to-leave-device-backdo-1737189d/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/holder-urges-tech-companies-to-leave-device-backdo-1737189d/</guid><description>Published: September 2014
URL: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/09/30/holder-urges-tech-companies-to-leave-device-backdoors-open-for-police/
Abstract: This news article from 2014 features comments from Attorney General Eric Holder urging technology companies to insert back doors into their products because encryption could potentially imperial investigations into kidnapping and sexual predation of children. Holder stated that companies could design technology in such a way that would not burden privacy. This article outlines statements from a top law enforcement official, linking encryption to crimes against children.</description></item><item><title>How secure is AES Against Brute Force Attacks?</title><link>/entries/how-secure-is-aes-against-brute-force-attacks-a76070ac/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/how-secure-is-aes-against-brute-force-attacks-a76070ac/</guid><description>Authors: Arora, Mohit
Published: May 2012
URL: https://www.eetimes.com/how-secure-is-aes-against-brute-force-attacks/
Abstract: In May of 2012, Mohit Arora, Sr. Systems Engineer &amp;amp; Security Architect for Freescale Semiconductor, wrote for the EE Times regarding the security of Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) against brute force attacks. Arora analyzed the system’s strength against brute force attacks with different key sizes and projected advancements in processing speeds. Ultimately, Arora concluded that “even with a supercomputer, it would take 1 billion years to crack the 128-bit AES keying using [a] brute force attack,” and thus deemed AES “safe against any brute force attack.</description></item><item><title>How Unvalidated Encryption Threatens Patient Data Security</title><link>/entries/how-unvalidated-encryption-threatens-patient-data-f2fafa62/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/how-unvalidated-encryption-threatens-patient-data-f2fafa62/</guid><description>Authors: HealthITSecurity
Published: July 2016
URL: https://healthitsecurity.com/news/how-unvalidated-encryption-threatens-patient-data-security
Abstract: This article argues that failures by regulators to enforce precise encryption rules in data breaches by healthcare providers endanger allow substandard encryption to continue operating, endangering patient data. The article discusses the HIPAA, and subsequently elucidating NIST standards for encryption for healthcare patient data. However, because of leniency enforcement, vendors continue providing inadequate encryption without fear of consequences. The article argues that consistent enforcement of the NIST standards will ensure more secure data protection for healthcare patients.</description></item><item><title>HTTPS-Everywhere for Government</title><link>/entries/https-everywhere-for-government-5c0a30ab/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/https-everywhere-for-government-5c0a30ab/</guid><description>Published: June 2015
URL: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2015/06/08/https-everywhere-government
Abstract: This 2015 announcement from the White House Office of Management and Budget announces the HTTPS-Only Standard Directive, where federal websites and web services will use a secure HTTPS connection. The program seeks to solve vulnerabilities in unsecured HTTP connections and create uniformity in privacy and security standards across federal websites.</description></item><item><title>Human Rights and Encryption</title><link>/entries/human-rights-and-encryption-380229a2/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/human-rights-and-encryption-380229a2/</guid><description>Authors: U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
Published: 2016
URL: https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000246527
Abstract: This study from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization outlines the benefits of encryption to human rights, the legality of interference with free and strong encryption, and gives best practices for nations and other stakeholders. This study offers case studies in various member states, including Germany, the United States, India, and Brazil, and looks at both legal restrictions on encryption as well as legal measures which promote its adoption.</description></item><item><title>IC on the Record, Video: ODNI General Counsel Robert Litt</title><link>/entries/ic-on-the-record-video-odni-general-counsel-robert-f1f2db82/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/ic-on-the-record-video-odni-general-counsel-robert-f1f2db82/</guid><description>Authors: Robert Litt
Published: February 2015
URL: https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/110099240063/video-odni-general-counsel-robert-litt-speaks-on
Abstract: On February 4, 2015, Robert Litt, General Counsel, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, gave a talk titled “U.S. Intelligence Community Surveillance One Year After President Obama’s [January 2014] Address” at the Brookings Institute. Litt discussed issues related to transparency in intelligent activities, limitations on surveillance, bulk collection of data, incidental collection of data, protection for non-American citizens, and the future.</description></item><item><title>In Re: Application for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2705(b) Relating to a Subpoena to Open Whisper Systems for the Accounts Listed</title><link>/entries/in-re-application-for-an-order-pursuant-to-18-u-s-f42df79e/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/in-re-application-for-an-order-pursuant-to-18-u-s-f42df79e/</guid><description>Published: September 2016
URL: https://signal.org/bigbrother/eastern-virginia-grand-jury/</description></item><item><title>Information Security and Privacy in Network Environments</title><link>/entries/information-security-and-privacy-in-network-enviro-73af6c6d/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/information-security-and-privacy-in-network-enviro-73af6c6d/</guid><description>Authors: Computing Technologies Program (Joan Winston) Telecommunications
Published: September 1994
URL: https://www.epic.org/crypto/reports/ota_1994.html
Abstract: This 1994 report from the US Congress Office of Technology Assessment provides background on national cryptography policy, guidance on safeguarding government unclassified information, and legal issues in information security. This report provides guidance and background on existing regulations on cryptography, as well as their impact on e-commerce, information privacy, digital libraries, and intellectual property. Finally, the report emphasizes the importance of cryptography on congressional operations.</description></item><item><title>International Human Rights Organizations Express Privacy Concerns About Canadian Cryptography Policy</title><link>/entries/international-human-rights-organizations-express-p-07872304/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/international-human-rights-organizations-express-p-07872304/</guid><description>Authors: Electronic Frontier Canada
Published: April 1998
URL: http://www.efc.ca/pages/pr/efc-pr.27apr98.html
Abstract: On April 27, 1998, Electronic Frontier Canada, Canada’s leading online civil liberties group, issued a press release regarding the 23 civil liberty and human rights organizations—all members of the Global Internet Liberty Campaign—who signed a letter urging the Canadian government to liberalize its cryptography policy. The letter, which was issued in response to an Industry Canada report which listed possible scenarios for government regulation of encryption hardware and software, emphasized the freedom of expression, freedom of association, and privacy rights protected by cryptography.</description></item><item><title>Issue Brief: A “Backdoor” to Encryption for Government Surveillance</title><link>/entries/issue-brief-a-backdoor-to-encryption-for-governmen-feec9f35/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/issue-brief-a-backdoor-to-encryption-for-governmen-feec9f35/</guid><description>Authors: Hall, Joseph Lorenzo
Published: March 2016
URL: https://cdt.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Issue-brief-A-backdoor-to-encryption-for-government-surveillance-CDT-03032012.pdf
Abstract: On March 3, 2016, the Center for Democracy and Technology published an article about whether or not there should be an encryption “backdoor” for government surveillance. The article discussed the decision by Apple and Google to make their smartphones “encrypted by default”, the desire of the FBI that all encrypted communications services have a “backdoor”, the major problems created by backdoors, including the undermining of user security and harm to United States businesses, rejects the claim that “companies’ increasing adoption of strong encryption by default will suddenly lead to government ‘going dark’ and unable to access critical information”, and factors relevant to whether or not compelled decryption is legal.</description></item><item><title>It Came from Planet Clipper: The Battle Over Cryptographic Key "Escrow"</title><link>/entries/it-came-from-planet-clipper-the-battle-over-crypto-351f4ef6/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/it-came-from-planet-clipper-the-battle-over-crypto-351f4ef6/</guid><description>Authors: Froomkin, A Michael
Published: 1996
Abstract: In 1996, the University of Chicago Legal Forum published an article about the various phases of “the U.S. government’s recent attempts to keep the cryptography genie in the bottle in the face of increasing commercial and political pressure to loosen or abolish cryptographic export control.” The article discusses the export control regime for cryptography, the changing goals of U.S. cryptography policy, a summary of the Clipper chip initiative, an overview of the proposal for software-based key escrow, an in-depth exploration of “recent technical and political changes that make the current export control policy increasingly difficult to maintain”, and concludes with a discussion of trust and Congress’ role in this policy formation.</description></item><item><title>James Comey, F.B.I. Director, Hints at Action as Cellphone Data Is Locked</title><link>/entries/james-comey-f-b-i-director-hints-at-action-as-cell-f7538b3a/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/james-comey-f-b-i-director-hints-at-action-as-cell-f7538b3a/</guid><description>Authors: David E. Sanger, Matt Apuzzo
Published: October 2014
URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/17/us/politics/fbi-director-in-policy-speech-calls-dark-devices-hindrance-to-crime-solving.html
Abstract: On October 16, 2014, David E. Sanger and Matt Apuzzo wrote for the New York Times regarding F.B.I. Director James Comey’s comments on the potential the Obama administration would seek regulations and laws forcing companies to create an encryption backdoor to unlock photos, emails and contacts stored on cellular devices. The comments came shortly following the decisions of Apple and Google to automatically encrypt the contents of their cellphones—a first among widely used consumer devices—which Comey claimed would hinder intelligence gathering.</description></item><item><title>Keeping Secrets</title><link>/entries/keeping-secrets-73be089b/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/keeping-secrets-73be089b/</guid><description>Authors: Corrigan-Gibbs, Henry
Published: December 2014
URL: https://stanfordmag.org/contents/keeping-secrets
Abstract: On November 6, 2014, Stanford Magazine published an article about a group of researchers at Stanford who, at the International Symposium on Information Theory on October 10, 1997, ended “the U.S. government’s longstanding domestic monopoly on cryptography”. Prior to the symposium, the group received a letter from an NSA employee who told the group that “merely publishing a scientific paper on cryptography would be the legal equivalent of exporting nuclear weapons to a foreign country.</description></item><item><title>Key Escrow</title><link>/entries/key-escrow-880e03ca/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/key-escrow-880e03ca/</guid><description>Published: April 1998
URL: https://epic.org/crypto/key_escrow/</description></item><item><title>Key Escrow from a Safe Distance: Looking Back at the Clipper Chip</title><link>/entries/key-escrow-from-a-safe-distance-looking-back-at-th-acc94260/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/key-escrow-from-a-safe-distance-looking-back-at-th-acc94260/</guid><description>Authors: Blaze, Matt
Published: 2011
URL: http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=2076732.2076777
Abstract: In 2011, Matt Blaze, of the University of Pennsylvania, published a retrospective paper on the key escrow cryptosystem and the Clipper Chip. The paper begins with a carrot and stick analogy on early 1990s encryption regulations. The stick, classification of encryption as a munition and its deterrent effect on incorporation of strong encryption in consumer products. The carrot, an exception for systems incorporating a backdoor (the key escrow system).</description></item><item><title>Keys Under Doormats: Mandating Insecurity by Requiring Government Access to All Data and Communications</title><link>/entries/keys-under-doormats-mandating-insecurity-by-requir-5df4f072/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/keys-under-doormats-mandating-insecurity-by-requir-5df4f072/</guid><description>Authors: Abelson, Harold and Anderson, Ross and Bellovin, Steven M and Benaloh, Josh and Blaze, Matt and Diffie, Whitfield and Gilmore, John and Green, Matthew and Landau, Susan and Neumann, Peter G and Rivest, Ronald L and Schiller, Jeffrey I and Schneier, Bruce and Specter, Michael and Weitzner, Daniel J
Published: July 2015
URL: https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/97690/MIT-CSAIL-TR-2015-026.pdf
Abstract: On July 7, 2015, a group of computer scientists and security experts published a study to ascertain the likely effects of renewed attempts to mandate back doors of all data for law enforcement.</description></item><item><title>Lawful Access – Consultation Document</title><link>/entries/lawful-access-consultation-document-a8b104aa/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/lawful-access-consultation-document-a8b104aa/</guid><description>Published: August 2002
URL: https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/cons/la-al/consult.html
Abstract: On August 25, 2002, the Canadian Department of Justice published a consultation document on Lawful Access, an “important and well-established technique used by law enforcement and national security agencies to conduct investigations” involving the interception of communications and search and seizure of information pursuant to legislative and criminal code authorizations. The Department of Justice described tool as essential in the “prevention, investigation and prosecution of serious offences and the investigation of threats to the security of Canada.</description></item><item><title>McCaul’s Crypto Commission: First, Do No Harm</title><link>/entries/mccauls-crypto-commission-first-do-no-harm-478ce042/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/mccauls-crypto-commission-first-do-no-harm-478ce042/</guid><description>Authors: White, Nathan
Published: February 2016
URL: https://www.accessnow.org/mccauls-crypto-commission-first-no-harm/
Abstract: On March 2, 2016, AccessNow published an article about the proposed McCaul-Warner Encryption Commission, which would “create a bipartisan commission of experts to study the debate over encryption and provide recommendations for overcoming the current impasse.” The article notes that despite their good intentions, “the commission, as proposed, might not produce what” they expect. The proposal relies on “the assumption that people from both ‘sides’ of the debate have not already engaged with one another in good faith” when in fact they did in the 1990s and more recently.</description></item><item><title>Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies: Policy to Require Secure Connections Across Federal Websites and Web Services</title><link>/entries/memorandum-for-the-heads-of-executive-departments-beed0dbf/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/memorandum-for-the-heads-of-executive-departments-beed0dbf/</guid><description>Authors: Scott, Tony
Published: June 2015</description></item><item><title>Mozilla Cybersecurity Delphi 1.0: Towards a User-centric Policy Framework</title><link>/entries/mozilla-cybersecurity-delphi-1-0-towards-a-user-ce-3db1081f/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/mozilla-cybersecurity-delphi-1-0-towards-a-user-ce-3db1081f/</guid><description>Authors: Camille François, Chris Riley, Dave Steer, Jochai Ben-Avie, Su Midghall
Published: July 2015
URL: https://blog.mozilla.org/netpolicy/files/2015/07/Mozilla-Cybersecurity-Delphi-1.0.pdf
Abstract: This study by Mozilla brought together 30 cybersecurity experts from academia, civil liberties, government and military, security, and technology, to discuss priorities and goals in the development of encryption policy. The report found several areas of agreement, such as prioritizing automating encryption over consumer education and the prioritization of developing behavioral and cultural norms in cybersecurity.</description></item><item><title>New Directions in Cryptography</title><link>/entries/new-directions-in-cryptography-0e85af23/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/new-directions-in-cryptography-0e85af23/</guid><description>Authors: Diffie, Whitfield and Hellman, Martin E.
Published: November 1976
URL: http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/1055638/
Abstract: In November 1976, Whitfield Diffie and Martin E. Hellman, of the Stanford University Department of Electrical Engineering, wrote regarding potential solutions to the need for new cryptographic systems which minimize the necessity of secure key distribution channels and supply the equivalent of a written signature. The paper noted that then-contemporary cryptography imposed such severe inconveniences on the system users (namely, the need to transfer keys prior to initially communicating) that it entirely nullified the benefits of teleprocessing and acted as a disincentive for industry adoption.</description></item><item><title>New Perspectives on the Future of Encryption</title><link>/entries/new-perspectives-on-the-future-of-encryption-29240979/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/new-perspectives-on-the-future-of-encryption-29240979/</guid><description>Authors: Baker, Jim and Landau, Susan
Published: May 2019
URL: https://www.lawfareblog.com/new-perspectives-future-encryption
Abstract: Encryption and its effects on law enforcement’s access to data seem to occupy a perennial place in the headlines (and on Lawfare as well). The two of us have been working on it for years. The subject is often highly contested, but the fierce discussion has ignored some critical factors. One of those is how changing usage patterns and technologies will affect how law enforcement can—or can’t—obtain access.</description></item><item><title>Newest Androids Will Join iPhones in Offering Default Encryption, Blocking Police</title><link>/entries/newest-androids-will-join-iphones-in-offering-defa-48399d14/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/newest-androids-will-join-iphones-in-offering-defa-48399d14/</guid><description>Authors: Timberg, Craig
Published: September 2014
URL: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/09/18/newest-androids-will-join-iphones-in-offering-default-encryption-blocking-police/
Abstract: On September 18, 2014, The Washington Post published an article about the decision by Google to, for the first time, encrypt all data by default in its Android operating system. Previously, the operating system required a user to enable encryption in the device settings, but “few users [knew] how to turn on the feature.” Google made this move in order to be more competitive with Apple’s smartphones, who already encrypt all data by default.</description></item><item><title>NSA Isn’t the Going Dark Solution, Part I: Richard Clarke Gets It Wrong</title><link>/entries/nsa-isnt-the-going-dark-solution-part-i-richard-cl-976df318/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/nsa-isnt-the-going-dark-solution-part-i-richard-cl-976df318/</guid><description>Authors: Susan Hennessey
Published: March 2016
URL: https://www.lawfareblog.com/nsa-isnt-going-dark-solution-part-i-richard-clarke-gets-it-wrong
Abstract: Let’s start with a point that will be significant emotional satisfaction to many readers: Richard Clarke was dead wrong. In a remarkable statement last week, the former Clinton and early Bush administration counterterrorism official told NPR’s Morning Edition:</description></item><item><title>NSA Isn’t the Going Dark Solution, Part II: There’s No Such Thing As Magic</title><link>/entries/nsa-isnt-the-going-dark-solution-part-ii-theres-no-9863433f/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/nsa-isnt-the-going-dark-solution-part-ii-theres-no-9863433f/</guid><description>Authors: Susan Hennessey
Published: March 2016
URL: https://www.lawfareblog.com/nsa-isnt-going-dark-solution-part-ii-theres-no-such-thing-magic
Abstract: In Part I of this series, I noted the tendency of commentators—without any actual knowledge—to assert that NSA could simply break into a given locked iPhone.</description></item><item><title>OECD Guidelines for Cryptography Policy</title><link>/entries/oecd-guidelines-for-cryptography-policy-3bce3cbf/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/oecd-guidelines-for-cryptography-policy-3bce3cbf/</guid><description>Published: March 1997
URL: https://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/guidelinesforcryptographypolicy.htm
Abstract: The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development published the first Guidelines for Cryptography Policy on March 27, 1997, and reviews and updates them every five years. The most recent guidelines discuss the transition to electronic transactions, secret key cryptography, public key cryptography, digital signature, electronic payments, certifying public key relationships, user trust, user choice, market-driven development, standardisation, protection of privacy, lawful access, liability, international cooperation, and government activities related to cryptography policy.</description></item><item><title>Old Technopanic in New iBottles</title><link>/entries/old-technopanic-in-new-ibottles-50857d54/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/old-technopanic-in-new-ibottles-50857d54/</guid><description>Authors: Julian Sanchez
Published: September 2014
URL: https://www.cato.org/blog/old-technopanic-new-ibottles
Abstract: If we aim to preserve an “equilibrium” between government power and citizen privacy, we should accept that it will occasionally close one as well.</description></item><item><title>Open Letter to Mark Zuckerberg: Facebook's "Privacy First" Proposals</title><link>/entries/open-letter-to-mark-zuckerberg-facebook-s-privacy-ac79aa39/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/open-letter-to-mark-zuckerberg-facebook-s-privacy-ac79aa39/</guid><description>Authors: Patel, Priti and Barr, William and McAleenan, Kevin K. and Dutton, Peter
Published: November 2019
Abstract: From US, UK, Australia objecting to implementation of end-to-end encryption without ensuring &amp;ldquo;there is no reduction in user safety and without including a means for lawful access to the content of communications to protect our citizens.&amp;rdquo;</description></item><item><title>Open Letter to Mark Zuckerberg: Facebook's End-to-End Security Plans</title><link>/entries/open-letter-to-mark-zuckerberg-facebook-s-end-to-e-81bc1514/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/open-letter-to-mark-zuckerberg-facebook-s-end-to-e-81bc1514/</guid><description>Published: October 2019
URL: https://cdt.org/insights/open-letter-facebooks-end-to-end-encryption-plans/
Abstract: Letter in support of end-to-end encryption from 112 signatory groups/associations.</description></item><item><title>OTI Policy Director Kevin Bankston Offers Ten reasons Why Backdoor Mandates Are a Bad Idea</title><link>/entries/oti-policy-director-kevin-bankston-offers-ten-reas-349f9fa5/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/oti-policy-director-kevin-bankston-offers-ten-reas-349f9fa5/</guid><description>Published: April 2015
URL: https://www.newamerica.org/oti/blog/oti-policy-director-kevin-bankston-offers-ten-reasons-why-backdoor-mandates-are-a-bad-idea/
Abstract: In April 2015, OTI Policy Director Kevin Bankston was schedule to testify before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform’s Subcommittee on Information Technology regarding backdoor mandates and potential U.S. policy responses. New America published this blog post, on April 28, 2015, summarizing Bankston’s prepared statement and highlighting the ten key reasons Bankston identified against backdoor mandates. The reasons identified by Bankston were: 1) surveillance backdoors were already rejected as a policy approach two decades ago, including by Congress; 2) it would seriously undermine U.</description></item><item><title>Outside Looking In: Approaches to Content Moderation in End-to-End Encrypted Systems</title><link>/entries/outside-looking-in-approaches-to-content-moderatio-3fcad0c7/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/outside-looking-in-approaches-to-content-moderatio-3fcad0c7/</guid><description>Authors: Kamara, Seny, Knodel, Mallory, Llansó, Emma, Nojeim, Greg, Qin, Lucy, Thakur, Dhanaraj, Vogus, Caitlin
Published: August 2021
URL: https://cdt.org/insights/outside-looking-in-approaches-to-content-moderation-in-end-to-end-encrypted-systems/
Abstract: A group of researchers at the Center for Technology and Democracy orient the ongoing content moderation/end-to-end-encryption debate within the history of the Crypto Wars and analyze the strength of central competing claims. Content detection, and the obstacle of end-to-end-encryption, is only the latest permutation in the ongoing dialogue between law enforcement investigative capabilities and competing values including privacy, freedom of expression, and secure ecommerce.</description></item><item><title>Paper on Codes Is Sent Despite U.S. Objections</title><link>/entries/paper-on-codes-is-sent-despite-u-s-objections-be957f04/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/paper-on-codes-is-sent-despite-u-s-objections-be957f04/</guid><description>Authors: John Markoff
Published: August 1989
URL: https://www.nytimes.com/1989/08/09/us/paper-on-codes-is-sent-despite-us-objections.html
Abstract: On August 9, 1989, the New York Times published an article about a Xerox Corporation computer scientist who decided to distribute “a paper describing fast and inexpensive ways of keeping information private”, in contradiction with the National Security Agency’s (NSA) request that it not be distributed due to national security concerns. The computer scientist, John Gilmore, “decided to transmit the paper to make a point about what he considers the suppression of valuable information on the technology of writing and deciphering messages in code, or cryptography.</description></item><item><title>Prepared Statement by Senator Chuck Grassley, Hearing On “Going Dark: Encryption, Technology, and the Balance Between Public Safety and Privacy</title><link>/entries/prepared-statement-by-senator-chuck-grassley-heari-63a8fa1c/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/prepared-statement-by-senator-chuck-grassley-heari-63a8fa1c/</guid><description>Authors: Grassley, Chuck
Published: July 2015
Abstract: On July 8, 2015, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator Chuck Grassley, addressed a Senate hearing, inquiring “whether recent technological changes have upset the balance between public safety and privacy.” Of particular focus for Senator Grassley was responding to law enforcement questions of “whether the laws Congress has enacted over the years to adapt [the framework of the Fourth Amendment] to changing technology, such as the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, or CALEA, are adequate to the task [of preserving the rule of law, ensuring the maintenance of public safety, and protecting individual privacy and civil liberties].</description></item><item><title>Press Release: The Search for Quantum-Resistant Cryptography: Understanding the Future Landscape</title><link>/entries/press-release-the-search-for-quantum-resistant-cry-90e3d809/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/press-release-the-search-for-quantum-resistant-cry-90e3d809/</guid><description>Published: September 2019
URL: https://sectigo.com/newsroom/the-search-for-quantum-resistant-cryptography-understanding-the-future-landscape
Abstract: This press release by Sectigo, a commercial Certificate Authority, describes Sectigo&amp;rsquo;s release of educational materials that describe how developments in quantum computing could render modern encryption ineffective. The materials describe the necessity for quantum-resistant cryptography, the capabilities such technology must possess, and the efforts to develop quantum-resistant algorithms.</description></item><item><title>Promoting Public Saftey, Privacy, and the Rule of Law Around the World: The Purpose and Impact of the CLOUD Act</title><link>/entries/promoting-public-saftey-privacy-and-the-rule-of-la-062fe8ee/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/promoting-public-saftey-privacy-and-the-rule-of-la-062fe8ee/</guid><description>Published: April 2019
Abstract: In April 2019, the Department of Justice published this White Paper on the purpose and impact of the CLOUD Act. The Paper explains the CLOUD Act was enacted to speed access to electronic information held by U.S.-based global providers (communications service providers, “CSPs”) that is critical to foreign partners’ investigations of serious crimes. Specifically, the CLOUD Act is designed to permit those “foreign partners that have robust protections for privacy and civil liberties to enter into executive agreements with the United States to obtain access” this electronic information and evidence.</description></item><item><title>Protecting the Fourth Amendment in the Information Age: A Response to Robert Litt</title><link>/entries/protecting-the-fourth-amendment-in-the-information-5c78fc7e/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/protecting-the-fourth-amendment-in-the-information-5c78fc7e/</guid><description>Authors: Cohn, Cindy
Published: 2016
Abstract: On July 27, 2016, the Yale Law Journal Forum published a short essay that agrees in part and disagrees in part with Robert Litt’s, General Counsel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “new analysis for the Fourth Amendment in the Information Age”. The author rejected Litt’s proposal that the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test “should simply be eliminated”, and analyzed why Litt’s proposed balancing test is not a suitable replacement.</description></item><item><title>Questions for Apple</title><link>/entries/questions-for-apple-b3e6b97c/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/questions-for-apple-b3e6b97c/</guid><description>Authors: Susan Hennessey, Benjamin Wittes
Published: March 2016
URL: https://www.lawfareblog.com/questions-apple
Abstract: On March 1, 2016, Susan Hennessey and Benjamin Wittes, Executive Editor and Editor in Chief of Lawfare, wrote in Lawfare regarding a House Judiciary Committee hearing at which both FBI Director James Comey and Apple General Counsel Bruce Sewell were scheduled to testify on going dark matters. Hennessey and Wittes published a series of questions for Apple. The questions covered a range of topics, including anticipated impacts on Apple stemming from China’s 2015 Counterterrorism Law and Apple’s rationale for declining to comply with requests from law enforcement to decrypt their devices.</description></item><item><title>Recommendation of the Council Concerning Guidelines for Cryptography Policy (adopted by the Council at its 895th session on 27 March 1997 [C/M(97)6/PROV])</title><link>/entries/recommendation-of-the-council-concerning-guideline-8821d5fd/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/recommendation-of-the-council-concerning-guideline-8821d5fd/</guid><description>Published: May 1997
URL: https://one.oecd.org/document/C(97)62/FINAL/en/pdf</description></item><item><title>Report of the Attorney General's Cyber Digital Task Force</title><link>/entries/report-of-the-attorney-general-s-cyber-digital-tas-7bcf0590/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/report-of-the-attorney-general-s-cyber-digital-tas-7bcf0590/</guid><description>Published: July 2018
Abstract: In February of 2018, the Attorney General established a Cyber-Digital Task force within the U.S. Department of Justice and tasked it with answer two foundational questions. First, “how is the Department responding to cyber threats?” Second, “how can federal law enforcement more effectively accomplish its mission in this important and rapidly evolving area?” This Report addresses the first question. The Report begins with a focus on malign foreign influence operations, before expanding into a discussion of other cyber-enabled threats.</description></item><item><title>Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, David Kaye</title><link>/entries/report-of-the-special-rapporteur-on-the-promotion-8c9333a5/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/report-of-the-special-rapporteur-on-the-promotion-8c9333a5/</guid><description>Authors: Kaye, David
Published: May 2015
URL: https://www.undocs.org/A/HRC/29/32
Abstract: On June 19, 2018, the United Nations’ Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression issued a report regarding Liberia’s protections of the right to freedom of opinion and expression. The aim of the visit and subsequent report was “to assess the situation as regards the right to freedom of expression in [Liberia], in particular the issues of press freedom, media independence and diversity, and access to information.</description></item><item><title>Report on Post-Quantum Cryptography</title><link>/entries/report-on-post-quantum-cryptography-ee42092b/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/report-on-post-quantum-cryptography-ee42092b/</guid><description>Authors: Lily Chen, Stephen Jordan, Yi-Kai Liu, Dustin Moody, Rene Peralta, Ray Perlner, Daniel Smith-Tone
Published: April 2016
URL: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2016/NIST.IR.8105.pdf
Abstract: In recent years, there has been a substantial amount of research on quantum computers –machines that exploit quantum mechanical phenomena to solve mathematical problems that are difficult or intractable for conventional computers. If large-scale quantum computers are ever built, they will be able to break many of the public-key cryptosystems currently in use.</description></item><item><title>Request for Comments: Revisions to Encryption Items</title><link>/entries/request-for-comments-revisions-to-encryption-items-0c68d1bf/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/request-for-comments-revisions-to-encryption-items-0c68d1bf/</guid><description>Authors: Lewis, James A.
Published: January 2000</description></item><item><title>Rethinking Encryption</title><link>/entries/rethinking-encryption-b0065e9b/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/rethinking-encryption-b0065e9b/</guid><description>Authors: Baker, Jim
Published: October 2019
URL: https://www.lawfareblog.com/rethinking-encryption
Abstract: This article written by Jim Baker encourages law enforcement officials in the U.S. to embrace encryption due to cybersecurity threats, particularly from china. The article begins by describing the issues of going dark to law enforcement, and quotes officials such as Attorney General William Barr encouraging Congress to legislate around encryption. However, because Congress has failed to act in light of such pressures, it is possible action will never occur.</description></item><item><title>Revealed: How US and UK Spy Agencies Defeat Internet Privacy and Security</title><link>/entries/revealed-how-us-and-uk-spy-agencies-defeat-interne-6703184c/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/revealed-how-us-and-uk-spy-agencies-defeat-interne-6703184c/</guid><description>Authors: Ball, James and Borger, Julian and Greenwald, Glenn
Published: September 2013
URL: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security
Abstract: • NSA and GCHQ unlock encryption used to protect emails, banking and medical records• $250m-a-year US program works covertly with tech companies to insert weaknesses into products• Security experts say programs &amp;lsquo;undermine the fabric of the internet&amp;rsquo;</description></item><item><title>Russia Wants to Make an Example of Telegram</title><link>/entries/russia-wants-to-make-an-example-of-telegram-7aa97786/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/russia-wants-to-make-an-example-of-telegram-7aa97786/</guid><description>Authors: Bershidsky, Leonid
Published: September 2017
URL: https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2017-09-28/russia-wants-to-make-an-example-of-telegram
Abstract: The messaging app is under direct attack from Russian domestic intelligence. The real target may be Facebook and Twitter.</description></item><item><title>S. 1336 - Data Breach Prevention and Compensation Act of 2019</title><link>/entries/s-1336-data-breach-prevention-and-compensation-act-e1fa535f/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/s-1336-data-breach-prevention-and-compensation-act-e1fa535f/</guid><description>Authors: Warren, Elizabeth and Warner
Published: May 2019
URL: https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/1336/text
Abstract: To create an Office of Cybersecurity at the Federal Trade Commission for supervision of data security at consumer reporting agencies, to require the promulgation of regulations establishing standards for effective cybersecurity at consumer reporting agencies, to impose penalties on credit reporting agencies for cybersecurity breaches that put sensitive consumer data at risk, and for other purposes.</description></item><item><title>S. 266 - Comprehensive Counter-Terrorism Act of 1991</title><link>/entries/s-266-comprehensive-counter-terrorism-act-of-1991-780b290c/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/s-266-comprehensive-counter-terrorism-act-of-1991-780b290c/</guid><description>Authors: Biden, Joseph
Published: January 1991
URL: https://www.congress.gov/bill/102nd-congress/senate-bill/266/text
Abstract: Text for S.266 - 102nd Congress (1991-1992): Comprehensive Counter-Terrorism Act of 1991</description></item><item><title>S. 2889 - National Security and Personal Data Protection Act of 2019</title><link>/entries/s-2889-national-security-and-personal-data-protect-a7b6e85d/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/s-2889-national-security-and-personal-data-protect-a7b6e85d/</guid><description>Authors: Hawley, Josh and Cotton, Tom and Rubio, Marco
Published: November 2019
Abstract: To safeguard data of Americans from foreign governments that pose risks to national security by imposing data security requirements and strengthening review of foreign investments, and for other purposes.</description></item><item><title>S.1842 - Protecting Personal Health Data Act</title><link>/entries/s-1842-protecting-personal-health-data-act-8bffdbe7/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/s-1842-protecting-personal-health-data-act-8bffdbe7/</guid><description>Authors: Klobuchar, Amy and Murkowski, Lisa
Published: June 2019
URL: https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/1842/text
Abstract: To protect the personal health data of all Americans.</description></item><item><title>Secret US Cybersecurity Report: Encryption Vital to Protect Private Data</title><link>/entries/secret-us-cybersecurity-report-encryption-vital-to-9703fda8/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/secret-us-cybersecurity-report-encryption-vital-to-9703fda8/</guid><description>Authors: Ball, James
Published: January 2015
URL: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jan/15/-sp-secret-us-cybersecurity-report-encryption-protect-data-cameron-paris-attacks
Abstract: Newly uncovered Snowden document contrasts with British PM’s vow to crack down on encrypted messaging after Paris attacks</description></item><item><title>Secrets or Shields to Share? New Dilemmas for Dual Use Technology Development and the Quest for military and Commercial Advantage in the Digital Age</title><link>/entries/secrets-or-shields-to-share-new-dilemmas-for-dual-34d6ebbe/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/secrets-or-shields-to-share-new-dilemmas-for-dual-34d6ebbe/</guid><description>Authors: Stowsky, Jay
Published: February 2003</description></item><item><title>Security vs. Security - Rapid7 Supports Strong Encryption</title><link>/entries/security-vs-security-rapid7-supports-strong-encryp-4634f37f/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/security-vs-security-rapid7-supports-strong-encryp-4634f37f/</guid><description>Authors: Geiger, Harley
Published: April 2016
URL: https://blog.rapid7.com/2016/04/01/security-vs-security-rapid7-supports-strong-encryption/
Abstract: A major area of focus in the current cybersecurity policy discussion is how growing adoption of encryption impacts law enforcement and national security, and whether new policies should be developed in response. This post briefly evaluates several potential outcomes of the debate, and provides Rapid7&amp;rsquo;s current position on each. Background</description></item><item><title>Security Win: Burr-Feinstein Proposal Declared “Dead” for This Year</title><link>/entries/security-win-burr-feinstein-proposal-declared-dead-728401be/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/security-win-burr-feinstein-proposal-declared-dead-728401be/</guid><description>Authors: Reitman, rainey
Published: May 2016
URL: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/05/win-one-security-burr-feinstein-proposal-declared-dead-year
Abstract: This post from the Electronic Frontier Foundation details how proposed legislation from Senators Burr and Feinstein was not going to be introduced, which was seen as a win by many privacy advocates. The article explains the proposal, which would mandate backdoors, and then describes that although it would not advance, many others like it were still being proposed or debated.</description></item><item><title>Security “Front Doors” vs. “Back Doors”: A Distinction Without a Difference</title><link>/entries/security-front-doors-vs-back-doors-a-distinction-w-27fb709b/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/security-front-doors-vs-back-doors-a-distinction-w-27fb709b/</guid><description>Authors: Jeffrey Vagle, Matt Blaze
Published: October 2014
URL: https://www.justsecurity.org/16503/security-front-doors-vs-back-doors-distinction-difference/
Abstract: This article by Jeffrey Vagle and Matt Blaze discusses FBI Director James Comey’s speeches calling for back doors in encryption for law enforcement and argues that it is technologically infeasible and politically wise. The article details how back doors will eventually be uncovered and lead to vulnerabilities in systems. Finally, the article argues that the language being used to advocate for back doors builds a false sense of security in populations unfamiliar with the technological realities and leads people away from more workable solutions.</description></item><item><title>Security, Surveillance And The Truth About Going Dark</title><link>/entries/security-surveillance-and-the-truth-about-going-da-639358d3/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/security-surveillance-and-the-truth-about-going-da-639358d3/</guid><description>Authors: Blech, Richard
Published: July 2019
URL: https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2019/07/25/security-surveillance-and-the-truth-about-going-dark/
Abstract: This article details a meeting among government officials on whether to ban the public availability and explores similar proposals from the past. The article details how encryption policy frequently debates back doors and the balance between security and surveillance. The article argues that as surveillance technology becomes increasingly prevalent, security must be prioritized.</description></item><item><title>Senator Backs Off Backdoors</title><link>/entries/senator-backs-off-backdoors-b6e3901e/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/senator-backs-off-backdoors-b6e3901e/</guid><description>Authors: McCullagh, Declan
Published: October 2001
URL: https://www.wired.com/2001/10/senator-backs-off-backdoors/
Abstract: A senator changes his mind after calling for a prohibition on data-scrambling products without backdoors for government surveillance. Now, he &amp;ldquo;has no intentions&amp;rdquo; of working on such an encryption bill. Declan McCullagh reports from Washington.</description></item><item><title>Shining a Light on the Encryption Debate: A Canadian Field Guide</title><link>/entries/shining-a-light-on-the-encryption-debate-a-canadia-9d78aca2/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/shining-a-light-on-the-encryption-debate-a-canadia-9d78aca2/</guid><description>Authors: Gill, Lex and Parsons, Christopher and Israel, Tamir
Published: May 2018</description></item><item><title>Software Firms Call U.S. Plan on Encryption 'Unworkable'</title><link>/entries/software-firms-call-u-s-plan-on-encryption-unworka-5550f1d3/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/software-firms-call-u-s-plan-on-encryption-unworka-5550f1d3/</guid><description>Authors: Chandrasekaran, Rajiv
Published: December 1996
Abstract: This article details the Business Software Alliance, a software industry group, and its rejection of Clinton Administration export controls as unworkable. This disagreement presented a large roadblock to discussions between industry and government</description></item><item><title>Sources: We Were Pressured to Weaken the Mobile Security in the 80's</title><link>/entries/sources-we-were-pressured-to-weaken-the-mobile-sec-d482f436/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/sources-we-were-pressured-to-weaken-the-mobile-sec-d482f436/</guid><description>Authors: Færaas, Arild
Published: January 2014
URL: https://www.aftenposten.no/article/ap-Olkl.html
Abstract: This article details how the A5/1-encryption standard, used to secure mobile phones, was made intentionally weaker than it could have been. Four men involved with the invention of the encryption standard detailed the political agreements that lead to the standard being weaker than technologically possible, as the encryption standard had been made 54 bit, rather than 128 bit. This encryption standard, they argued, could have at least delayed NSA hacking of the encryption.</description></item><item><title>SS7 Hack Explained: What Can You Do About It?</title><link>/entries/ss7-hack-explained-what-can-you-do-about-it-2ca330ad/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/ss7-hack-explained-what-can-you-do-about-it-2ca330ad/</guid><description>Authors: Gibbs, Samuel
Published: April 2016
URL: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/apr/19/ss7-hack-explained-mobile-phone-vulnerability-snooping-texts-calls
Abstract: This article explains the SS7 hack—which allowed hackers to listen to phone calls, read texts, and track mobile phones—recounts what lead to the hack, and gives solutions for people to protect their data. The article, geared towards a law audience, explains how systems can be hacked and what can be done about it, both by a consumer and by companies and the government.</description></item><item><title>Standards Setting and Federal Information Policy: The Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES)</title><link>/entries/standards-setting-and-federal-information-policy-t-0fafb4ad/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/standards-setting-and-federal-information-policy-t-0fafb4ad/</guid><description>Authors: Gegner, Karen E. and Veeder, Stacy B.
Published: January 1994
URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0740624X94900183
Abstract: The controversial Escrowed Encryption Standard, recently adopted as a Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS), has polarized some stakeholders both within and outside government and has also raised disturbing questions about the role of Federal agencies in the standards-setting process. This article explores the relationship between standards and Federal information policy and examines the balance between national security and law enforcement concerns, on the one hand, and privacy rights and U.</description></item><item><title>Statement by Commerce Secretary William Daley Re: Administration encryption policy</title><link>/entries/statement-by-commerce-secretary-william-daley-re-a-f1d56237/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/statement-by-commerce-secretary-william-daley-re-a-f1d56237/</guid><description>Authors: Daley, William M.
Published: September 1999
URL: http://www.techlawjournal.com/cong106/encrypt/19990916dal.htm</description></item><item><title>Statement by the Press Secretary</title><link>/entries/statement-by-the-press-secretary-617ea86a/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/statement-by-the-press-secretary-617ea86a/</guid><description>Published: April 1993
URL: https://epic.org/crypto/clipper/white_house_statement_4_93.html
Abstract: Statement on the Clipper Chip</description></item><item><title>Statement of Cindy A. Cohn, Testimony on Encryption as Constitutionally Protected Speech</title><link>/entries/statement-of-cindy-a-cohn-testimony-on-encryption-5ab3bf4f/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/statement-of-cindy-a-cohn-testimony-on-encryption-5ab3bf4f/</guid><description>Authors: Cindy A. Cohn
Published: March 1998
URL: http://gos.sbc.edu/c/cohn.html
Abstract: This testimony from by Cindy A. Cohn, Lead Counsel in the Bernstein v. Department of Justice, before the Senate Judiciary Committee&amp;rsquo;s Subcommittee on Constitution, Federalism and Property Rights, discusses the Bernstein v. Department of Justice litigation, other similar cases, and their potential impacts. The case centered around First Amendment concerns in encryption, and the testimony emphasizes encryption’s impact on free expression and communication.</description></item><item><title>Statement of General Keith B. Alexander, Commander, United States Cyber Command, Before the Senate Committee on Armed Services</title><link>/entries/statement-of-general-keith-b-alexander-commander-u-d467327a/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/statement-of-general-keith-b-alexander-commander-u-d467327a/</guid><description>Authors: Alexander, Keith B.
Published: March 2013</description></item><item><title>Status Report on the First Round of the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Process</title><link>/entries/status-report-on-the-first-round-of-the-nist-post-579fe6e3/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/status-report-on-the-first-round-of-the-nist-post-579fe6e3/</guid><description>Authors: Alagic, Gorjan and Alperin-Sheriff, Jacob and Apon, Daniel and Cooper, David and Dang, Quynh and Liu, Yi-Kai and Miller, Carl and Moody, Dustin and Peralta, Rene and Perlner, Ray and Robinson, Angela and Smith-Tone, Daniel
Published: January 2019
URL: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2019/NIST.IR.8240.pdf
Abstract: The National Institute of Standards and Technology is in the process of selecting one or more public-key cryptographic algorithms through a public competition-like process. The new publickey cryptography standards will specify one or more additional digital signature, public-key encryption, and key-establishment algorithms to augment FIPS 186-4, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), as well as special publications SP 800-56A Revision 2, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, and SP 800-56B, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization.</description></item><item><title>Submission of the Citizen Lab (Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto) to the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, Ms. Dubravka Šimonović</title><link>/entries/submission-of-the-citizen-lab-munk-school-of-globa-8208d51f/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/submission-of-the-citizen-lab-munk-school-of-globa-8208d51f/</guid><description>Published: November 2017
URL: https://citizenlab.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Final-UNSRVAG-CitizenLab.pdf
Abstract: This report, submitted to the o the United Nations Special Rapporteur on violence against women, details how gender-based violence can be perpetrated through technology and how encryption should be part of the solution to prevent such violence. The report offers case studies of gendered violence in Canada and proposes solutions. Among those solutions, encryption can offer privacy and anonymity to victims, as well as advocates.</description></item><item><title>Surveillance Costs: The NSA's Impact on the Economy, Internet Freedom \&amp; Cybersecurity</title><link>/entries/surveillance-costs-the-nsa-s-impact-on-the-economy-5c789458/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/surveillance-costs-the-nsa-s-impact-on-the-economy-5c789458/</guid><description>Authors: Kehl, Danielle and Bankston, Kevin and Greene, Robyn and Morgus, Robert
Published: July 2014
URL: https://www.newamerica.org/oti/policy-papers/surveillance-costs-the-nsas-impact-on-the-economy-internet-freedom-cybersecurity/
Abstract: It has been over a year since The Guardian reported the first story on the National Security Agency’s surveillance programs based on the leaks from former NSA contractor Edward Snowden, yet the national conversation remains largely mired in a simplistic debate over the tradeoffs between national security and individual privacy. It is time to start weighing the overall costs and benefits more broadly.</description></item><item><title>Symposium: Recent Development: Key Escrow Encryption Policies and Technoligies</title><link>/entries/symposium-recent-development-key-escrow-encryption-7ab38e95/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/symposium-recent-development-key-escrow-encryption-7ab38e95/</guid><description>Authors: Denning, Dorothy E. and Baugh, Jr., William E.
Published: 1996
URL: https://advance-lexis-com.colorado.idm.oclc.org/document/teaserdocument/?pdmfid=1516831&amp;amp;crid=8b6ba342-19bb-468d-ba50-25b58114a8ae&amp;amp;pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fanalytical-materials%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A3S3V-6N10-00CT-V0F6-00000-00&amp;amp;pddocid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A3S3V-6N10-00CT-V0F6-00000-00&amp;amp;pdcontentcomponentid=139228&amp;amp;pdteaserkey=h1&amp;amp;pditab=allpods&amp;amp;ecomp=sp79k&amp;amp;earg=sr0&amp;amp;prid=045f1ac9-dc07-4c8a-abad-d37187cd5523
Abstract: This article from 1996 details the Clinton Administration’s key escrow proposal, outlines the positions around key escrow, international approaches to key escrow, and argues that key escrow is an effective solution that should be implemented. The article argues that key escrow assists law enforcement, protects businesses, would put the US in line with other nations, and can be securely implemented in up to 64 bit encryption.</description></item><item><title>Techies Urge Senator To Drop Encryption Key Plan</title><link>/entries/techies-urge-senator-to-drop-encryption-key-plan-7c42e2b5/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/techies-urge-senator-to-drop-encryption-key-plan-7c42e2b5/</guid><description>Authors: Brian Krebs
Published: October 2001
URL: https://web.archive.org/web/20011011022244/http://www.newsbytes.com/news/01/170592.html
Abstract: This article details a letter sent by privacy advocates to Senator Judd Gregg in response to a speech he made days after September 11, condemning encryption. Senator Gregg called for quasi-judicial rulemaking requiring backdoors, stating that it was likely that the 9/11 attackers likely used encryption in emails to plan the attack. Meanwhile, advocates stressed the impracticality of requiring a back door, as well as the risk of holding all passwords in one central location, in case that is hacked.</description></item><item><title>the People of the State of Colorado v. Shaun R. Davis</title><link>/entries/the-people-of-the-state-of-colorado-v-shaun-r-davi-ca69bf48/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/the-people-of-the-state-of-colorado-v-shaun-r-davi-ca69bf48/</guid><description>Published: April 2019
Abstract: In Colorado v. Davis, the Colorado Supreme Court held that using a passcode given to police officers to execute a search warrant on a smartphone did not violate the Fourth Amendment. In this case, a criminal defendant had given his cellphone passcode to police officers during his arrest so they could call his girlfriend. Later, after law enforcement received a warrant to search the phone, the passcode was used to search the phone.</description></item><item><title>The Burr-Feinstein Proposal Is Simply Anti-Security</title><link>/entries/the-burr-feinstein-proposal-is-simply-anti-securit-e9e5d5f1/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/the-burr-feinstein-proposal-is-simply-anti-securit-e9e5d5f1/</guid><description>Authors: Cohn, Cindy
Published: April 2016
URL: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/04/burr-feinstein-proposal-simply-anti-security
Abstract: This article described proposed legislation that would require technology companies—including device manufacturers, software developers, ISPs, and others—to decrypt data if ordered to do so by any court at any time. Further, because the proposed actions are not feasible, and if the law were enacted it would harm Americans’ privacy, all while foreign alternatives would still be available. The article argues that because the proposal is so far removed from any technologically feasible solution, it demonstrates how out of touch key regulators are with the reality of encryption.</description></item><item><title>The Clipper Chip</title><link>/entries/the-clipper-chip-edd3daa1/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/the-clipper-chip-edd3daa1/</guid><description>Authors: Electronic Privacy Information Center
Published: 1994
URL: https://epic.org/crypto/clipper/
Abstract: This announcement regarding the Clipper Chip announces the Electronic Privacy Information Center’s attempt to challenge the national security classification of the Clipper Chip algorithm, so the algorithm may be evaluated by civilians. It provides a guide to the relevant documents explaining the organization’s positions.</description></item><item><title>The EARN IT Act Is Unconstitutional: Fourth Amendment</title><link>/entries/the-earn-it-act-is-unconstitutional-fourth-amendme-a7207348/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/the-earn-it-act-is-unconstitutional-fourth-amendme-a7207348/</guid><description>Authors: Pfefferkorn, Riana
Published: March 2020
URL: http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2020/03/earn-it-act-unconstitutional-fourth-amendment
Abstract: This blog post outlines the argument that proposed legislation entitled the EARN IT Act is unconstitutional on Fourth Amendment Grounds. The Post argues that the Act would require online service providers to actively scan for Child Sexual Abuse Materials, rather than merely reporting it when it is found. By requiring providers to conduct these searches, the providers would become state actors and the searches would require a warrant, and without a warrant, these searches would be unconstitutional under the fourth amendment, and the evidence would be excluded in court proceedings.</description></item><item><title>The Encryption Debate in the European Union</title><link>/entries/the-encryption-debate-in-the-european-union-6437b4a5/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/the-encryption-debate-in-the-european-union-6437b4a5/</guid><description>Authors: Koomen, Maria and Koomen, Maria
Published: May 2019
URL: https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/05/30/encryption-debate-in-european-union-pub-79220
Abstract: The Encryption Debate in the European Union is a policy brief that describes the intensifying encryption debate in the European Union, the interests and actors involved, and a possible timeline and substance of potential legislation. While encryption had largely thrived in Europe since the 1990s, the occurrence of multiple terror attacks in the late 10’s sparked a debate about encryption and national security within the EU.</description></item><item><title>The Encryption Tightrope: Balancing Americans' Security and Privacy</title><link>/entries/the-encryption-tightrope-balancing-americans-secur-8372b960/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/the-encryption-tightrope-balancing-americans-secur-8372b960/</guid><description>Published: March 2016
Abstract: On March 1, 2016, the House Judiciary Committee of the 114th Congress held a hearing entitled, The Encryption Tightrope: Balancing Americans’ Security and Privacy. The key focus of the hearing was answering the question: How do we deploy ever stronger, more effective encryption without unduly preventing lawful access to communications of criminals and terrorists intent on doing us harm? The Committee began the hearing by nothing its chief concern, that “[a]doption of new communications technologies by those intending harm to the American people is outpacing law enforcement’s technological capability to access those communications in legitimate criminal and national security investigations.</description></item><item><title>The Evolution of US Government Restrictions on Using and Exporting Encryption Technologies (U)</title><link>/entries/the-evolution-of-us-government-restrictions-on-usi-2a478a7b/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/the-evolution-of-us-government-restrictions-on-usi-2a478a7b/</guid><description>Authors: Schwartzbeck, Michael
URL: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0006231614.pdf
Abstract: This declassified report outlines the development of encryption technology by the United States government, and how private actors have challenged the government’s monopoly and changed the landscape of encryption. The report begins by detailing the creation of the NSA and the development of cryptography and provides a timeline through key escrow in the 1990s. The article ends by proposing potential paths for the future of cryptography and urging the Clinton Administration to seek an international resolution to require key escrow registration to allow governments a back door while preventing foreign technology as an alternative to complying with American requirements.</description></item><item><title>The Five Eyes Statement on Encryption: Things Are Seldom What They Seem</title><link>/entries/the-five-eyes-statement-on-encryption-things-are-s-be5639a2/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/the-five-eyes-statement-on-encryption-things-are-s-be5639a2/</guid><description>Authors: Landau, Susan
Published: September 2018
URL: https://www.lawfareblog.com/five-eyes-statement-encryption-things-are-seldom-what-they-seem
Abstract: This report from Lawfare details a summit of law enforcement officials from the Five Eyes intelligence alliance—made up of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States—and argues that the rhetoric espoused was far less troubling than it seemed. At the summit, Australian officials detailed an aggressive stance against encryption. However, by ignoring technical realities, the policy proposals are rendered toothless.</description></item><item><title>The Human Rights Benefits of Encryption</title><link>/entries/the-human-rights-benefits-of-encryption-9be91f1d/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/the-human-rights-benefits-of-encryption-9be91f1d/</guid><description>Authors: Andi Wilson Thompson
Published: March 2015
URL: https://www.newamerica.org/oti/blog/the-human-rights-benefits-of-encryption/
Abstract: The Human Rights Benefits of Encryption is a blog post detailing public interest organizations&amp;rsquo; efforts to have encryption recognized as a right by the UN Human Rights Council. This article describes submissions by a multitude of public interest organizations—including the ACLU, Human Rights Watch, and technology-specific organizations—and their arguments for the importance of encryption to free expression, privacy, and human rights.</description></item><item><title>The Last Refuge of the Criminal: Encrypted Smartphones</title><link>/entries/the-last-refuge-of-the-criminal-encrypted-smartpho-ba7ee311/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/the-last-refuge-of-the-criminal-encrypted-smartpho-ba7ee311/</guid><description>Authors: de Bolle, Catherine, Vance, Cyrus R., Jr.
Published: July 2021
URL: https://www.politico.eu/article/the-last-refuge-of-the-criminal-encrypted-smartphones-data-privacy/
Abstract: Catherine de Bolle and Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., write in Politico that encrypted devices—particularly encrypted smartphones—pose an intolerable impediment to law enforcement, the pursuit of justice, and vindication of victims and their families. They argue that criminals exploit unregulated encryption to perpetrate a variety of crimes, from ransomware to child sex trafficking, and that the ability to lawfully access devices is overwhelmingly frustrated by judges, policies, and budgets.</description></item><item><title>The Law and Policy of Client-Side Scanning</title><link>/entries/the-law-and-policy-of-client-side-scanning-7598c301/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/the-law-and-policy-of-client-side-scanning-7598c301/</guid><description>Authors: Rosenzweig, Paul
Published: August 2020
URL: https://www.lawfareblog.com/law-and-policy-client-side-scanning
Abstract: Paul Rosenzweig, former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy in the Department of Homeland Security, and founder of a homeland security consulting company, writes an analysis of client-side scanning published by the Lawfare Institute in cooperation with the Brookings Institute. He concludes that, while client-side scanning offers attractive protective capabilities to meet the rise of online-distributed child pornography via encrypted systems, its adoption at its current nascent stage would be nonetheless undesirable due to technological, legal, and policy uncertainties.</description></item><item><title>The Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, The Clipper Chip, and the Constitution</title><link>/entries/the-metaphor-is-the-key-cryptography-the-clipper-c-9a3caf0b/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/the-metaphor-is-the-key-cryptography-the-clipper-c-9a3caf0b/</guid><description>Authors: Froomkin, Michael A.
Published: 1996
URL: http://osaka.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/articles/clipper.htm</description></item><item><title>The NSA’s Split-Key Encryption Proposal is Not Serious</title><link>/entries/the-nsas-split-key-encryption-proposal-is-not-seri-126e61d2/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/the-nsas-split-key-encryption-proposal-is-not-seri-126e61d2/</guid><description>Authors: Joseph Lorenzo Hall
Published: April 2015
URL: https://cdt.org/insights/the-nsas-split-key-encryption-proposal-is-not-serious/
Abstract: The NSA&amp;rsquo;s Split-Key Encryption Proposal is Not Serious discusses the NSA&amp;rsquo;s 2020 proposal to require technology companies to create a &amp;ldquo;golden key,&amp;rdquo; a split-key that would allow the company or the NSA access to encrypted communications. Hall argues that split-key encryption is a technology infeasible, vulnerable, and costly, and would not be able to ensure any data was protected from the NSA.</description></item><item><title>The Risks of Key Recovery, Key Escrow, and Trusted Third-Party Encryption (Revised)</title><link>/entries/the-risks-of-key-recovery-key-escrow-and-trusted-t-50dad67f/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/the-risks-of-key-recovery-key-escrow-and-trusted-t-50dad67f/</guid><description>Authors: Abelson, H. and Anderson, R. and Bellovin, S.M. and Benaloh, J. and Blaze, M. and Diffie, W. and Gilmore, J. and Neumann, P.G. and Rivest, R.L. and Schiller, J.I. and Schneier, B.
Published: 1998
URL: https://www.schneier.com/academic/archives/1997/04/the_risks_of_key_rec.html
Abstract: This report offers a detailed technical evaluation of the technical risks, costs, and policy implications of allowing government access to encryption keys. The article begins with the proposals that would benefit law enforcement officials, and the possibly insurmountable barriers to building such a system, and the details of the security risks and costs of such a system.</description></item><item><title>The Risks of “Responsible Encryption”</title><link>/entries/the-risks-of-responsible-encryption-149c012c/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/the-risks-of-responsible-encryption-149c012c/</guid><description>Authors: Pfefferkorn, Riana
Published: February 2018
Abstract: The Risks of “Responsible Encryption” critiques “responsible encryption,” a term developed used by US law enforcement officials describing a general policy of government access to encrypted materials. The article begins by detailing the origins of the terms and their use by government officials, then seeks to define the scope of the term and possible technical definitions. Next, the paper warns of the risks of exceptional access, including increased key usage and access, authentication of exceptional access requests at scale, the economic and competitive effects on US technology companies, and the limitations of exceptional access capabilities.</description></item><item><title>The Role of Encryption in Australia</title><link>/entries/the-role-of-encryption-in-australia-4e0f543e/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/the-role-of-encryption-in-australia-4e0f543e/</guid><description>Authors: O&amp;rsquo;Shea, Lizzie and Thomas, Elise
Published: January 2018
URL: https://www.accessnow.org/cms/assets/uploads/2018/01/Crypto-Australia-Memo.pdf
Abstract: Encryption is essential to Australia’s modern digital society, economy, and cyber security, and it is only effective if it is strong and robust.
Strong encryption serves Australia’s national interests by protecting governments, communities, and the economy from criminal, terrorist, and state-sponsored attacks.
Encryption will only become more important for protecting Australian interests as technology advances in the coming decades.</description></item><item><title>The Shifting Landscape of Global Internet Censorship</title><link>/entries/the-shifting-landscape-of-global-internet-censorsh-92d9e491/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/the-shifting-landscape-of-global-internet-censorsh-92d9e491/</guid><description>Authors: Zittrain, Jonathan L. and Faris, Robert and Noman, Helmi and Clark, Justin and Tilton, Casey and Morrison-Westphal, Ryan
Published: 2017
URL: https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2993485
Abstract: The 2017 Shifting Landscape of Global Internet Censorship by the Berkman Klein Center for Internet &amp;amp; Society is the 2017 update to their report which studies Internet censorship in 75 countries. The study looks at the filtering of documents and information, both in terms of specific topics or individuals as well as entire platforms.</description></item><item><title>The Wassenaar Arrangement: On Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies</title><link>/entries/the-wassenaar-arrangement-on-export-controls-for-c-1d93278e/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/the-wassenaar-arrangement-on-export-controls-for-c-1d93278e/</guid><description>Published: February 2020
URL: https://www.wassenaar.org/
Abstract: On July 26, 2015, The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies published an article on the history of the Wassenaar Arrangement. After the Cold War, the COCOM export control regime was disbanded. The former members of COCOM recognized “a need to establish a new arrangement to deal with risks to regional and international security and stability related to the spread of conventional weapons and dual-use goods and technologies.</description></item><item><title>The Way Forward: Working Together to Tackle Cybercrime</title><link>/entries/the-way-forward-working-together-to-tackle-cybercr-9b44953b/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/the-way-forward-working-together-to-tackle-cybercr-9b44953b/</guid><description>Authors: Wray, Christopher
Published: July 2019
URL: https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/the-way-forward-working-together-to-tackle-cybercrime
Abstract: These remarks, given by Cristopher Wray, former director of the FBI at the 2019 FBI International Conference on Cyber Security, offer an insight into the goals and capabilities of the FBI. Director Wray describes the capabilities of the FBI to combat cybersecurity, the dangers of foreign influence, and the foreign development of cyber technology. Then, Director Wray argues how encryption impedes law enforcement, describes specific crimes where encrypted information hindered an FBI investigation, and argues that lawful access to encrypted materials is increasingly necessary to law enforcement investigations.</description></item><item><title>Timeline: The U.S. Government and Cybersecurity</title><link>/entries/timeline-the-u-s-government-and-cybersecurity-5f7be48e/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/timeline-the-u-s-government-and-cybersecurity-5f7be48e/</guid><description>Published: May 2003
URL: https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A50606-2002Jun26.html
Abstract: This article offers a short timeline of government actions to curb the hacking of government computer systems. This article was prescient given the panic the Y2K bug that was creating in the vulnerabilities of government systems.</description></item><item><title>Travel Guide to the Digital World: Encryption Policy for Human Rights Defenders</title><link>/entries/travel-guide-to-the-digital-world-encryption-polic-2d5134d2/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/travel-guide-to-the-digital-world-encryption-polic-2d5134d2/</guid><description>Authors: Global Partners Digital
Published: 2017
URL: https://www.gp-digital.org/publication/travel-guide-to-the-digital-world-4-encryption-policy-for-human-rights-defenders/
Abstract: This is a guide, aimed at a non-technical audience, seeking to explain the connection between human rights and encryption. The article gives a background on the basics of encryption, and how it affects the day-to-day life of people around the globe, and its impacts on privacy and freedom of expression. Finally, the article outlines the legal and policy background of encryption regulation across the globe and at the international, national, and local levels.</description></item><item><title>U.S. Relaxes Export Controls on Supercomputers</title><link>/entries/u-s-relaxes-export-controls-on-supercomputers-a6ca258e/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/u-s-relaxes-export-controls-on-supercomputers-a6ca258e/</guid><description>Authors: Diamond, Howard
Published: July 1999
URL: https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1999-07/press-releases/us-relaxes-export-controls-supercomputers
Abstract: This news article details a loosening of export restrictions on supercomputers to various nations on national security and economic grounds that had been tightened several years prior. The article details the process and substance of the loosened restrictions, as well as the political hurdles that had delayed the changes.</description></item><item><title>U.S. Says It Has Unlocked iPhone Without Apple</title><link>/entries/u-s-says-it-has-unlocked-iphone-without-apple-c5d963b4/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/u-s-says-it-has-unlocked-iphone-without-apple-c5d963b4/</guid><description>Authors: Benner, Katie and Lichtblau, Eric
Published: March 2016
URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/29/technology/apple-iphone-fbi-justice-department-case.html
Abstract: This New York Times article by Katie Benner and Eric Lichtblau reports on the government&amp;rsquo;s successful unlocking of the iPhone of the suspect in the San Bernardino mass shooting, the investigation which gave rise to the Apple vs. FBI court case. The article reports on how the successful unlocking may lead Apple to request information about the exploited vulnerability in order to fix it.</description></item><item><title>U.S. Supercomputer Export Control Policy</title><link>/entries/u-s-supercomputer-export-control-policy-9f12a98a/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/u-s-supercomputer-export-control-policy-9f12a98a/</guid><description>Published: November 1997
URL: http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/security/has317000.000/has317000_1.HTM
Abstract: This hearing is from the House of Representatives Committee on National Security, in their 1997 hearing on U.S. Supercomputer Export Control Policy. Here, many high-level government officials are questioned on the details of encryption export policy. It gives a thorough accounting of the attitudes of the government officials involved in encryption policy in the 1990s.</description></item><item><title>U.S. Tries to Make It Easier to Wiretap the Internet</title><link>/entries/u-s-tries-to-make-it-easier-to-wiretap-the-interne-7c6b8243/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/u-s-tries-to-make-it-easier-to-wiretap-the-interne-7c6b8243/</guid><description>Authors: Savage, Charlie
Published: September 2010
URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/27/us/27wiretap.html
Abstract: This New York Times article by Charlie Savage reports on planned legislation by the Obama administration which would allow for the US government to decrypt select communications and prevent going dark. The article discusses how encryption has worked in recent law enforcement investigations, and why the government finds such a technology necessary. The article discusses the feasibility of different possible elements of the proposed law, including attempting to regulate encryption technology coming from abroad.</description></item><item><title>US Encryption Export Regualtion: US to EU: Me Too! — The United States Amends Its Export Controls on Encrption, Responding to Recent Developments in the European Union</title><link>/entries/us-encryption-export-regualtion-us-to-eu-me-too-th-169deed5/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/us-encryption-export-regualtion-us-to-eu-me-too-th-169deed5/</guid><description>Authors: Thomsen II, Roszel C and Paytas, Antoinette D
Published: January 2001
URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0267364901001030
Abstract: This paper reviews the most recent changes to the US export controls on encryption items (referred to herein as the “US Regulations”) that were published in the US Federal Register on 19 October, 2000.1165 Fed. Reg. 62600 (2000). It describes how the decision by the European Union (EU) Council of Ministers on 22 June 2000, to create a license free zone for exports of encryption (and other) items (referred to herein as the “EU Regulations”) provided the initial stimulus for these changes.</description></item><item><title>US Government Fines Intel's Wind River Over Crypto Exports</title><link>/entries/us-government-fines-intel-s-wind-river-over-crypto-09cbe60a/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/us-government-fines-intel-s-wind-river-over-crypto-09cbe60a/</guid><description>Authors: Leyden, John
Published: October 2014
URL: https://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/10/17/intel_subsidiary_crypto_export_fine/
Abstract: This article by John Leyden discussed a $750,000 fine by the Department of Commerce on Wind River for exporting products utilizing encryption to foreign nations, including China, Russia, and Israel. The article explores increasing action by regulators, viewing large fines for violations as the norm going forward, in the conflict over foreign control over encryption. The article explores the consequences of escalating enforcement action over the trade of encrypted technology with foreign nations.</description></item><item><title>Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies</title><link>/entries/wassenaar-arrangement-on-export-controls-for-conve-7584af0f/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/wassenaar-arrangement-on-export-controls-for-conve-7584af0f/</guid><description>Published: December 1995
Abstract: The Wassenaar Arrangement, an arrangement from 1996 between 33 nations seeking to create consistent and transparent policy on encryption, and to promote security. This document contains the declarations, guidelines, and procedures that governed the agreement. It provides detail and specifics on the functioning of the arrangement.</description></item><item><title>We Need More Protection from Government Surveillance — Not Less</title><link>/entries/we-need-more-protection-from-government-surveillan-3c66d9c0/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/we-need-more-protection-from-government-surveillan-3c66d9c0/</guid><description>Authors: McGowan, Iverna and Naranjo, Diego and Koomen, Maria and Beltrà, Guillermo and Preiss, Omri and Massé, Estelle and Cohn, Cindy and Stollmeyer, Alice and Bukovská, Barbora and Dusepulchre, Gaelle and Anderson, Andrew and Skoric, Vanja and Westby, Joe and Keller, Paul
Published: July 2021
URL: https://www.politico.eu/article/we-need-more-protection-government-surveillance-not-less/
Abstract: A group of user- and human-rights advocates jointly write an article published by Politico in response to Catherine de Bolle and Cyrus R.</description></item><item><title>What is the Wassenaar Arrangement?</title><link>/entries/what-is-the-wassenaar-arrangement-e44b92a7/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/what-is-the-wassenaar-arrangement-e44b92a7/</guid><description>Published: February 2020
URL: https://www.wassenaar.org/the-wassenaar-arrangement/
Abstract: This brief explainer provides a background on the Wassenaar Arrangement, an arrangement from 1996 between 33 nations seeking to create consistent and transparent policy on encryption and to promote security.</description></item><item><title>Who Holds the Key? – A Comparative Study of US and European Encryption Policies</title><link>/entries/who-holds-the-key-a-comparative-study-of-us-and-eu-2e2a0618/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/who-holds-the-key-a-comparative-study-of-us-and-eu-2e2a0618/</guid><description>Authors: Andrews, Sarah
Published: June 2000
URL: https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/2000_2/andrews/
Abstract: This paper from 2000 by Sarah Andrews details the arguments for and against the use of encryption. In favor of encryption, the paper discusses the increased need for assurances of confidentiality in email and internet communication, as well as fraud. Against its use, the article discusses hindrances to law enforcement and the concealment of crimes. Finally, this article looks at the competing approaches of regulators in the U.</description></item><item><title>Why An Encryption Backdoor for Just the "Good Guys" Won't Work</title><link>/entries/why-an-encryption-backdoor-for-just-the-good-guys-918a9e9d/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/why-an-encryption-backdoor-for-just-the-good-guys-918a9e9d/</guid><description>Authors: Stepanovich, Amie and Karanicolas, Michael
Published: March 2018
URL: https://www.justsecurity.org/53316/criminalize-security-criminals-secure/
Abstract: Recently, U.S. law enforcement officials have re-energized their push for a technical means to bypass encryption. But seeking to undermine encryption only looks backward instead of focusing on where technology is going. We should be having conversations about new investigative techniques, not trying to preserve the access enjoyed in the days before encryption was so widespread, particularly when so much is at stake in doing so.</description></item><item><title>Wiretapping and Cryptography Today</title><link>/entries/wiretapping-and-cryptography-today-925f8d0d/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/wiretapping-and-cryptography-today-925f8d0d/</guid><description>Authors: Blaze, Matt
Published: July 2011
URL: https://web.archive.org/web/20110715210433/http://www.crypto.com/blog/wiretap2010
Abstract: This blog post from Matt Blaze examines the 2011 Wiretap report and argues that encryption has done little to hinder law enforcement. The blog post points out that despite the increased prevalence of encryption, few wiretap searches by law enforcement even encountered encryption, and never did it interfere with the investigation. The proposes that with the increased prevalence of encryption, law enforcement methods have adapted.</description></item><item><title>World Map of Encryption Laws and Policies</title><link>/entries/world-map-of-encryption-laws-and-policies-af6d8b94/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/world-map-of-encryption-laws-and-policies-af6d8b94/</guid><description>Authors: Global Partners Digital
URL: https://www.gp-digital.org/world-map-of-encryption/
Abstract: This interactive map provides an overview of encryption laws throughout the world. The law categorized nations by minimal, some, and widespread restrictions, as well as imposing filters based on specific law or policy measures.</description></item><item><title>Worried about Apple? California Has a Bill That Would Disable Encryption on All Phones</title><link>/entries/worried-about-apple-california-has-a-bill-that-wou-fa26214c/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/worried-about-apple-california-has-a-bill-that-wou-fa26214c/</guid><description>Authors: Crocker, Andrew
Published: March 2016
URL: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/03/worried-about-apple-california-has-bill-would-disable-encryption-all-phones
Abstract: This article from the Electronic Frontier Foundation discusses a bill proposed in the California state legislature that would require smartphones sold in the state to be capable of being decrypted by the manufacturer. The article discusses the concurrent Apple court case seeking decryption, and other similar legislation being proposed at the state and federal levels. The article argues that such measures are likely unconstitutional, but that they are also ineffective and impractical.</description></item><item><title>“Five Eyes” Governments Respond to Coalition Demands to Stop Undermining Encryption</title><link>/entries/five-eyes-governments-respond-to-coalition-demands-c670f1bb/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/entries/five-eyes-governments-respond-to-coalition-demands-c670f1bb/</guid><description>Authors: Cyphers, Bennett and Stepanovich, Amie
Published: October 2017
URL: https://www.accessnow.org/five-eyes-governments-respond-coalition-demands-stop-undermining-encryption/
Abstract: Status update on the Five Eyes governments&amp;rsquo; position on encryptionIn October of 2017, Amie Stepanovich and Bennett Cyphers of Access Now, wrote regarding the organization’s decision to join the more than 80 members of civil society from the “Five Eyes” countries in a letter calling on government leaders to protect strong encryption, and the responses received to date. The letter called for “an unequivocal rejection of laws, policies or other mandates or practices—including secret agreements with companies—that limit access to or undermine encryption and other secure communications tools and technologies.</description></item></channel></rss>